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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines aviation’s influence on German cultural and social 
history between 1908 and 1925. Before the First World War, aviation embodied one of 
many new features of a rapidly modernizing Germany. In response, Germans viewed 
flight as either a potentially transformative tool or a possible weapon of war. The 
outbreak of war in 1914 moved aviation away from its promised potential to its lived 
reality. In doing so, the airplane became a machine which compressed time and space, 
reordered the spatial arrangement of the battlefield, and transformed the human 
relationship with killing. Germany’s fliers initially served as observers, noting troop 
positions in the war’s opening weeks. As the Western Front transformed into static trench 
warfare, flight, in concert with photography, became a method of gathering intelligence. 
The camera also shaped the identity and iconography of the aviator both in public and in 
private photographs. Aviation created a privileged space for combat pilots to engage 
with, or ignore, the consequences of killing as aerial violence became commonplace. 
Killing, death, and superstition in the air were repackaged with older cultural tropes to 
render new violence knowable. The German general staff too, became increasingly 
obsessed with killing in the air, and this fascination fed a new system for understanding 
the air war. Germany’s regional divisions were also reflected in aviation and directly 
influenced both the composition of its air service and the machines issued to its pilots. 
Aviators were again privileged in their use of cultural markers to signpost individual, 
local, and national identities. The end of the war, however, shattered previous perceptions 
of war time, and left living aviators to struggle to make sense of a new present, while the 
nation’s lost fliers were repurposed for contradictory social and political ends. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation follows the cultural history of German aviation before, during, 
and immediately following the First World War. The advent of powered flight entered a 
complex historical narrative in Germany between 1908 and 1925. My research examines 
the ways in which powered flight was a disruptive experience for German aviators, and 
the ways those experiences were repurposed to produce the illusion of reassuring 
continuities in German popular culture. My work builds on previous histories of German 
social and cultural history written in the last quarter-century, while incorporating the 
influence of powered flight to elucidate both continuities and discontinuities within 
German culture. In doing so, I demonstrate the disruptive role that technology played in 
Germany, and how German culture responded to it. 
2017 marks the latter half of four years of centenary commemorations of the First 
World War. This period has witnessed an intense production of new historical research 
regarding the conflict and its broader consequences. Undoubtedly, this prodigious period 
of historical research will continue well after the anniversaries pass, and it is my hope 
that this dissertation contributes not only to the history of First World War aviation, but 
to the much wider historical questions being addressed in the current conversation.1 In 
addition to intervening in the historical question of the war’s wider consequences, my 
dissertation builds on the original request for a wider and culturally sophisticated history 
                                                     
1 The ongoing historiography of the First World War features works from a variety of methodological 
approaches, some of which inform my own research. See Ross Wilson, Landscapes of the Western Front: 
Materiality during the Great War (London: Routledge, 2012). See also, Birger Stichelbaut and Piet 
Chielens, The Great War Seen from the Air in Flanders Fields, 1914-1918 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2016).  
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of aviation, first made by James Hansen.2 The response to his call produced a body of 
literature focused on aviation’s social, cultural, economic, political, and military history. 
My dissertation contributes to this call by examining the ways in which powered flight 
shaped the culture of German aviators and how that relationship influenced broader 
cultural markers in German society. Consequently, my research employs multiple 
perspectives to go beyond considering flight from a strictly military or industrial 
standpoint, to examine the ripple effect of aviation across social, cultural, economic, 
gender, and geographic divides. My approach draws on the cultural traditions of the long 
nineteenth century.3 In doing so, I frame aviation as a technology that built on the rapidly 
shifting landscape of the previous century. In doing so, aviation created new discourses 
while drawing on older cultural markers to make a new paradigm knowable. 
Hansen’s call for a wider view of aviation sparked a vibrant historical 
conversation. Histories of powered flight were initially a one-sided monologue which 
focused exclusively on technical, mechanical, economic, or industrial narratives. These 
works included biographies on specific pilots, and almost always focused on fighter 
pilots who were famous during the war for their aerial exploits.4 Other authors produced 
histories of German squadrons during the First World War. Histories of these groups 
                                                     
2 See James Hansen, “Aviation History in the Wider View,” Technology and Culture. Vol 30, No. 3. (July., 
1989): 643-656. 
3 A substantial collection of works also informs my wider understanding of the First World War as a 
historical event. The most influential of these on my own research have been the following: See, Hew 
Strachan, The First World War (New York: Penguin Group, 2004). For an overview of the contested 
history of the First World War’s causes, see, Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: 
Controversies and Consensus (London :Pearson, 2002). See also, David Fromkin, Europe’s Last Summer: 
Who Started the Great War in 1914 (New York: Vintage Books, 2005). 
4 The body of literature encompassing biographies of aviators is truly enormous. See, Terry Treadwell and 
Alan Wood, German Fighter Aces of World War One (Stroud: Tempus Publishing, 2003) for an example of 
purely biographical information regarding pilots. Other biographies include Peter Kilduff, Richthofen: 
Beyond the Legend of the Red Baron (Leicester: Brockhampton Press, 2000). 
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concentrated solely on the daily military duties of these units and largely centered on 
fighter squadrons who achieved fame during the war.5 Aviation history’s conversation 
matured to bring pairs of historical entry points into dialogue with one another: military 
and industrial, aviators and nationalism, bodies and machines. John Morrow’s work on 
Germany’s aviation industry during the First World War represents one of the most 
exhaustive examinations of the relationship between the German war ministry, military 
planners, and the country’s embryonic aviation industry.6 Morrow’s research highlighted 
a complex ecosystem of political power plays, regional and industrial struggles for 
independence, and military planners grappling first to realize aviation’s potential and then 
desperately maximize it before losing the First World War. His work elucidated the 
complex nature of aviation and the advantages that a broader historical perspective had in 
telling a more nuanced story of powered flight during wartime. 
Beyond the research of John Morrow, historians began to place the narrative of 
aviation within a broader context. Robert Wohl, who published The Generation of 1914 
in 1979, examined the culture which shaped those who would fight in the Great War.7 
His next work, A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918 
placed aviation within broader cultural discourses.8 Wohl’s research, however, focused 
exclusively on high culture across Europe during the period. A Passion for Wings 
explored the way aviation shaped art movements, twentieth century poetry, and views of 
the landscape. His examination of military aviators focused, again, on fighter pilots who 
                                                     
5 See Norman Franks, Jasta Boelcke: The History of Jasta 2, 1916-18 (London: Grub Street 2004). 
6 See John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
7 Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).  
8 Robert Wohl, Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1994). 
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became “aces” during the conflict. Wohl’s work does, however, represent the rich 
historical narratives that can be created when placing aviation into a broader cultural 
context. Another important work that explored the influence of aviation on other 
discourses was Peter Fritzsche’s, A Nation of Fliers, which examined the ways aviation 
influenced both nationalism and modernism from the advent of the Zeppelin to the rise of 
the Third Reich, highlighting the immense power that aviation wielded in shaping the 
national discourse of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century.9 Fritzsche’s work 
has heavily influenced my own, but his focus was centered largely on the question of 
nationalism and the ways that powered flight reinforced nationalistic tendencies within 
Germany. My own research shows that Fritzsche’s assessment was correct, but that the 
discourse of aviation reached far beyond nationalism and modernism.  
More recent works examine German aviation over the course of both World 
Wars, and track a progression within the development of flight and its evolutionary 
effects on aviators. These narratives view man and machine melding into a unfeeling, 
fearless, cyborg-like creation, and see the fighter pilot of Nazi Germany as the epitome of 
a technological and philosophical progression that reached back to before the First World 
War.10 While I do not discount the argument that Nazism sought to perfect the fighter 
pilot as an example of the submission of technology to the German will, I do argue that 
the disruptive nature of First World War aviation must be viewed on its own terms. The 
consequences of powered flight in the first two decades of the twentieth century extended 
                                                     
9 See Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992). 
10 See Christian Kehrt, Moderne Krieger: Die Technikerfahrungen deutscher Militärpiloten: 1910-1945 
(Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010). 
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far beyond the confines of the military flier and militaristic discourse, and both reflected 
and influenced broader strands of German social and cultural history. Aviators too, were 
more nuanced and complicated beings than mere body and machine melding. Fliers often 
experienced an inherent tension between man and machine, and mechanical maladies and 
the hazards of operational duties meant that pilots and their observers often developed 
idiosyncrasies and superstitions in the belief that such practices would ensure survival. 
The wider experience of aviation too, which transmuted time and space, killing and 
death, memory and place, also influenced wider conversations within German culture. 
Christian Kehrt’s work raises important questions regarding aviation’s effects on 
the body. In particular, this dissertation examines the ways in which aviation was viewed 
as a fundamentally violent experience on the body. Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and 
Annette Becker’s work on violence in the First World War heralded a call to return to the 
history of the body in the study of warfare. In spite of a wealth of publications on the 
war’s military actions, few historical inquiries had examined war through the prism of the 
body and war’s consequences in the infliction of suffering. Their work 14-18, 
Understanding the Great War, revitalized interest in the manifestations of violence 
during the conflict and the way it shaped the experience of war on soldiers and civilians. 
The ramifications of violence were also reflected in Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau’s 
exploration of the discourse of war, as well as its effects on mourning.11 My research 
pursues this line of historical inquiry in regards to aviation. Through a close-source 
analysis of the private and public writings of aviators, as well as an exploration of the 
                                                     
11 See Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18 Understanding the Great War (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2000). 
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systems of knowledge that grew around the statistical tracking of aerial violence, a clear 
perception of aviation as both an intensely violent a differently violent space becomes 
clear.12 I also contend that aerial violence created privileged relationships with killing. 
Aerial crews assigned to reconnaissance and bombing duty viewed killing in an 
abstracted fashion, framed through the physical distance between them and their targets, 
as well as the discourse of their duties which was framed around terms like “sighting,” 
“observation,” “artillery ranging,” and “bombing.” In particular, the term “bombing” was 
abstracted not through the term, but through the object of the attack, which was almost 
always listed as an enemy position, rather than troops. For fighter pilots, the act of killing 
other aviators was credited as a “victory,” a term which always counted the number of 
aircraft brought down and not the people killed. This research then compliments the work 
done by historians of violence and the First World War, and adds a new contribution to 
the narrative of violence in the air. 
New systems of knowledge also resulted from expansion of aerial violence. While 
previous histories have engaged with the way the air war was fought, none have explored 
the types of knowledge produced by the German air service.13 As aviation technology 
improved to carry greater payloads and weapons, the ability to inflict violence increased. 
While the gathering of intelligence regarding enemy frontline positions was incredibly 
important, it was the rise of the fighter plane – designed to prevent enemy reconnaissance 
aircraft from reconnoitering German positions – that attracted ever greater attention. An 
                                                     
12 My third chapter explores the ways in which the physical placement of bodies both within aircraft and in 
the air created new relationships with killing. 
13 Again, John Morrow explores the structural history of the Luftstreitkräfte in German Air Power in World 
War I. See also, John Morrow, The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909-1921 (Washington 
D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).  
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examination of military reports and claim forms reveals the growing level of granular 
detail required by the German general staff. German aviators, after downing an enemy 
aircraft, were required to fill out a full report that not only detailed the events of their 
mission, and the type of enemy aircraft they brought down, but the serial number of the 
machine, the type of engine that powered it, and the serial number of the engine inside.14 
As the war continued, the reports to the Luftstreitkräfte general staff grew more and more 
interested in the exploits of fighter pilots like Boelcke and later, Manfred von Richthofen. 
As a result, the work of reconnaissance crews who were tasked with gathering 
intelligence continually receded into the background of the air war’s weekly reports. I 
interpret this phenomenon as a transition of focus on the part of the military hierarchy, 
away from the realistic goals of winning the war on the ground, and towards the ongoing 
technological arms race that presented the gratifying, if fanciful, notion of winning the 
war through superior technology.  
The work of these observation units has been overlooked by nearly every 
historian of the First World War. German units in particular, have received virtually no 
historical attention.15 My dissertation explores the role of the photographic camera in 
shaping the weaponization of both the airplane and photography. Aerial reconnaissance at 
the outbreak of the First World War was conducted by observers flying over enemy 
positions, often marking notations down on notepaper regarding the location and number 
of troops and potential strengths and weaknesses in the rapidly moving front lines of the 
                                                     
14 I explore these claim forms in full detail in my dissertation’s third chapter. 
15 Recent works are now examining the role of aerial photography in shaping the First World War. See 
Birger Stichelbaut and Piet Chielens, The Great War Seen from the Air in Flanders Fields, 1914-1918 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).  
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war’s early weeks. As the war on the Western Front solidified into a static conflict 
defined by trenches, the airplane’s importance only grew.16 While the photographic 
camera was not a new invention in 1914, it was soon miniaturized to the extent that it 
could be carried aloft. The high-resolution photographs captured by aerial observation 
units created an extraordinary level of delineation and detail, providing military 
intelligence officers with remarkable insight into the events on the Western Front. The 
camera, however, was also a weapon that served as a mode of defining and expressing 
individual identity, as observation crews frequently made use of on-site dark rooms to 
print personal photographs of friends, comrades, wartime surroundings, and the carnage 
and death of the war’s incredible violence.17 Thus, my research into these overlooked 
aerial squadrons reveals the manner in which aviation and photography intersected to 
shape the identities of Germany’s first generation of aviators, and provides a long-needed 
addition to the historiography of First World War aviation.  
Identity was not only a product of technology and war. German aviators were 
born in the in the latter half of the nineteenth. Consequently, the men who would serve as 
pilots and observers during the First World War experienced the rapid rate of 
technological change in Germany in a manner similar to their fellow countrymen. 
Aviators, then, did not come to the newness of the airplane as a blank canvas. Their 
identities were the product of their preconceived notions, biases, cultural and social 
                                                     
16 For more on the impact of the landscape in shaping the experiences of soldiers in the First World War, 
see Ross J. Wilson, Landscapes of the Western Front: Materiality during the Great War (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
17 The theoretical and methodological framework that informs much of my analysis of photography as a 
primary source comes from Dan Magilow, The Photography of Crisis: The Photo Essays of Weimar 
Germany (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012). 
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lineage, and education. As such, my dissertation examines Germany’s aviators, not as 
new heralds of a new and modern type of warrior, but from a holistic perspective that 
incorporates the influence of the long nineteenth century in shaping the Germans of the 
First World War.18  
Germany in 1900 was a newly unified nation in which regional identities still 
played an important role. The historiography on regionalism in Germany is one of the 
richest bodies of literature that influences my research. My dissertation is informed by the 
landmark studies produced by Abagail Green, Celia Applegate, and Alon Confino, 
among others.19 My research builds on these historical works to ask, in paraphrasing 
Alon Confino, how aviators “internalize the nation,” and how they then expressed that 
internalization.20  
Aviation, perhaps more than any other technology in Germany during the First 
World War, was directly affected by regional divisions within the country. In particular, 
the animosity between Bavaria and Prussia would have lasting and significant 
consequences regarding the quantity, type, and quality of aircraft that Bavarian aviators 
would use during much of the war. Here again, I draw on the industrial and military 
history of the conflict by John Morrow, who elucidates the political infighting between 
two kingdoms; Prussia who wanted complete control over the direction of Germany’s 
                                                     
18 See Helmut Walser Smith, The Continuities of German History: Nation, Religion, and Race across the 
Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
19 See, Abagail Green, German Home Towns: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century 
Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The 
German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1990). Alon Confino, The Nation as 
Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
20 Alon Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 
1871-1918 (Charlotte: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 9. 
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aviation industry, and Bavaria, who desperately sought to maintain the autonomy of its 
Royal Flying Corps.21 The consequences of regionalism are found in my primary sources, 
which highlight the poor quality of some Bavarian aircraft in the early years of the war. 
The influence of the long nineteenth century and lingering cultural echoes of the decades 
preceding the First World War are also apparent in the ways aviators expressed regional 
and national identity. Here the role of Heimat culture, so eloquently explored by Confino, 
appears in the photographs and journals of aviators, who express an intense and 
emotional sentimentality with the landscape, and who, through the privilege of being 
billeted far from the Front, could erect structures which embodied both national and 
regionally specific cultural signposts.22 My research adds to a branch of historiography 
that examines the ways in which the war was experienced in different regions in 
Germany.23  
When moving from the confines of the Western Front to more distant territories, 
German aviators tended to express their identity in broader, more nationalistic terms. My 
exploration of the experience of a Bavarian reconnaissance squadron in Palestine 
highlights the way that technology shaped the process of “othering” local populations in 
                                                     
21 John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 29-
31. 
22 See Part Two of Alon Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and 
National Memory, 1871-1918 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997).  Germany’s 
regional educational system also played a role in shaping the mentalities of Germany’s aviators. For the 
differences between school textbooks in Germany, see Katherine Kennedy, “Visual Representation and 
National Identity in the Elementary Schoolbooks of Imperial Germany,” Paedagogica Historica, 36:1, 235. 
23 See, Benjamin Ziemann, War Experiences in Rural Germany: 1914-1923 (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2007). See also, Roger Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany, Freiburg, 
1914-1918. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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foreign territory.24 The squadron, 304b “Pasha,” as it was named, faced the daunting task 
of moving hundreds of men, aircraft, and tons of materiel from the airfields of Munich to 
the deserts of the Middle East. Even in the daily correspondence of military supply 
officers, the othering of Palestine is apparent in the tone and content of their messages. In 
such a harsh environment, where aircraft regularly crashed on landing, where engines and 
equipment consistently failed due to dust and sand, and where aviators rotated home due 
to sickness and injury, German notions of intellectual and racial superiority appear in the 
squadron records. Thousands of miles from Germany, the airmen of 304b held to the 
belief that they were superior to the people they encountered. They subsequently viewed 
the environment as inherently dangerous and filled with potential disease, and their 
commanders contended that they were fighting a defensive war, even while occupying 
foreign land far from home. The narrative constructed in the documents of 304b confirms 
the powerful influence of lingering strains of racism that continued in its most virulent 
form the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.25 
Perhaps, most fundamentally, aviation disrupted perceptions of time. Powered 
flight during the First World War divided the experience of time in a manner best 
described by the Greek terms chronos and kairos.26 Aviation revolutionized the ability to 
                                                     
24 For an analysis of the process of differentiating populations, I draw from Johnathan Smith, “What a 
Difference a Difference Makes, in To See Ourselves as Others See Us: Christians, Jews, “Others” in Late 
Antiquity, ed. Jacob Neusner and Ernest Freichs (Chico: Scholars Press, 1985). 
25 See Hew Strachan, The First World War, and, Kristian Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle 
East (London: Hurst & Company, 2014). 
26 Several works inform my interpretation of chronos and kairos. See Phillip Sipiora and James Baumlin, 
ed, Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2002). See Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008). See, “Chronos and Kairos” in John Spencer Hill, Infinity, Faith, and 
Time: Christian Humanism and Renaissance Literature (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1997). 
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cross vast distances in remarkably short periods of time. As a result, the advent of the 
airplane compressed the perception of time and space, shrinking both considerably. As 
the First World War’s aerial component evolved, the rapid development of the airplane 
further compressed the perception of time among Germany’s aviators. The dizzying rate 
of progress contracted conceptions of generational differences among airmen born within 
a few years of one another. Suddenly a member of the “old” guard could meet a “new” 
airman who was the same age, yet the differences in their experience of technology and, 
consequently, their perception of time, were dramatically different. My research into the 
question of time and space builds on a long legacy of historiography that has examined 
the question from multiple perspectives, but which has yet to apply these methodologies 
to the question of First World War aviation.27 A close examination of the experience of 
German aviators reveals a sense of expertise that grew the longer individual fliers were in 
service and survived. Aviation too, provided a rigid and regimented sense of chronos 
time, with patrols measured in morning, afternoon, and evening events. Aerial violence 
punctuated these passing chronological moments with heighted moments of decision, or 
kairos time. The ending of the war fundamentally broke this sense of time and for some 
aviators, the continuation of violence in Germany’s uprisings in 1919 and 1920 was 
indicative of a war that never ended in 1918.28  
Aviation also affected the role of memory in making sense of German defeat. The 
                                                     
27 See Stephen Kern. The Culture of Space and Time: 1880-1918. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1983). See also, Monica Black. “Miracles in the Shadow of the Economic Miracle: The “Supernatural '50s” 
in West Germany.” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 84, No. 4. (December, 2012). See also, Peter 
Merriman, Mobility, Space and Culture (London: Routledge, 2012).  
28 For more on post war Germany, see Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993).  
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role of memory in shaping the experience of war for subsequent generations has been 
explored in previous works, such as The Great War and Modern Memory.29 This work 
was vitally important in shaping contextualizing memory’s role in shaping meaning 
within cultural events, and the degree to which memory is malleable and fallible. While 
powered flight was expressly prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles, the memory of 
aviation and the role of aviators in the conflict played an important part in finding 
meaning within the incomprehensible loss of the war. Long dead aviators like Manfred 
von Richthofen, who perished in the spring of 1918, were exhumed and reburied in 
Berlin.30 While their bodies were reburied, the meaning and the significance of their lives 
were repurposed to serve other social, cultural, and ideological means. Thus, the 
experience of aviation during the First World War continued to exert influence over the 
course of events in the 1920s and 30s. 
Finally, aviation represents a branch within the wider history of technology. The 
study of the history of technology often raises the methodological question, does 
technology drive history?31 In response to this, my dissertation examines the ways in 
which human beings respond to the changes brought by technology and how those 
responses shape and define the historical narrative in the immediate, and long term 
aftermath. Aviation during the First World War was a disruptive technology that worked 
within the defining point of rupture of the twentieth century. That point of disruption, 
                                                     
29 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 
30 I derive much of the theoretical and methodological foundation for my exploration into the deaths of 
aviators and the social and cultural meaning of their loss from Monica Black, Death in Berlin: From 
Weimar to Divided Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
31 Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, ed. Does Technology Drive History: The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994). 
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embedded within a seismic and traumatic rupture, has contributed to its 
underdevelopment as a subject of historical analysis. 
The airplane straddles a fascinating and challenging historical divide. It is at once 
both forward looking and rearward glancing. The very materials of powered flight in the 
First World War, that of wood and canvas and wire, can trace their origins back to ship 
building of the middle ages.32 Powering that ancient frame was the driving motor of the 
twentieth century, the gasoline powered engine. The material culture of flight embodied a 
border between past and future. Within that framework, the culture of the long nineteenth 
century and the expectations of the twentieth emerged through a remarkably elastic and 
disruptive mode of technical, social, personal, and cultural expression. Aviation also does 
not always follow a linear progression of improvement, as many First World War fliers 
unfortunately discovered. While focused on a very different area of research, I borrow 
from the methodology in the work of Donald MacKenzie.33 MacKenzie examines the 
language of accuracy that built up around the use of nuclear weapons. He finds that, 
despite the fact that a nuclear missile would devastate thousands of square kilometers 
around its intended target, defense contractors obsessed over creating missiles that were 
accurate to within a few meters of its target. MacKenzie uncovers the discourse of 
technological improvement and the questions that arise around it. I draw similar 
conclusions in this dissertation and have found numerous instances when a supposedly 
                                                     
32 Curiously, although specifically directed at locating the longer roots of the discourse that formed much of 
the conversation around the First World War, aviation’s medieval iconography remained unexamined even 
in works focused on the topic. See, Stefan Gobel, The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, 
Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
33 Donald MacKenzie. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance. 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990). 
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“better” airplane – deemed so because of having a bigger engine or a better rate of climb 
– does not manifest itself as an improvement in the hands of an aviator. This adds to the 
literature that problematizes the perceived evolution of technology as one of consistent 
and relentless improvement. 
Culture shapes technology, and humans are also subsequently shaped by the 
technology they create. The history of powered flight in the first decades of the twentieth 
century offers a powerful example of both of these processes. In other words, the aircraft 
is not only a tool or a technological revolution, it is a source that can be read and 
interpreted and contextualized as an artifact from the period. Aviation measured the 
abilities of men. My engagement with this question derives from Michael Adas’ work, 
Machines as the Measure of Men, which examines the role of technology in shaping the 
narrative of Western dominance on the global stage.34 In perusing this approach, it is a 
clear that aviation at the dawn of the twentieth century valued the worth of the machine 
over human life. At first, the dictates of engineering - that of creating a craft as light as 
possible - pushed the machine above the man in the hierarchy of value. War took this 
relationship and elevated that hierarchy to a previously unimagined degree of inhumanity. 
His body was placed between fuel tanks and flammable material with no means of 
escape. Aviation then, created an inherent tension point between the man and machine. 
While the developmental arc of the airplane during the war privileged the mechanical 
necessities of the machine, German fliers, as well as German culture, created an 
                                                     
34 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
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extraordinary sense of entitled privilege around aviators.35 
To counteract the devaluation of the self, German aviators in particular, cultivated 
an exaggerated sense of personal agency and self-expression. They painted their 
machines in personal colors and often incorporated iconography that was deeply rooted in 
regional histories and individual identities. They wrote in private diaries and published 
autobiographies as an avenue of self-expression. They created art and poetry as yet 
another means of marking themselves and their place within the community of aviators. 
These modes of self-expression, of asserting the individual as important, provides a 
different view from that of the troops serving in the mud of the trenches. Unlike soldiers, 
aviators were actively encouraged to express the self as they operated within a system 
that organized violence and knowledge in a manner that not only condoned exaggerated 
expressions of self-assertion over war, but actively encouraged it. A rapturous, often 
conservative demographic of the public, waited eagerly to consume stories and images of 
Germany’s First World War fliers, who were often labeled as noble knights of the air. 
Aviation, of course, was not knightly, nor was it noble. Popular narratives of the 
period also ignored a massive demographic within the community of German fliers. Two-
seater crews, tasked with the inglorious task of photographing the lunar landscape of the 
Western Front have been all but invisible in German aviation history, largely because 
they were invisible during the war. These crews, who did not pilot nimble, attractive 
scout aircraft but rather climbed aboard large, slow, lumbering “barges,” were never 
                                                     
35 For a discussion on the First World War and consequences of modernism on culture, see Modris 
Eksteins, The Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 2000). 
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given the agency of their fighter pilot comrades.36 Their daily work formed the backbone 
of military intelligence but, within the weekly reports of the German Air Service, they 
were completely overshadowed by the exploits of fighter pilots. In other words, they 
were invisible from the record because they were all but invisible to both the state and 
popular culture. These crews, however, also sought to express a sense of identity and did 
so within largely ignored mediums. Squadron photographs and newspapers reflected both 
the humor and the strain expressed by aviators in these difficult jobs.37 Squadron 
newspapers mirrored the production of newspapers by soldiers on the ground. Trench 
newspapers, which were produced in massive numbers due to the static nature of the 
Western Front, have been the topic of new research. I also draw on this new avenue of 
historical investigation. As part of a resurgence of the social and cultural history of 
modern warfare, these documents, which were utterly overlooked by historians for 
decades, reveal a very different side of war. These papers show us that where women are 
far more present near the front than soldiers letters home reveal. It shows us the 
mentalities of those who fight and, most importantly for this dissertation, show us the 
degree to which German soldiers, fighting on foreign soil, went to rationalize their war as 
one of defense.  
German aviators and German culture, then, presents a fascinating opportunity to 
examine the influence of technological change and disruption. The nation’s regionalized 
education system, its recent formation as a unified country, its ongoing and dynamic 
                                                     
36 Before he became a fighter pilot, Rudolf Berthold was part of one of these crews and frequently referred 
to his machine as a “barge,” denoting its massive size. See, Rudolf Berthold, Personal Diary, MSG2-10722. 
Freiburg Bundesarchiv.   
37 See Robert L. Nelson, German Soldier Newspapers of the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
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conversation around regional and national questions of identity and what those identities 
would look like, and the historical legacy of older social and cultural markers, make it an 
ideal testbed to examine the ways in which aviation disrupted both new social 
conversations and older traditions and cultural norms. In doing so, this dissertation 
contributes to a broader conversation that examines the ways that technology shapes 
culture, and how culture shapes technology. 
 
Commentary on Source Material 
My dissertation takes advantage of a rich and diverse document collection that 
includes published sources, squadron records, personal photo albums, and private diaries. 
These sources provide a fascinating dichotomy to works produced in the aftermath of the 
conflict. Given the social and political upheaval in Germany immediately following the 
First World War, no official history of the conflict’s aerial component was recorded, 
although individuals within the Luftstreitkräfte endeavored to write their personal 
accounts of Germany’s air war. Popular works of semi-fictional autobiographies 
permeated the German book market in the late 1920s and early 30s but these too are 
somewhat problematic sources.38 Consequently, I am mindful of my analysis of more 
problematic sources, most notably, the published autobiography of Manfred von 
Richthofen during the First World War. Richthofen’s account was always meant for 
public consumption and the process of writing his book is not particularly well known. 
Therefore, rather than approach Richthofen’s story as an accurate and unvarnished 
                                                     
38 These works, however, do provide a fascinating case study into what popular audiences expected from a 
book about a flier’s experiences in the First World War. 
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account of his experiences, I explore his writing from the perspective of authorial intent. 
In other words, what did Manfred von Richthofen want his audience to see and perceive 
regarding the air war? In asking those questions, I was able to find illuminating 
perspectives on aviation during the conflict.  
My dissertation draws on archival material from the Deutsches Museum as well as 
the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv: Kriegsarchiv, located in Munich. The Deutsches 
Museum provided a wealth of background knowledge in First World War aviation and, 
notably, houses the private photo and scrap book albums of German aviators. Most 
notably, the museum has the photo album of Peter Supf, a German aerial observer who 
wrote extensively about the history of the German air service in the First World War. His 
album chronicles his experiences from mobilization in 1914 until the end of 1917 and 
provides a unique opportunity to employ close source analysis on photographic material. 
The Bavarian War Archive houses the squadron records of several units, including fighter 
squadrons on the Western Front. Most interestingly, the archive is home to the complete 
archival record of Bavarian reconnaissance unit 304b, which served in Palestine, along 
with the personal files of its commanding officer, Franz Walz.  
The Bundesarchiv in Freiburg, contained thousands of pages of military 
documents from the First World War, including hundreds of pages of correspondence and 
reports within the Fliegertruppe and the Luftstreitkräfte. Of the most interest to my 
research, Freiburg contains the private war diary of Rudolf Berthold, whose writing 
provides remarkable insight into the first-hand experiences of a German aviator who was 
profoundly changed by his experiences in the First World War. Berthold’s diary was 
never published and, subsequently, it has remained an underutilized historical source. I 
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also employ the weekly reports to the general staff of the air service, as well as the 
personal files of other German aviators like Ernst Heß, whose career is documented from 
his education at Gymnasium up to the telegram notifying his mother of his death in aerial 
combat in December, 1917. Finally, I also make use of historical spaces, most notably the 
airfield located outside of Munich, called Oberschleißheim. The airfield was home to the 
Royal Bavarian Flying Corps during the First World War and, with the archival research 
of the Deutsches Museum, has been rebuilt to model its Great War appearance. 
First World War aviation history in Germany is also challenging in another 
respect. Many of the aviators who served during the conflict later joined the National 
Socialist Party and many who died before the war ended were rebranded as “good 
Nazis.” While my dissertation’s period of examination ends in 1925, many of the aviators 
I explore in this work later followed a dark political path. Many of the aviators who 
survive the war either became National Socialists or were sympathetic to the cause of 
Nazism. The importance of these political and social trajectories cannot be ignored or 
underestimated, and as such, I track, wherever possible, the future events in the lives of 
the aviators I examine. The ramifications of these political choices could easily form a 
dissertation unto itself. My primary question, however, is focused on how aviation 
technology disrupted social and cultural practices before the First World War, and how 
those disruptions continued during and immediately after the conflict. To fully elucidate 
those disruptions, I narrowed my focus to view aviation as a new technology within a 
lived present, rather than a harbinger of events a generation later. Consequently, I have 
limited the scope of my dissertation to the central and driving question of how technology 
disrupts social and cultural practices in Germany before, during, and immediately 
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following the First World War in order to address a significant and important gap in the 
existing literature.  
Chapter Organization 
My dissertation is organized into five chapters which explore the different ways 
that aviation shaped German history between 1908 and 1925. Chapter One explores the 
social and cultural conversations surrounding German society as the nineteenth century 
gave way to the twentieth. Germany was a dynamic, new, and uncertain society 
exploding with industrial capacity and echoing the sentiments of the rest of Europe in its 
desire to expand its empires across the globe. Within that dynamic environment, the 
image of powered flight captivated the German popular imagination and baffled its 
leaders and military planners.  
Chapter Two examines the transformative influence of photography on aviators 
and aviation. Former Hauptmann Georg Neumann noted in his post-war history of the 
First World War’s aerial conflict, “it is more than doubtful if the airplane would ever 
have attained such importance as a means of attack and a decisive factor in warfare if the 
Great War had continued as an open campaign, and consequently ended in a short 
time.”39 The stagnant nature of the war, combined with the miniaturization of 
photographic technology coincided to give the embryonic airplane extraordinary agency. 
The airplane, which could not effectively bomb enemy positions in the early months of 
the conflict suddenly became a vital intelligence gathering device to military planners and 
strategists. The camera too, became a mode of self-expression as reconnaissance crews 
                                                     
39 Georg Paul Neumann, Die Deutschen Luftstreitkräfte in Weltkrieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920). 
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frequently made use of squadron dark rooms to develop images of friends and comrades. 
The portable camera allowed fliers to create albums documenting the conflict from 
formation to armistice. Here too, fliers were a privileged class, having access to the mode 
and mean of creating and storing photographs during an ongoing conflict. 
Chapter Three investigates the ways in which aviators understood and 
experienced violence from a privileged space. The airplane transformed the ways in 
which violence and suffering could be inflicted on the human body. The very experience 
of flight, that of exposing flesh and bone to previously unexperienced height and speed, 
was viewed as an inherently violent experience, one that imposed suffering even in the 
best of conditions. The nature of flight, that of operating structurally unstable machinery 
with no means of escape, also meant that flight could kill the aviator at any moment. 
Violence in the air expanded beyond the mere act of flying at altitude to include the 
ability to inflict pain and suffering on other bodies in other aircraft. The advent of 
machine guns allowed hostile fliers to open fire at one another and created a more direct 
means of inflicting and suffering violence. An entire system of gathering knowledge 
grew around the concept of shooting down other aircraft and, as a result, gave rise to a 
spoils system which actively encouraged this destruction over all other aerial activity. 
Eventually, the specter of shooting down enemy machines in ever greater numbers 
blinded even military planners to the original and most important requirement of military 
flight - that of winning the war on the ground. Consequently, aviators, through the 
attention paid to killing in the air, and to the privileged way that act was valued, viewed 
their actions as more important than others. Consequently, I explore the ways in which 
aviators experienced killing from an intensely privileged perspective. 
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Chapter Four explores the ways aviation served as a means of expressing and 
understanding regional and national identity. Germany’s recent unification meant that its 
regional kingdoms still sought active means of maintaining autonomy. Bavaria is the 
strongest example of the consequences of regional autonomy within the larger Reich. Its 
stubborn determination to keep its air service independent led its military planners to 
make disastrous decisions regarding the construction and procurement of military 
aircraft. The dependence on local factories created a situation where aviators in Bavarian 
squadrons received under-performing or outright dangerous machines. The lived 
consequences of this decision were spelled out in the diary of German aviators like 
Rudolf Berthold, who nearly lost his life in a crash at the controls of a poorly made 
Bavarian copy of a French aircraft. Regional identity was also embedded in the 
mentalities of aviators, and placed within a larger, more flexible discourse of national 
Heimat culture. By examining the roots of these regional narratives, a clearer picture of 
the world views of Germany’s aviators comes to light. Those views shaped their 
perception of the war and had very concrete consequences in how they framed and made 
sense of their role in the conflict. Again, the role of privilege shapes the experience of the 
aviator, providing them the space, time, and means to build expressions of regional and 
national identity at the front.  
The latter half of this chapter takes the lessons of regional identity and 
extrapolates those traits to the Middle East, where Bavarian reconnaissance units served 
in Palestine during the conflict. Here we see the outward projection, not of regional 
identity, but broader tropes of German nationalism in an alien land. The conclusion then, 
is that regional identity serves to differentiate populations in like-area lands like the 
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Western Front, whereas truly foreign lands tends to impel populations to reach back to 
find national traits to reinforce their sense of self. Even the military planning documents 
of squadrons like 304b “Pascha” were imbedded with German nationalism, racism, and a 
heightened sense of superiority over the local populations where they would serve. 
My final chapter examines the ways in which aviation influenced the very 
perception of time and space, as well as memory and mourning. Aviation fundamentally 
transformed the human relationship to time, an accessing the ways in which time was 
perceived by aviators has remained historically challenging. To access both the 
regimented sense of time created by military aviation, as well as the heightened moments 
of fear and peril, I employ ancient Greek concepts of time, through the prism of chronos 
and kairos to fundamentally change how fliers understood time. Military aviation 
provided a regimentation and structure to time: morning, afternoon, and evening sorties 
framed their days, weeks, months, and years of service. It also contributed to the chronos 
of monotony of time dragging on. Aerial violence broke this sense of continuity with 
heightened moments of kairos, of moments of decision that ultimately resulted in life or 
death experiences. This sense of time is expressed both in public and private writings, as 
well as photographs of the period. The chapter then expands beyond the time of the living 
to the realm of the dead. Aviators again were privileged in the realm of loss - where 
squadrons went to extraordinary lengths to recover lost pilots to give them a proper burial 
- an experience not shared by their counterparts on the ground. The end of the war and 
the banning of flight within the country broke the continuity of war time and, for some, 
created a sense that the war never ended. As chaos and violence overwhelmed German 
society immediately after the war, many of its aviators took the streets to continue a fight 
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that seemed to extend into perpetuity.  
It is the goal of this dissertation to fulfill the need to expand the history of 
aviation, not merely as a technological tool, but as a force that shaped cultural 
conversations within society. Technology fundamentally altered the course of the 
twentieth century and changed the ways human beings interacted with, perceived, and 
ultimately shaped the physical world around them. Aviation in particular collapsed space 
and time, redefined central aspects of warfare, altered the human relationship with 
violence, and provided an elastic mode of expression to redefine meaning and memory 
during and after the First World War. The ongoing questions of how new technology 
shapes society and culture continue into our own present, and serves only to further 
highlight the importance of studying the ramifications of technology in shaping the 
defining moments of the past. How did Germans perceive aviation? How did they 
experience it? How did aviators view themselves and the world around them, and how 
did the world of the nineteenth century inform those living on the apex of technological 
change in the twentieth? 
Our story begins before the First World War, as aviation entered a wider 
conversation regarding what the German Kaiserreich would represent. 
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CHAPTER ONE: PRE-WAR VISIONS 
 
Figure 1. Photo of Paul Engelhard over Johannisthal airfield. Source: Bild 146-1972-026-35, Bundesarchiv, 
Berlin. 
 
Introduction 
Few images capture the disruptive moment of aviation’s arrival better than the 
photograph of Paul Emil Engelhard lifting off over Johannisthal airfield, outside of 
Berlin, on August 12, 1910. In that instant, captured for posterity, Engelhard, 
accomplished something that few humans had at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Climbing aboard a Wright Flyer, similar to the type that lifted off from the sands of Kitty 
Hawk, North Carolina seven years earlier, Engelhard took to the air from the site that 
would become the nexus of flight in Germany.1 As he lifted off that morning, a camera 
captured his image within a scene intended to foreshadow the technological and cultural 
dichotomy of the young century. In the foreground, an officer sits on horseback, 
                                                     
1 Photo, Bild 146-1972-026-35, Bundesarchiv, Berlin.  
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resplendent in a cape as he looks on at the rising airplane. The image neatly telegraphs 
the intention of the photographer who captured it. Within the frame we see an instant 
where a passing age and its coming replacement intersect. It is also telling, perhaps, that 
we know the name of the pilot, yet the officer in the foreground remains anonymous. In 
that moment, that officer represents both the status and class of his forebears, reflecting 
the role of nobility over previous centuries. The airplane rising above him, showcases a 
new kind of nobleman - the technologically able airman.  
Just fifteen days later, Engelhard’s photo appeared on the cover of Flight 
magazine. The publication described itself as the “First Aero Weekly in the World: A 
Journal devoted to the Interests, Practice, and Progress of Aerial Locomotion and 
Transport.”2 What made the appearance of Engelhard’s photo all the more fascinating, 
was that Flight was a magazine based in the United Kingdom, not Germany. In that 
instant, Engelhard’s photo embodied the degree to which his country had grown in 
importance on the European aviation stage, as well as the transcendent power of aviation 
to capture the popular imagination across national borders. As his Wright Flyer passed by 
the nameless officer below, Engelhard’s flight represented yet another small step within a 
rapidly changing world of scientific and technological development, one that left those on 
the ground, both literally and metaphorically, behind. Even Flight’s tagline represented 
the inability of contemporary language to capture the transformational moment it 
witnessed, referring to powered flight as “aerial locomotion.”  
A century after Engelhard’s flight, the machines which defined aviation’s 
                                                     
2 Uncredited, Picture on front cover of magazine, Flight, August 1910. 
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development in the decade before 1914 hang suspended from the vaulted ceilings of the 
Deutsches Museum in Munich, Germany. Like dinosaurs from another age, these 
airplanes little resemble their modern counterparts - wood, canvas now yellowed with 
age, and rough wires form the skeletons of pre-war European aviation. Until the last three 
decades, the field of aviation history has largely paralleled these static displays of 
powered flight’s past. Previous works have concerned themselves predominantly with the 
technical development of the airplane itself, and with the biographical storylines of the 
field’s most important designers and fliers. The influence of aviation on broader cultural 
experiences for both aviators and the wider population, has been far less examined.3 
Following the call for wider cultural and social histories of aviation’s development and 
its effects, newer works began to look at the ways flight informed discourses of 
nationalism and high culture.4 While the subject has been examined from these 
perspectives, an approach that follows aviation’s influence through multiple perspectives 
within society, presents an opportunity to holistically view the impact of flight on 
Germany at a pivotal moment in its history. In particular, aviation both alleviated and 
contributed to, heighted anxieties in Germany about the direction of the nation and how 
the advent and propagation of new technologies would impact its culture, its politics, and 
in some discourses, even the very soul of the nation.5  
The creation and subsequent development of aviation did not occur in a vacuum. 
                                                     
3 See, James Hansen, “Aviation History in the Wider View.” Technology and Culture 30 (1989): 643-656. 
4 See Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992). See also, Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western 
Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
5 I draw partly from the theories posited by Peter Merriman in his examination of transportation 
technologies on wider culture in England. See Peter Merriman, Mobility, Space and Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2012).  
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Rather, flight entered a much wider cultural conversation in Germany during the decade 
preceding the First World War. Questions regarding national identity, the role of a newly 
defined “youth” demographic, and ongoing tensions between imperial and counter-
culture, were dynamic and ongoing when flight entered the German cultural 
consciousness. The ripple effect from aviation expanded to conceptions of regional and 
national landscapes, as well as urban and rural life.  
The airplane was also an amorphous technological promise; it sparked utopic 
imaginations and incurred harsh ridicule.6 It represented both the youthful German nation 
and older imperial ambitions. It troubled military planners and confused much of the 
general staff.7 It was utterly missed by a Kaiser dedicated to promoting “science, 
technology, and culture.”8 It was exemplified as a magical, utterly irresistible force for a 
young generation of engineers and it typified a burgeoning new field of business for the 
old guard. Powered flight was a remarkably elastic force for social and cultural 
expression – one which ultimately reflected the proclivities, anxieties, and biases of the 
individual viewing it. It also created new spaces for expression. It absorbed values and 
norms, and transcended them. The rise of early aviation in the decade before the First 
World War also sparked a flurry of futurist predictions - of the world that aviation could 
create and shape.9 Visions of transcontinental flight rested uncomfortably alongside more 
                                                     
6 For more on the transnational promise of flight, See Steven Kern, The Culture of Space and Time: 1880-
1918 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). Some elements of the German popular press ridiculed 
aviation in the years before the First World War. I will analyze these depictions of aviation in Jugend 
magazine further in this chapter. 
7 For a detailed description of the ways military planners failed to realize the import of powered flight, see 
John Morrow, The Great War in the Air (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993). 
8 Matthew Jefferies, Imperial Culture in Germany: 1871-1918 (London: Palgrave, 2003), 218. 
9 Writers of popular fiction created dystopic visions of the perils of militarized flight. See H.G. Wells, The 
War in the Air (London: George Bell & Sons, 1908). 
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pessimistic visions of a world wracked by warfare, replete with the visage of Zeppelins 
bombing cities and killing millions. From its inception, aviation housed an inherent 
tension - one of new nationalistic visions and transnational aspirations. The airplane then, 
proved to be a remarkably disruptive force within German culture between 1908 and 
1914, when the world of prediction would collide with the reality of war. 
 
Germany in 1900 
In order to understand the degree to which aviation acted as an agent of 
disruption, it must be placed within the wider context of German culture at the turn of the 
twentieth century. German culture in 1900 represented more than a discourse of 
nationalism or the movements of high culture. It embodied a myriad of perspectives and a 
multiplicity of conversations built around questions of national identity, the promise and 
peril of industrialism, the implications of modernity, the role of empire, defining gender, 
and expressing regionality. Cultural conversations are also experienced at a particular 
tempo, and this complex discourse was placed within the widely-expressed sensation that 
time and space were collapsing ever further with each passing day.10  
It is curious, then, given the significance of the changing perception of space and 
time within German culture of the period, that aviation has remained unexamined 
historically. The airplane as a historical topic, has largely been overlooked from the 
larger perspective of a world of rapid, even dizzying change. As a result, the development 
of aviation in the decade before the First World War has largely been viewed as an 
                                                     
10 The influence of modernity on the human perception of space and time was elucidated by Stephen Kern. 
See, Steven Kern, The Culture of Time and Space (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).   
  31 
isolated moment, placed in a contrasting world that existed before and after the 
realization of powered flight. In reality, the airplane takes its place amid a much larger 
and more sophisticated conversation and must be viewed in a much longer discourse of 
technological revolutions that fundamentally altered European perceptions of space and 
time. The development of the steam engine, the capturing and harnessing of electrical 
power, fueled transformations that changed not only the physical landscape, but the 
psychological world of millions of people as well.11 The airplane continued both an 
ongoing nineteenth century conversation regarding the role of technology in shaping 
society, while simultaneously transforming that conversation into something altogether 
different.  
Contextualizing aviation within these wider terms has, until recently, proved 
difficult for historians on the subject.12 One of the challenges has been a paucity of 
research on the specific cultural moments within the period of the Kaiserreich. While 
Weimar and the culture of Hitler’s Third Reich have, justifiably, received significant 
historical attention, the Imperial culture of the Kaiserreich has attracted far less 
investigation. This is partly the consequence of far larger historical shadows cast by 
subsequent generational moments in German history. Those later moments highlight the 
difficulty of contextualizing the period as a moment that was experienced in a lived 
                                                     
11 For the influence of rail travel on culture, see Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The 
Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 
1986). 
12 Conversely, historians who have examined aviation from a wider perspective have typically chosen one 
particular lens to such an investigation. For example, aviation has been viewed to its influence on high art 
or nationalism. See Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). See also, Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings: Aviation and 
the Western Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).  
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present. Finally, historians must grapple with the challenge of understanding German 
culture within the paradigm of a relatively new German nation, and the multiplicity of 
cultural conversations which constructs its broader discourse.  
To begin contextualizing German culture in this period, we begin by unpacking 
the discourse of Imperial culture, which attempted to exert influence over much of 
German national life. As Matthew Jefferies correctly asserts, this approach is useful for 
several reasons.13 First, the discourse of the Empire did not exist on the periphery but 
rather, informed the culture of a rapidly expanding middle-class in the German Reich. 
Second the relative youth of the newly formed “German Empire” of 1871 meant that, 
unlike older and more established nations, the culture emanating from the Kaiserreich 
largely fueled the conversation of what Germany was, what it represented, and what 
intellectual, social, and cultural ideas it embodied. This approach is also useful in 
elucidating that practical manner in which the German Empire operated within a formal, 
legal construct. The decision of those leading the newly constituted Empire to place the 
finance and subsequent control of the arts, education, and religion firmly within the 
jurisdiction of the various states within the Empire, had a direct impact on the 
development of German culture in a highly localized manner. Finally, this approach 
begins the process of recognizing the implications of Germany’s broader history, while 
realizing the Kaiserreich as a historical moment that existed in a dynamic and lived 
present. 
The “unification of Germany” in 1871 then, is perhaps a misnomer. German 
                                                     
13 Matthew Jefferies, Imperial Culture in Germany: 1871-1918 (London: Palgrave, 2003), 11. 
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society at the close of the nineteenth century teetered as a powerful yet highly factious 
society, one that often seemed perilously close to the verge of social meltdown.14 The 
causes for these divisions were multiple and interconnected. Jefferies posits that regional, 
confessional, gender, urban-rural, and class all provided points of intense friction within 
German culture. The Empire, as it existed at the turn of the century, was a society pulled 
by a multiplicity of tensions. One point of friction fell along confessional boundaries, 
with an overwhelmingly Christian society split along Catholic and Protestant fault lines 
of 62% Protestant and 36% Catholic.15 Jefferies notes too, that population density also 
played a significant role in defining confessional distinctions. Despite Southern 
Germany’s largely Catholic population, it remained outnumbered by Catholics in the 
more densely populated region of Prussia. Urban and rural differences also shaped 
opinions on the German Empire. Despite booming industrial growth, Germany largely 
remained what Jefferies called “an empire of small towns.” Gender too, played a 
significant role, one that surely colored men’s perspectives on women. Even by 
nineteenth century standards, Germany was a remarkably patriarchal society, with 
women all but barred from public life. Their role was summed up, uncomfortably, in the 
motto of the period, “Kinder, Küche, Kirche,” (children, kitchen, church).16 Sexual 
discrimination was widely prevalent, with the severity of such discrimination, in public at 
least, defined largely by class and wealth.  
Regional differences provide perhaps the most concrete examples of friction 
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points within German society. That said, regional identity must be understood 
contextually, as a historical force which fractured German society, but one that should 
not be overstated.17 While the stinging defeats of 1866 left long standing resentments 
between Prussia and its southern neighbors, regional identity is one of the most fluid 
categories of self-interpretation, and one of the most susceptible to change over time.18 
The Empire attempted to smooth over regional chasms through the cultivation of a 
Heimat culture, one that viewed a pastoral, often nostalgic look at Germany was a 
unifying feature among all Germans. Heimat, was originally viewed by historians in the 
past, as an anti-modern movement; one which eschewed industrial and technological 
revolutions as damaging to the quiet, pastoral pace of life in the German countryside.19 
Alon Confino, however, finds important delineations in the interpretation of Heimat 
culture in the early years of the twentieth century. With industrialism’s ascendency a 
seemingly unstoppable force, Confino finds a Heimat culture that readily embraced the 
rise of progress narratives. A 1914 Heimat publication from the town of Heidenheim, 
describes the co-existence of rural tranquility and modern industrialization: 
 
Similar to the cities, we also find in rural communities a welcome increase 
in prosperity… everywhere and in almost every field of life we feel a sound 
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progress… Communication has increased in the entire district very rapidly, 
and the transportation of people and goods has developed to a degree that 
was unthinkable a few decades ago…. One writes and speaks over great 
distances in a flash. Even in the smallest locality there is a public-call office. 
Motorists and bicycle riders rush with alarming speed raising dust between 
valleys and hills. In fact, soon Heidenheim will have an airship hanger and 
aviation center. A special picture of our valley will be offered to the coming 
generations when the canal connecting the Neckar and the Danube will 
cross it. Then the localities on the Brenz, provided with locks, cranes, and 
disembarkation areas, will draw the heavy cargo steamers. New jobs will be 
created, new factories will be established. Some old things will disappear 
and new life will flourish out of their ruins. Our times, to be sure, never 
halt.20 
 
Heimat culture’s inherently flexible discourse could comfortably explain regional 
differences, or regionally focused identities, and the transformation of the landscape, in a 
manner that was not anti-modern.21 As the momentum of industrial transformation grew, 
so did the acceptance of this new type of landscapes, one that even in the first few years 
of the twentieth century, was inhabited by the spindly airplane. 
This tension, then, highlights not a rigidly anti-modern perspective nor a blind 
embrace of industrial capacity as “progress.” German culture, at the crossroads of the 
new century, straddled both extremes and intellectually embraced the dichotomy of both 
glorifying a nostalgic past and celebrating modernity. Regions like Württemberg 
embraced both local and national, traditional and modern, identities. But that embrace 
came with a cost, and the discourse embedded within Heimat images of German barns 
and factories dotting the landscape produced and inherent anxiety about the promise and 
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peril of new technologies and the ways they might be harnessed for good or ill.22 The 
airplane, as we shall see, straddled this treacherous ledge of German culture.  
Confino also makes an important point of distinction about the modern German 
society that eventually welcomed the airplane. Resisting Foucault, who argued that 
modern society creates merely an illusion of agency, one that robs the participants of any 
semblance of choice, Confino argues that such a view of modernity is a fallacy - one that 
obliterates agency and ignores change, the kind clearly illustrated by the rise of machines 
like the airplane. People, in Confino’s argument, do not lead sheep-like existences, but 
rather embrace rich lives filled with contradictions shaped by human actions. I contend, 
however, that aviators lived a new type of existence, one that straddled both realms. The 
rise of the airplane created a world of rich possibilities, and gave the individual 
previously unimaginable power to affect change. Much of that potential rested in the 
abilities of airmen to control the new machines at their fingertips. That potential, 
however, rested on the reliability of inherently dangerous and often unpredictable 
machinery. Put another way, the aviator was all-powerful only when his machine was 
working. Crashes were almost always fatal, and the gruesome sight of a shattered aircraft 
and mangled pilot often attracted crowds of morbid onlookers.23 Just such an accident 
would claim the life of Paul Emil Engelhard less than a year after his image framed an 
iconic photograph. 
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In contrast, cultural forces, however, are seldom, if ever, one directional. The 
close of the nineteenth century witnessed yet another disruptive force in the ongoing 
conversation regarding German culture. Entering into an already fractious discussion that 
incorporated regional, confessional, gender, urban-rural, and class differences in German 
society, was the rise of the Youth Movement at the turn of the century. Linguistically, the 
term Jugend had, until 1900, largely referred to a stage in life, when one progressed from 
childhood to adulthood in German society.24 Beginning roughly two decades before 
1914, the Youth Movement turned the term Jugend from a stage of life into a class of 
people. Jugend came to embody a multiplicity of meanings, one of the most significant of 
which was its intellectual rejection of the Wilhelmian Empire. Influenced by radical 
thinkers like Nietzsche, members of the Youth Movement called for a rejuvenation of 
German culture through a “change of blood.”25 For the younger generation, especially 
those born between 1892 and 1897, the German Empire they inhabited was not one 
welded together through Bismarck’s “blood and iron,” but rather a culturally blighted 
society that played “lip service to national unity.”26 The industrial explosion that fueled 
the German economy was, in the mind of the Jugend a Faustian bargain that made 
Germany powerful at the cost of German cultural and spiritual identity. As a result, 
groups like the Wandervogel movement, shifted the worldview of many young Germans 
to that of an anti-establishment perspective, one that was best consoled with long 
excursions to the countryside.27 Wandervogel members often cultivated both a sense of 
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camaraderie with their peers while fostering the illusion that a knightly and rural world 
was still a physical possibility.  
By 1900, an ever-accelerating sense of speed, combined with rapid industrial, 
imperial, and economic growth, left many in the Kaiserreich with a pessimistic sense that 
the nation was fueled only by materialistic ambitions. Nietzsche called it the “extirpation 
of German Spirit for German Empire.”28 Otto Glagau called the empire vulgar and 
materialistic.29 But the disillusionment of 1900 was perhaps best expressed by George 
Iggers when he said, “If the historical approach to human reality seemed at first to open a 
way for genuine understanding of real life, it now threatened to unveil the relativity of all 
knowledge and of all value. All norms that once appeared firm seemed now to be swept 
away by historical and social scientific inquiry, and history began to reveal itself as a flux 
devoid of meaning or ethical value.”30 The Jugend of 1900 represent the internal 
contradictions and dichotomies, with the Youth Movement quoting Nietzsche and calling 
for new blood, while other segments of the younger generation “were prepared to grow 
their mustaches in the royal style and even imitate Wilhelm’s rasping voice.”31 Aviation 
then, would further complicate the discussion of youth in German culture, as the looming 
possibility of war early in the twentieth century divided the future “Front Generation” 
between those captivated by aviation’s power, and those who viewed the technology as 
little more than yet another tool to be harnessed by a decadent, power-hungry society.  
In 1900, however, powered flight remained an elusive fantasy - one attempted by 
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many and accomplished by none. Even after the success of the Wright Brothers in 1903, 
heavier than air flight was viewed with considerable skepticism in German culture.32 The 
Kaiser too, appears to have missed the opportunity presented with the rise of the airplane. 
It is curious, that in spite of his insistence that “the supreme task of our cultural efforts is 
to foster our ideals,” and his steadfast support of science and technology through massive 
state building projects, the importance of powered flight left the Kaiser and many in the 
German military ranks utterly baffled.33 Aviation then, upon its arrival in 1908, would act 
as a force which both absorbed German culture and disrupted it. Until then, the multitude 
of conversations in Germany fixated on questions of materialism, authenticity, the 
spiritual survival of the nation, before turning its attention not to the airplane, but the 
Zeppelin.  
 
The Zeppelin, the Airplane, and the Culture of German Transportation 
Aviation fostered a dichotomous conversation in German culture, one that 
elucidated both the promise and peril that the new technology offered. From the early 
development of the rigid airship to the rise of the airplane, the field of aviation in 
Germany both absorbed and expressed a complex litany of national and local discourses 
that informed a highly fractious society in 1900. As the airship struggled and heavier-
than-air flight flourished, Germans from widely different regional, generational, and 
economic backgrounds flocked to the new field of powered flight. The cultural and 
economic backgrounds they brought to the design, construction, and uses for aviation 
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would shape the development of the airplane in Germany in dramatic ways before the 
outbreak of war in 1914. Aviation then, captured the popular imagination, confused older 
military planners, and fueled the dystopic visions of popular fiction writers both in 
Germany and across Europe. The new discourse influenced by the Zeppelin reflected 
anxieties regarding the rapidly shifting technological landscape of the nation. 
The development of mass transportation in Germany during the nineteenth 
century was largely a regional and state funded affair. As Abagail Green notes, the 
revolution of 1848 shifted the perceived responsibilities of local elites, from one 
unconcerned with the local citizenry to one necessarily more empathetic towards their 
needs. Part of this shift in perspective included public works projects and in the decades 
following 1848, few endeavors attracted more attention or garnered greater approval than 
the railroad.34 Regionalism, however, remained a significant influence in the 
development of German transportation at the end of the nineteenth century. The routes 
and construction of railroads were often dictated by the demands of the state sponsorship 
which paid for them. As a result, rail lines were often a network that only reinforced local 
and regional alliances rather than transcend them. In spite of the logistical challenges 
created by this highly regional system, the railroad was, by the twentieth century, the 
most efficient transportation network in Germany. The acceptance and systemization of 
rail travel in Germany also resulted in a compressed conception of space and time, as 
rapid travel between previously distant towns and regions soon became a new and 
accepted reality. 
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For many in Germany, the twentieth century only continued this new period of 
ever increasing speed and compressed space. It also represented a period defined by an 
onslaught of the “new.” Entering into that conversation, the Zeppelin, a rigid airship that 
was the brainchild of Swabian Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin, represented the potential 
for a new form of rapid transportation. Zeppelin was emblematic the transitional tension 
in German society at the turn of the century. Like his counterparts who reacted to the 
dictates of 1848, Count Zeppelin was a wealthy, independent and powerful member of 
German society. He was politically well connected and his airships received the personal 
support of Kaiser Wilhelm.35 The technological prowess of his airships, however, gave 
Count Zeppelin power that his nineteenth century predecessors had never dreamed of. 
The machine that bore his name offered Count Zeppelin the opportunity to bypass the 
intricate regional and local networks that made early railroad construction a largely 
frustrating and inefficient enterprise. Rather than spend valuable time and effort 
negotiating with regional and local leaders to satisfy a litany of demands to run a rail line 
through Germany, Zeppelin’s new machine simply flew over them. Thus, the Zeppelin 
and the man who created it, straddled the transition point between the old world of the 
nineteenth century and the potential of the new realities of the twentieth. He 
simultaneously represented the work of the aristocracy and the new national discourse 
which erupted amid rising industrialism and modern transportation. 
Count Zeppelin, was also an expert salesman, and pitched the airship as a stable, 
rapid, long distance mode of transportation that would eventually resemble an “aerial 
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express train.”36 The airship would serve civilians and the military alike, sending German 
sight seers everywhere, from the African interior to the North Pole. In its military 
configuration, the airship could be used for long-range reconnaissance, bombardment, or 
the transport of men and equipment. By creating a dual-purpose machine, Zeppelin hoped 
to attract business from both the civilian and military markets. By the turn of the century, 
a working prototype had successfully flown for 18 minutes and seven years later, the LZ3 
flew 350KM in just under eight hours.37 Such feats attracted substantial support from the 
German government, who no doubt perceived such a machine as useful in future military 
endeavors. Less than a year later, the LZ3’s successor, the LZ4, bested the previous time 
in a twelve hour flight across Germany.38 This time, the feat was documented not only as 
the triumph of technological innovation, but a moment of national recognition within the 
German empire.  
The week of the LZ4’s tour in August of 1908, created a public spectacle that 
rivaled the emotions and pomp of the Franco-Prussian War nearly forty years prior. The 
Zeppelin received rapt attention from the popular press, as other new technologies - 
namely the telegraph - wired dispatches accounting for the movement of the LZ4 in near-
real time.39 Accounts of the airship’s travels from Lake Constance across Germany were 
printed several times daily in mass printed newspapers. The sight of the Zeppelin, a 
massive airship that measured over 446 feet in length, created both an inspiring and 
imposing visage.40 Crowds gathered in the airships path; across towns in Germany 
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thousands gathered on rooftops to witness the passing of the Zeppelin as it traveled from 
Friedrichshafen to Basel, Mülhausen, Colmar, Lahr, Markotshain and Strassburg. Peter 
Fritzsche notes that the Zeppelin story became more than the travel log of the airship, a 
national conversation began to center around its travel. One newspaper was quoted as 
saying: 
The streets fill up, people clambered onto rooftops. And one waits, patiently 
waits for another hour! And then after the long silence, the crowd cries out. 
Above the hilltops, just to the right of the Bismarck Tower, a silver, 
glimmering, wondrous entity appears. At first it seems to stand still, but then 
pushes itself slowly but steadily against the fresh morning breeze. One feels 
its power; we are overcome by a nervous trembling as we follow the flight 
of the ship in the air. As only with the greatest artistic experiences, we feel 
ourselves uplifted. Some people rejoice, others weep.41 
 
The account from the Schwäbischer Merkur is filled with apocryphal imagery and 
early nationalistic iconography. The awe inspiring mechanical wonder of the moment is 
expressed, but the Zeppelin also represents an emotional as well as an aesthetic 
experience as well. The monumental nature of its arrival both physically and 
metaphorically required patience. The physicality of the airship, including where it fits on 
the German landscape as well as the specifics of where and how it arrives demands closer 
scrutiny. The direction of the LZ4’s arrival, that of flying directly past the tower 
dedicated to the father of the Reich, Otto von Bismarck, is likely apocryphal in its 
account. The direction of the ship’s arrival conveniently encapsulates a moment of 
national discourse and with it, inferred a sense of national unity. The landscape beyond 
the Bismarck tower also hearkens back to instilled notions of German Heimat culture. 
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Here too, the relationship between the new modern airship and the nostalgic discourse of 
Heimat is complicated. The Zeppelin both complements the landscape as well as altering 
it as it moves against the fresh morning breeze. The power and imposing nature of the 
airship also strikes powerful emotional chords, with some rejoicing and others crying at 
the image of the strange machine lumbering through the sky silently. It is a moment 
packaged to encapsulate a burgeoning national discourse, one found within the unity of 
experience. The technology of the airship, and that which made the telegraphing of its 
travels possible, create an experience rapid enough to link a nation of small towns 
together for the first time, even if only for a temporary moment. 
Fritzsche notes rightly that the narrative of the airship’s appeal transcended class 
boundaries in German society42. Germans from all walks of life gathered on rooftops and 
church steeples, mountain tops, and town halls, to crane their necks and witness the 
arrival of a promising, if not imposing, moment in history. The event was highly scripted, 
and marketed as yet another step toward a world that was constantly setting new limits 
within space and time. Faster trains, instantaneous communication, and now air travel 
across a young German nation collapsed notions of what was distant and what was 
possible. And while the rise of aviation carried embedded nationalistic overtones, the 
technological possibilities it represented resonated across cultural delineations. The 
narrative of the Zeppelin made for fantastic newspaper fodder, the kind that no doubt 
spiked sales, but the grand story hid an invention fraught technical and mechanical 
fallibilities. The massive Zeppelin was inherently unstable in poor weather or in high 
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winds. The rigid airframe meant that the airship was susceptible to catastrophic damage 
in the event of even a light collision which, in windy conditions, was extremely likely. 
The sheer size of the machine meant it was difficult to control, and ground crews tasked 
with physically anchoring the airship to the ground by holding onto ropes, were left in 
perilous danger. Much like the young German nation itself, the airship represented great 
power as well as underlying, systemic points of potential failure.  
 Five days after beginning its cross-country journey, the LZ4 landed at 
Echterdingen, where it attracted a large crowd of curious onlookers. Among them, at least 
as claimed in his 1955 autobiography, was a young German aviation enthusiast named 
Ernst Heinkel.43 As the crowd approached the LZ4’s landing site, a strong wind managed 
to unmoor the LZ4 from its anchors. As Peter Fritzsche notes, “Spectators watched in 
horror as soldiers gripping the anchor ropes were lifted up into the air before they jumped 
to safety at the last moment. The huge airship rose higher and higher and raked its anchor 
through the crowd.”44 The airship, filled with flammable gas, crashed to the ground, 
where it ignited a series of violent explosions. “…flames shot up from the hull, a second, 
a third detonation… a column of fire rose to the sky, immense, horrible, as if the earth 
had opened up releasing the flames from hell.”45 Remarkably, no one was seriously 
injured in the accident at Echterdingen. The crowd was terrified, shocked, and utterly 
heartbroken by the accident. Curiously, the catastrophic failure of the LZ4 garnered no 
criticism. Instead, it generated an emotion of generosity and donation. Heinkel, in his 
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autobiography, claims that donations were taken up on site. And newspapers, likely eager 
to continue capitalizing on the Zeppelin story, even if there was no longer an airship, ran 
ads for the Zeppelin-Spende.  
Ink was devoted to the story of the Zeppelin in the form of novels as well, and the 
airship attracted notable attention - as well as intense dread - from intellectuals abroad. 
British writer H.G. Wells predicted the rise of powered flight in the twentieth century and 
surmised, cynically, that its arrival would “be most assuredly applied to war.”46 As the 
LZ4 crisscrossed its way across Germany in 1908, Wells published a work of science 
fiction entitled The War in the Air, which prophesied the mutation of the German airship 
from technological wonder to fully realized weapon of war. Wells gives a fictional 
account of a great Zeppelin air war through the eyes of a truly modern protagonist: a man 
ironically named Bert Smallways. Smallways is attracted, like many at the dawn of the 
twentieth century, to anything and everything modern. Like the real-life Wright brothers, 
Bert works in a bicycle shop. He also embodies the fervent strain of nationalism 
indicative of his era.47 He is a man obsessed with efficiency and speed, and he 
inadvertently becomes the witness to the horrors that his modern ethos can unleash. Wells 
creates a world where the Zeppelin does not carry passengers and water ballast around on 
world-record setting trips. The armada of airships in The War in the Air are loaded with 
thousands of bombs, used to destroy American dreadnoughts - that super weapon of a 
bygone era - before razing Manhattan to cinders. As Richard Wohl notes, the illustrations 
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included in The War in the Air are disturbingly similar to future photographs of “the 
Blitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.”48  
German novels, too, discussed the future offensive capabilities of an effectively 
armed fleet of Zeppelins. Such visions, however, did not originate from the desks of 
German military planners but, rather, from disillusioned nationalists. One such 
disaffected worker named Rudolf Martin left his job at the Imperial Statistical Office 
after falling out of favor with his superiors, and subsequently penned the 1907 novel 
Berlin-Baghdad.49 Despite the Kaiser’s assertion that national security interests rested in 
creating a powerful naval fleet to rival England, Martin viewed the future of German 
military might as one that rested solely in the air.  
Martin’s story begins with the collapse of a weak Czarist Russia, which decimates 
the former empire into thousands of relatively powerless states, which are then co-opted 
by a dictatorial lunatic. The ensuing chaos requires a reluctant Germany to use its new air 
armada for its own strategic defense, as well as the aid of its neighbors. Berlin is bombed 
by the new Russian enemy, and Martin takes this literary moment to enforce the new 
rules of twentieth century warfare; the need to expand national borders as far as one can 
to protect against future assault from abroad. With such a lesson embedded in the minds 
of the German people, Martin weaves a narrative of warfare and death, as a reluctant yet 
increasingly powerful German confederation begins to gobble up more and more 
territories - always in the interest of self-defense.50 It is a story of self-interested world 
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domination - the kind that incorporates the nineteenth century narrative of a great western 
civilizing mission. By the end of their conquests, visiting tourists in the now German city 
of Baghdad wonder what had taken the Germans so long, when the benefits of 
domination are now so readily apparent. The world of Berlin-Baghdad is a landscape 
dominated by militaristic nationalism, expansionist fantasies, and aviation; a place where 
the knowledge of flight is universal, and the airplane has all but replaced life on the 
ground.51 
By 1908, flight was suddenly on the minds of certain members of the German 
General Staff. Far from the world-conquering capabilities displayed in fictional works 
like Berlin-Baghdad, German aviation largely lagged that of their American and French 
competition. The crash of the LZ4 that summer further dampened hopes that the airship 
could become a reliable weapon of war, and the successful crossing of the English 
Channel by French aviator Louis Blériot in 1909 proved that heavier-than-air flight was 
suddenly a viable alternative to the often unreliable and sluggish Zeppelins. Freed from 
the constraints of an indifferent American military, the Wright Brothers journeyed to 
Europe and began selling copies of their Flyer to French and British aviation interests.52 
The German General Staff, however, was far more cautious and preferred to leave the 
development of aviation in Germany in the hands of local industry. German General Staff 
Captain Hermann von der Leith-Thomsen warned his fellow officers, however, that it 
was unwise to passively observe the progress of foreign air powers without acting to 
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direct the nation’s aviation industry in a manner that would benefit the military.53 
As the airship floundered and French aviation came to dominate the conversation 
around heavier-than-air flight on the continent, a cadre of local and international 
inventors and industrialists would shape the embryonic field of aviation in Germany just 
before the First World War. By 1909, interest in powered flight had grown in civilian 
circles, and new aviation clubs and organizations had sprung up around Germany.54 The 
number of Germans interested in flight was not insignificant; some three thousand 
members joined the Deutscher Luftflottenverein (German Air Fleet League) and the 
Deutscher Luftfahrer-Verband (German Aviators Association) was the largest aviation 
sport association in the country.55 With this growing interest in flight, and the subsequent 
potential for new markets, future aviation industrialists, those who would design, build, 
and manufacture aircraft, flocked to Germany. Their backgrounds, ideologies, biases, as 
well as generational and national differences, would dramatically influence the direction 
of German aviation before 1914, and throughout the course of the coming war. 
 
Aviation Industrialists in German Culture 
The leading industrialists, engineers, designers, and inventors who would shape 
the early years of German aviation reflected the complex cultural background of their 
society at the turn of the century. Their differing perspectives affected aviation far 
beyond the realm of design and engineering. Their view on aviation’s role in the wider 
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world, the place of government in the realm of business, and their perspective on 
intellectual property all contributed to a dynamic and multi-faceted field of development 
were all the result of varying cultural and generational differences. These markedly 
varying approaches to the development of aviation created a vibrant industry in 
peacetime, but one prone to fracture with the outbreak of war in 1914. 
Aviation underwent a significant, albeit fractured, period of development in the 
three years which immediately preceded the coming of war. Centered around the first 
airfield in the country, located at Johannisthal outside of the German capital of Berlin, an 
array of machines designed and flown by an eclectic cross section of European society 
coalesced to foster the maturation of the modern airplane.56 Johannisthal quickly became 
home to a dynamic community of fliers, and reflected rapidly evolving German culture, 
international influence, and the disruptive nature of new technology. It was the focal 
point of collapsing space and time, and the cultural upheaval that accompanied it. The 
men and women who designed and flew here would go on to shape the German aircraft 
industry during the tumultuous years of the First World War, their backgrounds largely 
shaping their approach to this new industry; and these approaches similarly shaped 
Germany’s ability to wage war in the air a few short years later. The leaders of this 
movement, those who financed, designed, and engineered some of Germany’s earliest 
machines, came from widely differing generational and cultural backgrounds. 
Perhaps the oldest industrialist attracted to aviation was Hugo Junkers, who was 
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born before the modern German Empire he helped shape. Born in the Rhineland in 1859, 
Junkers perceived Germany and aviation from a dramatically different perspective than 
that of his aviation peers.57 Based at Dessau just outside of Berlin, Junkers made his 
fortune in the waning years of the nineteenth century not through aviation, but through 
patents for water systems and gas engines. The profits from his early ventures provided 
Junkers with the capital to explore other engineering opportunities, as well as furnish him 
a professorship at the University of Aachen.58 The rise of heavier-than-air flight in the 
first years of the twentieth century then, represented not a revolutionary new field, but yet 
another promising avenue of intellectual and technical exploration.  
By 1909, Junkers had entered the field of aviation. Junkers differed from his peers 
in his perspective on flight’s potential. Rather than looking to short-term gains in engine 
development and increases in power, Junkers ventured into far more theoretical and 
abstract areas of aircraft development. While working as a professor at the University of 
Aachen, Junkers co-developed a concept for an all-metal aircraft known as the Ente or 
“Duck,” with fellow colleague Hans Reissner.59 An all-metal design was unheard of from 
an engineering standpoint, as aircraft engines of the period struggled to lift even the 
lightest wood and canvas machines from the ground. Junkers parted company with 
Reissner in 1911, but continued work on his plan to build an all-metal aircraft. Despite 
his age, Junkers vision for aviation was ahead of his time. 
It has also been noted that Junkers was a fastidious worker who was dedicated to 
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the notion of creating quality products over short-term financial gain. Olaf Groehler and 
Helmut Erfurth note in Hugo Junkers: Ein Politisches Essay, that Junkers disdained 
government intervention and command economies.60 After Germany’s defeat in 1918, 
Junkers would view the end of the war as a liberation of sorts, where his firm could be 
freed from “an epoch of armaments [and the] hierarchy and ossification of militarized 
economies and compulsory state intervention, of stupidity and intellectual narrow-
mindedness.”61 Aviation was, for Hugo Junkers, an endeavor of intellectual expansion 
and long-term thinking. The pressures of war would frustrate this approach. 
Born in 1888, Ernst Heinkel’s life was, by his own description, defined by 
aviation. Heinkel referred to the crash of the LZ4 Zeppelin in 1908, which he witnessed, 
as the first “real birth” of his life; a moment which awakened him to the promise and 
potential of aviation.62 It is perhaps strange that a catastrophe like the LZ4’s crash could 
be viewed in a positive light, however, Heinkel’s life experiences were largely defined by 
moments of danger which he subsequently spun into optimistic moments. A year later, in 
1909, Heinkel discovered heavier-than-air flight, but was surprised that many of his 
fellow Germans did not hold the same enthusiasm that he did. While attending a lecture 
on aviation, he found rooms filled with only a handful of people, and in one lecture hall, 
the audience consisted of “the professor’s wife, his mother-in-law and a nursemaid.”63 
This was hardly an audience enraptured with the new science of aviation.64  
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Heinkel finally found information after discussing the matter with a friend, who 
pointed him to the Café Reinsburg in Stuttgart. The café was a relatively unknown 
repository of the latest aviation news, photographs, and documents. Heinkel immersed 
himself in the stories of the Wright Brothers flight at Kitty Hawk, which many in 
Germany referred to as the “lying brothers” - convinced that the flight as a tall tale from 
America. While reading in the Café Reinsburg, Heinkel discovered an ad for an 
upcoming aviation competition held in Frankfurt on the first week of October, 1909.65 
Heinkel, in retrospect, called this the second “decisive moment” of his life.66 The show 
was one of the earliest demonstrations of powered flight in Germany and Heinkel was 
transformed by the experience. The show convinced him to become an aviator and an 
aircraft constructor. After completing plans for his own machine, he replied to an ad for 
an engineer at an aviation firm, and quickly set to work. Unlike Junkers, Heinkel 
designed and flew some of his earliest machines. The endeavor nearly cost him his life 
when we crashed one of his planes and suffered severe injuries. In his writing, Heinkel 
describes his attraction to aviation in romantic language, elucidating that for him - at least 
retrospectively - aviation was a pursuit of passion rather than rationality. Heinkel would 
spend his time during the First World War working for the Albatros firm, where he honed 
his engineering and design skills; a background that would be put to use even more fully 
in the Second World War. 
Two of Germany’s most successful aviation entrepreneurs, Edmund Rumpler and 
Antony Fokker, were from outside of the Kaiserreich. Rumpler, an automotive designer 
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turned aviation pioneer, was born in 1872 the neighboring Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Rumpler’s work in the automotive industry was derailed by the arrival of the Wright 
Brothers and the new field of heavier-than-air flight. His first aeronautical product was a 
copy of a machine called the Taube, and with it, Rumpler became the first aircraft 
manufacturer in Germany. His firm would construct some of the earliest civilian flying 
machines in the Reich, as well as many of the high-altitude reconnaissance machines 
used by the German Air Service during the First World War.67 Rumpler’s Austro-
Hungarian birth can be seen as a connection between the two nations, joined in a 
somewhat uncomfortable alliance. More so, Rumpler’s desire to work in Germany also 
demonstrates the industrial and technical capabilities of the German economy at that 
time.68 
An outsider from Holland, Anthony Fokker was arguably the most conniving and 
ruthlessly opportunistic aircraft designer and aviation industrialist in Germany.69 Fokker 
was also the youngest of the aviation entrepreneurs. Born in 1890, Fokker arguably 
represented the polar opposite of Hugo Junkers. Where Junkers valued sound 
engineering, methodical design, and quality construction, Fokker quite simply, did not. 
Instead, Fokker represented a thoroughly twentieth-century man of action, who would 
rely on instinct, intuition, and remarkable powers of persuasion to shape his machines 
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and with them, the direction of German aviation. This trait was also the consequence of 
Fokker’s lack of and disdain for education. Fokker’s youth was defined by poor 
performance in school and an attraction to constructing and understanding machinery.70 
Fokker was also an innately political being, with a panache for making friends with 
pilots, and winning the favor of those tasked with climbing in and flying his machines. 
His friendships with German aviators would allow Fokker to create aircraft that might not 
have otherwise been produced, some with potentially fatal structural flaws. Unlike 
Junkers, Fokker viewed aviation as an opportunity for short-term gain, and welcomed the 
interest of the German military into the field of heavier-than-air flight. 
The backgrounds of men like Junkers, Heinkel, Rumpler, and Fokker further 
elucidate the influence of German culture on aviation in the years preceding and 
immediately following the turn of the twentieth century. Junkers, a man born before the 
Kaiserreich, saw aviation as a chance for long-term, cautious investment both in terms of 
technological and economic dimensions. His age meant that aviation was yet another, 
albeit important, stepping stone in a business life built around facilitating technological 
innovation in a variety of fields. He viewed interference from the state as an example of 
meddlesome and unintelligent bullying that only served to impede progress.71 He fielded 
an array of designers and engineers and carefully tested his products as they progressed. 
Fokker, born in Holland and more than three decades Junkers’ junior, epitomized the 
rapid, decisive world that many Germans saw coming to fruition by 1900. A man of 
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action, Fokker relied on political savvy and engineering instinct to create his machines. 
War, for Fokker, would be a welcome opportunity rather than an intellectual setback. The 
generational animosity espoused in publications like Jugend are clearly seen in the 
diametrically opposed mindsets of Fokker and Junkers. Ernst Heinkel perhaps, best 
represents the transition between Junkers’ and Fokker’s respective generations, a man 
who viewed aviation with a sense of romance and promise, despite witnessing - or 
experiencing first-hand – aviation’s extreme danger. Ultimately, however, it was the 
Austro-Hungarian Rumpler who arrived on the scene first, and whose firm would 
produce some of the most reliable reconnaissance and bombing machines of the First 
World War. For Rumpler and Fokker, Germany represented the most exciting, and 
potentially lucrative marketplace for flying machines. 
Thus, German aviation was, by 1911, in a fledgling but steadily progressing state 
of development.72 Machines varied from rudimentary and flyable to complex and 
theoretical. With the exception of Heinkel and Fokker, few of the designers of early 
airplanes would happily pilot their creations. The pilots who would ultimately fly these 
early airplanes came from an equally diverse set of backgrounds as those who created 
them. It was at Johannisthal airfield that aviation created a new cultural space for 
experimentation and expression. It opened a new venue for men, and women, to take part 
in the development of the newest technological innovation of the century. And if aviation 
was a disruptive force in the world of economics and technology, it would also prove to 
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be an influential social force as well. 
 
Machines as the Measure of Men and Women 
The new technology of heavier-than-air flight, particularly during its early 
inception and development, fostered a culture that gave remarkable social and cultural 
capital to the most talented individuals. In just five years, the skepticism surrounding 
aviation had given way to a curious enthusiasm. The question that remained was one of 
application - how could an individual interested in flying approach the new field of 
aviation? Heavier than air flight provided a solution by creating an effective entryway to 
aviation that the Zeppelin, with its large, cumbersome, and expensive construction, could 
never offer. Young, enthusiastic, and adventurous pilots could enter the field of flight 
and, despite the great hazards to their own physical safety, quickly establish themselves 
as designers and engineers. In a world where technical and physical ability trumped other 
attributes, cultural backgrounds, national identity, and even gender norms quickly faded 
into an intellectual landscape that fostered excitement and the desire to go ever higher 
and farther. 
By 1912, the center of aviation’s development in Germany had shifted, from 
Frankfurt, to Johannisthal airfield outside of Berlin. The airfield opened originally in 
September 1909, just a few weeks after a similar field opened in Rheims, France.73 
Johannisthal field quickly became the central hub of activity and the home of a 
community of fliers, not only from Germany, but from a host of other countries. Despite 
                                                     
73 Wohl, A Passion for Wings, 100-110. 
  58 
its central location and close proximity to the German capital, Johannisthal airfield was 
not a technologically sophisticated home base. Ernst Heinkel described it as resembling 
“a hastily erected shanty town of the early American West.”74 Early photographs of the 
airfield show bare-bones facilities, canvas hangers, low slung sheds, and rudimentary 
workshops. The landing field itself was exactly that, a grass runway that offered little in 
the way of safety. The atmosphere at Johannisthal, however, pushed cultural as well as 
engineering boundaries.  
Photographs and newspaper clippings about Johannisthal elucidate a complex 
cultural narrative. Johannisthal provided a new space, one where aviators from across the 
European continent could come and establish themselves as important members of the 
flying community. These included aviators from Germany’s most worrisome rival in the 
field of aviation: France. One aviator in particular, a French pilot named Adolphe 
Pégoud, attracted a great deal of attention from photographers at Johannisthal Field in the 
year before the outbreak of the First World War.75 Pégoud, who piloted a French 
monoplane, became one of the first aviators to develop and ultimately master early 
acrobatic flying. Maneuvers now known the world over as the “Split-S” or the “Inverted 
Loop” were first performed by fliers like Pégoud for audiences that assembled at 
Johannisthal. These maneuvers, which are now commonplace at air shows, were 
considered otherworldly in 1913. Pégoud, through extraordinary bravery, appeared to 
violate the laws of physics by standing his machine on its propeller. He could roll his 
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plane inverted through the skies as shocked onlookers stared at what surely appeared to 
be a looming accident, only to see the Frenchmen safely land moments later.  
Pégoud’s monoplane was frequently captured by the camera at the moments when 
it appeared that the French pilot was in the most peril.76 Pégoud, more than any other 
pilot in the penultimate year before the First World War, embodied what appeared to be 
superhuman abilities. Postcards of the Frenchman were numerous and sold at 
Johannisthal to curious onlookers. Most featured his monoplane in its most famous aerial 
position, upside down. Others showed Pégoud wearing his leather flying helmet and a 
heavy white turtleneck while standing next to his famous machine. Photos of Pégoud at 
the controls feature the Frenchman turned at a three-quarters angle with his arm lazily 
resting along the fuselage of his aircraft. He is depicted as courageous but cavalier - there 
is a lightness of spirit about him. Pégoud’s stature at Johannisthal was nothing short of 
heroic.77 
The example of Pégoud serves well to elucidate the transformative power of 
aviation in the years leading up to the First World War. In less than a decade, aviation 
had transformed distance and defied space. As Stephen Kern notes, aviation contributed 
to a larger conversation held within a rapidly shifting cultural landscape, one where “the 
whole of humanity is involved with catastrophes around the globe; international alliances 
have increased the “federative” nature of the world. It is an age of democracy - of crowds 
and public assemblies…”78 Pégoud, through his death-defying acrobatics over the crowds 
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gathered at Johannisthal, was part of that conversation. Aviation, more than previous 
modes of transportation, shattered the previous notion of space and distance. “The 
airplane pierced the wall of frontiers and wiped out the military significance of fixed 
positions.”79 And while German military planners might not have realized the 
significance of Pégoud’s aerial achievements, the sheer volume of postcard images of 
Pégoud might suggest another emotion elicited in his German audience; one of anxiety. 
The omnipresence of the French flier and his monoplane demonstrate the lead that 
Germany’s rival had not only in the types of machines being constructed, but also in the 
abilities of the pilots flying them.  
Photographs of the crowds that gathered at Johannisthal demonstrate the appeal 
aviation had on German culture just before the outbreak of war. Images from 1913 show 
hundreds, if not thousands, of Germans lined up along wood fences - not dissimilar to the 
kinds of stands at a football match, to watch the air demonstrations.80 One such 
photograph captures Pégoud with his machine inverted, screaming towards the ground, as 
the crowd stands breathless beneath him. The people featured in the images are largely 
middle and upper class - as depicted by their dress.81 A wide range of ages, however, are 
apparent, and aviation’s cross-gender appeal is also on display. Old men with binoculars 
stand next to young as well as old German women whose clothes appear more from the 
late nineteenth century. No doubt the element of extreme danger played a large role in the 
appeal of air shows for non-specialists. But there is also an excitement apparent in these 
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images - one of witnessing the birth of a new technological force, and watching its rapid, 
even meteoric development. In the realm of pre-war air shows, it was aerial acumen, not 
nationalism, that separated the heroes from the also-rans. And during the years before 
war between Germany and France, no one could perform the feats of Adolphe Pégoud. 
Johannisthal provided a fertile ground for pushing boundaries, both in engineering 
and in culture. The culture of experimentation was so dynamic, that aviation’s early 
development transcended gender boundaries - albeit not without struggle. Amelie 'Melli' 
Hedwig Beese-Boutard, was born in Saxony in 1886.82 She traveled to Johannisthal 
airfield in 1910 with the intent of becoming a pilot. Despite significant push back from 
her male counterparts, Beese-Boutard found an instructor and was the first woman in 
Germany to obtain a pilot’s license in 1911.83 By the following year, she had opened her 
own flying school at Johannisthal and began designing her own aircraft. Photographs of 
Beese-Boutard, who married a French aviator and experienced rampant discrimination 
during the First World War for her husband’s French background, are noticeably 
different from those of Pégoud. Amelie is featured at the controls of her machine, with a 
scowling glare as she peers over the cockpit. Where as Pégoud’s masculinity was 
reinforced by his occupation as a daredevil aviator, Beese-Boutard had to become more 
masculine in order to be taken as seriously as her French counterpart. The exploits of her 
flights at Johannisthal attracted the attention of the popular press at Johannisthal and, 
before the First World War, she was a well-known pilot. Ultimately, it was one’s ability 
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to control an airplane that secured their right to become a pilot.  
Despite the shared culture of community through technological development and 
the enthusiasm of aviation’s early pioneers, underlying nationalistic tensions remained in 
German culture, and readily manifested itself through the relationship between German 
aviation firms and the state. During the same air shows that featured Pégoud’s death-
defying antics, a series of photographs were taken of Crown Prince Ludwig of Bavaria as 
he and a cadre of general staff members inspected a new machine from the German 
aviation firm, Rumpler.84 Photographs of the Rumpler Taube or “pigeon,” which debuted 
in 1912 at Johannisthal, outnumber images of even the famous Pégoud. Rumpler sought 
to publish hundreds of postcards that could easily be bought by the German public at 
bookshops and at airshows.85 Even a series of postage stamps featuring Rumpler’s iconic 
machine were sold during this period. Posters produced by Rumpler featured an 
illustration of a German pilot at the controls of the Taube with the caption “Berlin-Wien” 
underneath - boasting of the machine’s ability to travel from Berlin to Vienna. Thus 
began Rumpler’s extensive marketing campaign to ensure that the German firm was well 
represented. Later images, produced during the war, featured famous German aviators 
and the Rumpler name - implying an endorsement by these pilots for the machines made 
by Rumpler.86 The young men featured in Rumpler’s ads seemingly embodied its 
embrace by Germany’s youth.  
Aviation, however, was not necessarily hailed by Germany’s youth with universal 
                                                     
84 Photograph Collection, DMM LR-03091/3, Deutsches Museum Archive, Munich, Germany. 
85 Examples of these postcards are found in the Deutsches Museum Archive. See Photograph Collection, 
DMM PERS 00136, Deutsches Museum Archive, Munich, Germany. 
86 Unknown Author, Photograph Collection, DMM LR-03091/2, Deutsches Museum Archive, Munich, 
Germany. 
  63 
acclaim and enthusiasm. Indeed, the airplane made for a complex discourse within 
Germany’s Jugend. The events at Johannisthal, which captured the public imagination 
and fueled postcard sales at its air shows, also served as a fertile ground to cultivate a 
satirical relationship between German culture and the airplane. Rather than a 
revolutionary tool that could transform the world and transcend national boundaries, 
some in the Jugend viewed the new technology with significant skepticism. Pre-war 
publications also highlight this complicated relationship in the years immediately 
preceding the First World War. One of the most popular magazine publications geared 
towards the Youth Movement before the First World War was the satirical publication by 
the same name as the demographic it represented, Jugend.87 The publication satirized 
everything from German politics to the machinations of the nation’s industrialists to the 
absurdities of modern life. The impact of the airplane, too, cannot be missed in its pages. 
A series of cartoons highlights the pessimistic view held by many members of Germany’s 
youth regarding the airplane and the role it would play in the future.  
A cartoon published in the March 17, 1912 issue of Jugend features a hapless 
German cavalry unit riding on horseback and vainly waiving butterfly nets while chasing 
after an armada of invading French aircraft. The title reads, “Deutschland und die 
französichen Aeroplane.”88 One cavalryman has managed to hook one of the French 
machines only to find him and his horse being dragged along the ground by it. The 
cartoon highlights a number of mixed and often conflicting emotions regarding aviation. 
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First, the talents of men like Pégoud, with their French built monoplanes, weighed 
heavily on the psyche of the militarily minded. Germany is depicted here as simply out of 
touch with the modern world. The nineteenth century cavalryman is no match for the 
twentieth century aviator. It also ridicules the government for stupidly countering 
superior French technology with a tool as strategically asinine as a butterfly net. While 
focused on building a navy to rival that of Great Britain, the creator of this cartoon draws 
our attention to a seemingly obvious blind spot in German strategic planning. Finally, 
“Deutschland und die französichen Aeroplane” shows us the absurdity of European 
militarism, with a scene so ridiculous as to border on a hallucination replete with flying 
machines and frustrated Prussians fighting an senseless and futile battle. 
Military anxiety returned again in the March 24th issue, which featured a French 
woman dreaming of revenge. Entitled “Mariannens Traum,” the cartoon reads, 
“Marianne dreams of sending planes to Germany to seek revenge for 1870 - provided 
there’s no east wind.”89 “Mariannens Traum” again shows us that the underlying fear of 
French retaliation for the Franco-Prussian war was still evident forty-two years later. The 
tool that would exact French revenge, however, does not come in the guise of the cavalry 
or the French army. It comes from the air. The technological infancy of the airplane, 
however, is still evident in this illustration. The fragility of aircraft is evident by the 
simple fact that it could be disturbed by prevailing winds. While demonstrating the 
absurd, Mariannens Traum rightly acknowledges known limitations in heavier-than-air 
flight during this period. Strong winds could, in fact, push machines so far off course as 
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to prevent their further travel. The threat of military invasion, however, is still there - the 
dream is present - it only needs to be honed to fruition. 
 Upon Marianne’s cap is the French insignia of the newly formed Armée de l'Air. 
The cartoon makes use of preexisting stereotypes regarding French nationalism and the 
desire to exact revenge on the new German nation for the injuries inflicted on France 
during the Franco-Prussian war. There is also an inherent anxiety in this illustration - one 
that demonstrates the impending day when airborne machines will be able to cross the 
borders of Germany unimpeded by anything so temperamental as a strong gust of air. It 
acknowledges in the mind of the author that a clock has been set in motion - one that 
Germany would do well to heed. It also casts aside the optimistic visions of what aviation 
can achieve. Far from dreams of a transnational world, “Mariannens Traum” reflects a 
vision of the future much more in line with H.G. Wells.  
For Jugend, the airplane also represents the worst traits in militarism and the 
naked ambition of the older generation. Rather than connecting the world and ending the 
paradigm of nationalism, the airplane is yet another tool of a materialistic world. The 
dreams of others, as well as the lack of foresight on the part of Germany’s defensive 
planners, could decimate the lives of millions of young Germans. Far from the 
romanticism of Heinkel, Jugend views aviation from a nervous, worried perspective. 
These cartoons play both on humor and underlying anxieties in German culture towards 
the airplane. German military leaders and strategic planners viewed the aircraft as 
underdeveloped for military application. But not everyone held the same short-term view 
of the development trajectory of the airplane. Already in 1912 there was a prevailing 
notion that the airplane could be utilized by Germany’s enemies in the next war. Aircraft 
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could leave German cavalry, long held as part of the elite cadre of the military, grasping 
at butterfly nets in desperation. Even success in “Deutschland und die französichen 
Aeroplane,” that of the improbable moment of catching a machine with a net, leads to 
humiliation as both rider and horse are dragged along the ground - a moment in which the 
nineteenth century is quite literally hauled along by the embodiment of the twentieth.  
Curiously, the airplane also made for ready advertisement material in issues of 
Jugend. One ad features a German man craning his neck skywards to see a monoplane - 
one reminiscent of Pégoud’s famous machine - as it loops overhead.90 The advertisement, 
this time for binoculars, places the preferred tool for German birdwatchers everywhere, in 
a new context: one of watching mechanical birds perform new and exciting feats at 
airfields across Europe. Another ad shows a young German man of middle class standing, 
as he enjoys the air show with his new pair of looking glasses. Curiously, in the previous 
week’s ad for the same product, a much older German man is featured using the same 
tools for observing a bumblebee as it skirts across his back yard. Targeted advertising, 
then, was pervasive even in pre-First World War Germany.91 
Aviation before the First World War, then, represented a complex interplay of 
nationalism, militarism, and an enthusiasm for the transcendent possibilities of flight. The 
airplane in 1912 captured the German imagination in a way not seen since the advent of 
the railway a century before. It crossed gender and cultural boundaries, and appealed to a 
wide range of demographics. Even national tensions could briefly subside in the sight of 
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awe-inspiring aerial acts of bravery. 1912 represented a space where French aviators 
could be heralded by German crowds as heroes of the sky and the airplane presented 
tantalizing possibilities of a borderless Europe. Beneath this enthusiasm, however, lay a 
deeper anxiety; that of the untapped potential for flight to reshape the battlefields of the 
next war. As a disruptive technological force, flight possessed the menacing potential of 
threatening the balance of power between competing militaries. In the minds of some of 
Germany’s youth, it also represented yet another tool that the older generation could use 
to destroy the dreams of the young. Ultimately, in the eyes of many who would buy 
copies of Jugend, aviation created an intense sense of anxiety. That anxiety cut across 
several intersection fears, that of a German nation unprepared, ill-equipped, and blind to 
the realities of an aerial war that could upend established military doctrine and render 
even the most elite utterly helpless.  
 
Cultural Disruption, Aviation, and War in 1914 
The dynamic conversation surrounding powered flight in Germany was disrupted 
by the outbreak of the First World War. With the arrival of mobilization orders and open 
hostilities, aviation immediately transformed from a mostly civilian pursuit to a fully 
militarized enterprise. The air shows at Johannisthal, record breaking attempts by private 
aviators, and the sense of community between pilots from different nations, all ceased the 
moment war was declared. The space aviation inhabited, that of a technological 
breakthrough that embodied world-changing potential, was adopted to the needs of an 
embryonic military service; one that was often under-prepared for the new tasks at hand. 
Germany’s newest type of soldier, the aviator, experienced this transition first hand. One 
  68 
flier documented his thoughts as the opening weeks of the Great War began and he 
moved from infantryman to aerial observer. 
Rudolf Berthold was born in Bamberg Germany in 1891.92 Raised by a middle-
class family, Berthold attended Gymnasium before enlisting in the Bavarian army. Before 
the outbreak of war, Berthold volunteered for the air service, and began his flying career 
at the infancy of military aviation. He started flight training in the summer of 1914 at a 
civilian flying school run by a local aircraft manufacturer, Fliegerschule der 
Halberstädter Flugzeugwerke. The Halberstadt Aeroplane Works’ airfield was used to 
test the machines they manufactured, such as licensed copies of the British-made Bristol 
monoplane.93 The firm offered training to both military and civilian clientele. The 
production of British-designed aircraft by a major German aviation firm in 1914 speaks 
to the underdeveloped nature of military aviation in Germany at the outbreak of the First 
World War.94 Berthold was accompanied in flight school by a fellow military aviator 
named Oswald Boelcke. Boelcke, who was later credited with developing the first 
codified set of aviation tactics, also became one of the first Fliegerheld, or flying heroes 
in German popular culture. In the summer of 1914, however, he was a new trainee like 
Berthold.  
Berthold, like many German pilots serving in the military, volunteered in the 
hopes of joining the Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches, or Imperial German 
                                                     
92 See “Rudolf Berthold,” in Norman Franks, Above the Lines: The Aces and Fighter Units of the German 
Air Service, Naval Air Service, and Flanders Marine Corps: 1914-1918 (London: Grub Street, 1993). 
93 Peter Kilduff, Iron Man: Rudolf Berthold: Germany’s Indomitable Fighter Ace of World War I (London, 
Grub Street, 2012), chap. 2, Kindle Edition. Halberstadt’s production of licensed British machines 
highlights the degree to which the aviation industry was significantly connected across national borders. 
94 For a detailed analysis of the development of German military aviation at the outbreak of World War I, 
see John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
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Flying Corps. Flight school was interrupted by the news of the assassination of Archduke 
Franz Ferdinand of Austria on June 27, 1914.95 The gravity of the moment weighed 
heavily on the young Berthold, and he subsequently began keeping a private diary only a 
few days later, on July 1, a date which coincided with being recalled to his infantry unit. 
The haphazard organization of the Fliegertruppe is apparent in the recalling of viable 
candidates back to their infantry duties. This scattered organization was also reflected in 
the way the air service assigned Feldflieger-Abteilung (FFA), or Field Flier Detachments, 
to various armies within the German military. Each unit fell under the jurisdiction of 
different generals and, as a result, the actions of the Fliegertruppe were not a truly 
unified effort. Flight training was also subservient to Berthold’s primary assignment, that 
of serving in the infantry as a rifleman. 
Berthold’s diary entries for the early days of mobilization reflect the chaotic 
fracturing of peacetime cultural discourses.96 Many Germans sensed a compression of 
time in the years leading up to the First World War. The rush toward open hostilities only 
served to accelerate an already disorientating rate of change. Berthold’s writing reminds 
us that recent historical assertions that the “Spirit of 1914” was more myth than lived 
reality. Within the confines of his infantry unit, Berthold describes a sense of fear, dread, 
and anxiety, rather than jubilation at the possibility of war. “We have just returned from 
the training ground. There is a peculiar mood in the regiment; you cannot even say what 
it is… The exercises were so different this time; every other word was ‘war standard!’ 
                                                     
95 Kilduff, chap. 2. 
96 Rudolf Berthold, Persönliches Kriegstagebuch, MSG2-10722. Freiburg Bundesarchiv, 1-2. 
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The marches, attack exercises, night exercises, there seems to be no end.”97 Berthold also 
related his personal feelings of no longer feeling like an infantryman, “for months I have 
not marched a single step nor taken part in a field maneuver. Now, sometimes my feet did 
not want to go; one unlearns how to march too quickly. In aviation service, one either sits 
in an airplane or in a car.”98 A little more than two weeks later, on July 17, Berthold 
received a permanent transfer to the Fliegertruppe.99 The intersection of aviation’s 
embryonic development and the outbreak of war would fundamentally alter the trajectory 
of Berthold’s life and subsequent death. 
Flight training, like most aspects of aviation technology, was forced to develop 
rapidly to meet the pressing demands of war. New recruits like Berthold flew as 
observers in multi-seat machines, allowing them to acclimate to the physical experience 
of flight, something few people understood in 1914. This also allowed them to grasp the 
physics behind flight without endangering themselves, or the training officers who 
accompanied them. Beyond safety, however, observation training was vitally important 
to the Fliegertruppen, whose primary mission was the monitoring of enemy troop 
movements and, later, the coordination of artillery fire on enemy emplacements. 
Berthold, like many future German combat pilots, wanted to do more than simply 
observe. The airplane provided the opportunity to steer, quite literally, one’s own destiny 
free of the haphazard circumstances of the battlefield. It was an opportunity to enticing to 
ignore: “I wanted to steer the airplane myself! I can no longer climb into an airplane with 
                                                     
97 Rudolf Berthold, Persönliches Kriegstagebuch, MSG2-10722. Freiburg Bundesarchiv, 1.  
98 Ibid. 
99 Rudolf Berthold, Persönliches Kriegstagebuch, MSG2-10722. Freiburg Bundesarchiv, 3. 
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anyone else; in my mind, I am steering and become restless when I notice uncertainty in a 
pilot.”100  
The Fliegertruppen of 1914, however, was hardly an organized and efficient arm 
of the German military. The decision made in the years preceding the First World War, 
that of allowing private German firms of widely varying capabilities and backgrounds to 
design the aircraft that would ultimately be put into military service, was beginning to 
show. As he stood on the grassy landing field of the Halberstadt flying school, Berthold 
noted, “A peculiar feeling came over me: Patched up in every spot, [the aircraft] did not 
really look ready for war.”101 Time and again, Berthold notes with some frustration, the 
condition of the flying machines pressed into military service. Training too, would be a 
chaotic and disorientating experience. Graduating to pilot status required the student to 
pass two examinations. Berthold noted that he had yet to do so and, “in the event of 
mobilization, I will definitely be an observer…”102 His contemporary, Oswald Boelcke, 
had not suffered the same interruptions in his training and graduated to the rank of pilot. 
For those drawn to aviation, there was a sense that flight could provide agency in 
the midst of periods of great uncertainty and change. As in peacetime, the sensation of 
flying, that of collapsing boundaries of space and time, was a transcendent experience. 
Berthold noted that his friend, Oswald Boelcke seemed attracted to flight as a way of 
finding control over his situation, “one look at him shows that he flies because it makes 
him happy.”103 For Berthold, the sensation of flight was accompanied by the need to have 
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direct control over the way he contributed to the war. Only four pages into Berthold’s 
diary, a thematic vein appears - that of feeling more than an obligation of duty to fly, but 
rather a compulsion to climb back into the cockpit time and again, regardless of danger or 
injury. This mindset returns time and again throughout Berthold’s Kriegstagebuch. 
Outside of the cockpit, Berthold appears to be a far more nervous individual.  Berthold’s 
reaction to war, as reflected in his diary, conveys a sense of intense, conflicting emotions; 
worry over the state of readiness of the Fliegertruppe, a sense of fear for his comrades 
who are marching to war, and the overwhelming sense of being swept away by 
something much larger than himself. The sense that he belongs to a much larger historical 
moment is further reflected in his writing. Upon seeing troops marching towards their 
marshalling area, Berthold writes, “What a happy and refreshing sight! They are singing, 
marching with flowers and their buttons and on the bayonets of their rifles! They are 
invincible in their hopes! Despite the seriousness of the situation they have happy, 
sparkling eyes. It was as if they were part of a big family… My service for the nation 
begins.”104  
The speed of aviation development intersected again, this time with the rapidly 
evolving needs of war in the opening moments of the conflict. Despite its ability to 
transcend time and space in peacetime, much of Germany’s military aircraft were shipped 
to the rapidly moving front lines by rail rather than flown to their destination.105 Berthold 
describes the chaotic scenes that unfolded upon arriving at what would become their base 
of operations. Airfields were not commonplace and over the course of the war, new bases 
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of operations were often erected near open fields. As a result, manor houses and chateaus 
often became the “suitable” operational home for German units.106 These homes, of 
course, were either abandoned by the civilian populations who fled the approaching 
armies or were taken by German forces.  
Aviation in war would occupy a far less planned and maintained physical space 
than it had during peacetime. Berthold notes that the field for FA23 was less than ideal, 
“Montjoie is in the worst spot imaginable. Big forests stretch out to the south, to the east 
and west are steep slopes…”107 Flying during the First World War was extremely 
hazardous in the best of conditions. Engines regularly failed, fire was an ever-present 
danger, and emergency landings were commonplace. Having clear, wide, preferably flat 
ground free of obstructions was highly desirable among First World War aviators. FA23 
hastily constructed the necessary facilities for a military air unit: hangers, workshops, 
storage for spare parts, workspaces for necessary repairs. Aircraft too, had to be 
assembled after being shipped in parts to the front lines. An increasing urgency 
accompanied the need to assemble aircraft and begin contributing to the war, which was 
also viewed as a conflict engaged at a furious tempo. 
Rudolf Berthold’s experiences in the early weeks of mobilization and war were 
hardly unique. His decision to record his thoughts, however, provides remarkable insight 
into the mentalities of the men who would fly for Germany during the First World War. 
In his entries, we find the impact of aviation on German culture, and the cultural values 
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that were in turn, embedded on the new machine known as the airplane. The coming of 
war released pent up anxieties about aviation’s ultimate purpose as either a transcendent 
technology of peace or a weapon of war. The outbreak of hostilities in August 1914, then, 
temporarily closed one path for aviation and opened another. The world had transformed 
rapidly since 1900, and German culture struggled to make sense of that change. The 
accelerating rate of change only increased with the coming of war, and Berthold 
witnessed the fear, anxieties, and nervous excitement of thousands of men his own age as 
they marched off to fight, knowing that their destiny would likely not be of their own 
making. The act of becoming an airman provided Berthold and others like him with the 
sense, however fragile, that they could transcend the chaos of war and wrest back control 
of their own fate. Aviation, with its empowering technical abilities and transcendent 
cultural discourse, provided a foundation of belief that Berthold would not only to 
survive the war, but to thrive in it. It was a belief shared by almost every young German 
who took to the air in 1914. The promise of aviation in peacetime, that of transcending 
time and space, of piercing borders and rendering the old world irrelevant, had been 
married to its peril, that of becoming a fully realized weapon of war.  
 
Conclusion 
In fourteen short years, a modern, rapidly industrializing, fractious German 
society rushed from the airship to the airplane. The rise of aviation, and its depiction as 
everything from national spectacle to individually empowering, embodies the very 
dichotomies within German culture. The discussion which formed around flight, from the 
nervous display of national power with the ultimately doomed tour of the Zeppelin in 
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1908, to the rise of the air show a few short years later at Johannisthal, reflects the litany 
of discourses which informed German culture at the turn of the twentieth century. The 
complex interplay of regionality, industrialization, the opposition of rural and urban, 
young and old, all informed a national discussion of what the new German nation would 
represent. Within that discourse lay the internal tensions; anger towards a growing 
materialism that threatened to destroy the culture of Goethe; resentment of the Jugend 
towards their elders, who they viewed as a threat to their future as young Germans; the 
dizzying experience of a technological and industrial expansion so rapid that even the 
largely traditional language of Heimat culture had to adapt. These tensions both fueled 
and fractured a German society that was, at times, seen on the verge of a social 
meltdown. Into that complex interplay, the airplane became a new space for cultural 
discussion. It represented both the dawning of a post-national, transcendent era, and a 
new age of tyrannical militarism by the older generation. It could propel the individual to 
new heights, but in the case of many like Paul Emil Engelhard, the airplane could also 
kill the very men who sought liberation through flight. It provided a space for some to 
challenge gender divides, and created new spaces of personal expression and professional 
development for women in a society that, even by nineteenth century standards, was 
particularly sexist. 
The dichotomous, often fractious society which gave German culture its color in 
1900, also influenced aviation in that country. Johannisthal represented the nexus of 
German flight, and the opportunities to harness the power of German industrial might 
prove too alluring for aviation pioneers like Edmund Rumpler and Antony Fokker. The 
new field of aircraft design and manufacturing then, grew out of a broad mix of 
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industrialists and entrepreneurs. Older, established firms like Junkers viewed flight as 
another opportunity for technological development. Men like Ernst Heinkel saw flight as 
a romantically powerful combination of imagination and engineering, albeit not without 
peril. And others like Fokker viewed the embryonic nature of flight in Germany as a 
remarkable opportunity to make a fortune designing flying machines. 
But the German aircraft industry received no guiding influence from its military. 
Content to let private industry sort out designs, the German government did little to 
provide the necessary logistical and financial support to move its future air force beyond 
its early, embryonic stage. The machines that were subsequently produced represented 
the economic, industrial, and bureaucratic climate that created them, and were of wildly 
varying quality. The aircraft Germany took to war in the summer of 1914, then, were 
representative of the fractious culture that produced them. This inconsistency influenced 
the lived realities of men like Rudolf Berthold, whose Kriegstagebuch reflects the 
anxiety, excitement, and fear that the coming war produced. The disorder and chaos he 
witnessed within his own unit served only to fuel the sensation that Germany, the rest of 
Europe, and indeed, possibly the world, were about to march off into an abyss. Even in 
the early weeks of fighting, military aviation proved to be incredibly dangerous. The new 
world of militarized flight was far removed from the peacetime pursuits of ever higher 
altitudes and aerial acrobatics. In their place was the new demands of intelligence 
gathering and distressingly regular fatalities among flying units.  
The airplane, which had served as a reflection of German culture through a 
decade of nervous peace, would now become a weapon of warfare. In that transition, 
aviation experienced a metamorphosis and became an altered space. Once a canvas of 
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cultural reflection, even ridicule, the airplane now formed the foundational piece of an 
uneasy German nationalism; the men charged with flying would use the airplane not only 
as a tool, but as a mode of cultural expression, even as their own experiences, indeed 
their own bodies, became the canvas for Germans to imprint their own cultural 
expectations upon them, whether grounded in reality or not.  
Warfare in 1914 then was both new and old; known and unknown. The airplane 
would become a part of the chaos and uncertainty that would follow. Its rapid 
militarization mirrored the war on the ground even as it transcended and defined it. 
Aviation’s gaze shifted: from those on the earth staring at awe into the air, to aviators 
monitoring a mutating ground war from above. Its focus was no longer on the 
achievements of flight, but on the slaughter below. 
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CHAPTER TWO: IMAGING AVIATION 
 
Introduction 
Writing in the decade following the First World War, Walter Benjamin suggested 
that modernity was constructed by a series of “shock experiences.”1 In the aftermath of 
the conflict which decimated a generation of Germans and disillusioned a nation, 
Benjamin’s assertions felt apt. The First World War was a conflict defined by shock 
experiences which were largely shaped by technological innovation. While the airplane 
provided the newest example of ingenuity on the battlefield, the photographic camera 
represented the repurposing of a slightly older technology in a new fashion. The camera, 
as employed during the First World War, came to occupy a fascinating space as a tool of 
military application and as a medium of documenting experience. Photographic images 
created the popular and powerful iconography of the conflict: barbed wire, muddy 
trenches, machine guns, and poison gas.  
The camera also intersected the development of the airplane, and the conversation 
between the two technologies would revolutionize both. At the outset of the conflict, 
military aircraft were tasked primarily with observing enemy troop movements. Doing so 
required a well-trained observer with a nearly photographic memory and the ability to jot 
down detailed notes, usually while under fire. The advent of the aerial photographic 
camera, however, transformed aerial observation and, with it, the way human beings 
viewed and analyzed wars.  
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The camera also helped shape the identity of Germany’s young fliers both in 
official discourse and in private moments of memory and meaning making. Public 
images, often sold as postcards, cultivated the narrative of the Fliegerheld, or “flying 
hero;” a noble warrior who embodied the best traits of the nation and expressed them 
through the role of the fighter pilot.2 Private photographs, in contrast, cultivated a less 
rigid and more dynamic personal identity among German aviators tasked with aerial 
observation and reconnaissance. Their experience in war and their subsequent memories 
of the conflict intersected with the tool they used on a daily basis over the Western Front, 
the camera. 
Photographic technology predated the First World War, but it transformed from 
an expensive, cumbersome, and largely fixed platform into a portable device that could 
be used by almost anyone. By the outbreak of the war, small, portable cameras allowed 
soldiers to capture images of the battlefield as well as private moments with comrades in 
training or during breaks behind the lines. Once designers and engineers fashioned a 
camera that could operate from a moving airplane, and capture high definition photos 
from extremely high altitudes, the results were transformative for both technologies. The 
airplane became more than a tool for visual observation: incredibly detailed photographs 
were recorded and sent back to Germany’s commanding generals within hours of 
development, rendering the battlefield, with its intricate and evolving system of trench 
fortifications, knowable from above. The camera, in addition to its weaponization, also 
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allowed German aviators to mimic their comrades on the ground, and capture private 
perspectives of the war. Alfred Lichtwark commented on the camera in 1907 by saying, 
“in our age there is no work of art that is looked at so closely as a photograph of oneself, 
one's closest relatives and friends, one's sweetheart."3 The advent of the rise of personal 
photography before the First World War moved the image “out of the realm of aesthetic 
distinctions into that of social functions.”4 
Photographic images, too, now command the attention of contemporary 
historians, not as illustrations of historical texts, but as textual sources unto themselves. 
Photography provides access that the written word cannot. It demonstrates identity, 
circumstance, and intent in ways that text fails to convey. Images often do so by accident 
- in the composition of the photo, in its placement in an album, in the repetition of themes 
or in the anomalies that appear. Examining the thousands of photographs captured by 
German observation crews, both on the ground and in the air over the Western Front, 
clearly demonstrates experiences that differ from the popular German Fliegerheld, and 
challenges previously held conventions of German aviators as universally stoic, 
“ruthlessly chauvinistic” and masculine warriors.5  
 
The Rise of Photography in Military Aviation 
The early development of aviation was characterized by the question of practical 
application. The machines created in the decade prior to the First World War were too 
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frail for most military duties. They lacked the power to carry weapons of any significance 
aloft and therefore, could not directly impact the battles unfolding below. Futurists, 
writers, and aviation designers all imagined a time when aviation’s technological 
progression would revolutionize warfare. Until that time, however, observation of the 
enemy was aviation’s paramount purpose in the years before the First World War. The 
aviation historian Charles Gibbs-Smith noted that, “in 1909 powered aviation came of 
age,” indicating that the airplane had matured beyond the point of its earliest prototypes – 
the kinds of machines that may fail to take off or break up in flight due to serious and 
systemic technical and mechanical limitations. In doing so, he contested, “the airplane 
became technically mature and established in the public mind.”6 Gibbs-Smith’s assertions 
coincide roughly with the moment aviation became of concern with military planners 
across Europe. Most notably, aviation became worthy of military investment when, 
during French military maneuvers during the Fall of 1911, an observation flight 
successfully located enemy positions from a distance of 60 kilometers.7 In that moment, 
the battlefield transformed. Military strategists had long relied on attaining an observation 
position on high ground, in a tower, or when necessary, perched in a high tree. The 
airplane significantly magnified the distance that commanding officers could see. The 
consequences of France’s military maneuvers sparked an arms race between the war’s 
future belligerent powers to invent, procure, and press new machines into service.  
Gibbs-Smith’s assessment also reflected a change in public consciousness 
regarding the potential power and peril of aviation. The literary futurist H.G. Wells 
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published The War in the Air in 1908.8 Instead of the airplane observing troop positions, 
however, Wells imagined a far more terrifying future; one where airships, the then 
dominant form of aviation technology, would have the capability to destroy entire cities. 
In The War in the Air, Wells describes a militaristic and bombastic Germany attacking 
the United States with a barrage of Zeppelins, destroying the U.S. Atlantic Fleet before 
razing Manhattan to cinders. It is the horror of Total War that Wells describes in such 
detail in The War in the Air.9 In the mind of Wells, this new type of warfare, conducted 
from thousands of feet up, rendered the aggressor desensitized to death as he murdered 
thousands without ever seeing his victims from the air. By the outbreak of war in the 
summer of 1914, each army possessed a limited but capable air arm, whose primary 
purpose was to observe the enemy and pass along strategic intelligence to the army’s 
command. While the airplane allowed for troop observation from above, the 
miniaturization and weaponization of the photographic camera would fundamentally 
change the mission of aviation, and the experience of the war’s aviators.10 
Like the airplane, the photographic camera was a technology which required a 
degree of sophistication and ease of use before attracting the attention of military 
planners. The camera’s invention predated the First World War by several decades, but 
its technological transformation around the beginning of the conflict was a revelation. 
The camera was no longer a difficult, expensive, and largely immobile medium. Instead, 
the camera became an item that could suddenly capture the everyday and do so in a 
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portable and relatively cost effective way. By the end of the 1870s, new technological 
innovations allowed for the capturing of objects in motion.11 Further, roll film and the 
advent of far smaller, more portable cameras created new opportunities for photography 
to transcend the walls of the expert’s studio into the hands of everyday people. 12  
Photography’s transformation began before 1914, but its technological 
development was rapidly accelerated by its weaponization and utilization during the First 
World War. In addition to its use on the battlefield, photography was employed as part of 
an industrial and cultural total war. The images captured at the point of the camera not 
only directed munitions and troop movements, but also the citizenry at home. As aviation 
grew in popularity during the war, the camera was employed to create the iconography of 
Germany’s fliers for popular consumption. Images of brave pilots flooded German 
markets, post offices, and bookstores. Simultaneously, these popular images ignored the 
largest demographic of German fliers, that of aerial observation crews tasked with the 
daily duties of photographing the front.  
Photography then, presents a fascinating point of entry into the cultural history of 
Germany’s air service during the First World War. The camera was more than 
weaponized for work on the battlefield, it was militarized to serve the morale of a 
population mobilized for total war. Aviators found growing importance in the minds of 
military planners as their ability to send by high resolution photographs of even the 
smallest frontline detail only improved over the course of the war. Equipped with 
personal cameras of their own, and often stationed at airfields with an on-site dark room, 
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these fliers assembled a massive collection of private photographs of their lives as 
Germany’s first airmen. By contrast, the fighter pilots assigned to protect them and 
destroy enemy aircraft, grew in such popular acclaim that they often sat for studio 
portraits, that were then bought by an enthusiastic public. The stark differences in the 
lived realities of aviators and the staged iconography of the Fliegerheld, or flying hero, 
elucidates the importance of the camera, not merely as a weapon of war and a medium of 
self-expression, but as a means to construct popular identity as well. 
 
The Photograph as a Weapon of War 
The weaponization of both the airplane and photography intersected precisely at 
the end of a camera. Even the evolution of the camera for use in aerial operations reflects 
the degree to which its weaponization translated to its physical shape and the manner in 
which an observer would interact with it. The photographic device in question was called 
the Maschinengewehrkamera, or “machine gun camera,” developed by German inventor 
Oskar Messter and constructed by the Ernemann company in Dresden.13 This camera is a 
fascinating remnant of material culture created during the First World War, primarily 
because the device looks unlike any civilian camera produced during the period. Instead, 
the “machine gun camera” resembles a working replica of a German-built MG08 model 
machine gun used both on the ground and in the air. Two wooden handles flank either 
side of the rear of the camera, with a long cylindrical tube extends down the “barrel” of 
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the device.14 The trigger button, used here to shoot film rather than bullets, is placed in 
the exact location as on the MG08. Even the “sights,” used for ranging a target with the 
weapon are replicated exactly on the camera.15 A close analysis of this remarkable device 
clearly demonstrates the importance of photography to the German air service. It also 
shows us the way engineers imagined an observer interfacing with the device, and how 
they felt they could most easily translate pre-existing knowledge regarding weapon 
operation to a new tool for aerial reconnaissance.  
It is clear from the design of the device that the camera’s operator would already 
be familiar with the MG08 machine gun. Rear-seat observers, assigned to air crews 
operating a wide range of multi-seat reconnaissance aircraft would have significant 
experience in operating and firing the MG08. The design and operation of the camera 
would utilize the training that these crew members already possessed. The observer 
simply had to lift the camera, lean it over the side of his aircraft, and “shoot” the target 
below. The camera operated with glass plate film, each plate ranging in size from 9x12 to 
9x18 cm formats.16 One can imagine how difficult it was for an observer to change the 
plates while under anti-aircraft fire or while being harassed by enemy scouts.  
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the photographs rendered at altitude by the 
“machine gun camera” is the clarity and fidelity of the images. A series of photographs 
archived by FA296 and Bayern Schlasta 31 (Bavarian Bombing Squadron) illustrate 
enemy front line positions in exacting detail.17 Attached with each photographic report is 
                                                     
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bayern Schlasta 31 Documents, Finding Aid: WK2128, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv: Abt. 
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a complete narrative by the observer, noting enemy troop positions relative to their 
location from the previous twenty-four hours. Friendly positions, too, are noted in 
comparison to their enemies, often located just a few hundred feet away. “Thinness” and 
“Thickness” were often noted in front line descriptions - illustrating the relative 
vulnerability of these troops in relation to their opponents.18 Even the depth and extended 
fortifications of both friendly and enemy troop positions were noted in great detail. If an 
enemy unit had dug their trench deeper, or begun work on a new network of connective 
trenches - which expanded across the Western Front like a living membrane - the details 
were recorded both on film and on paper. This information would have likely been 
passed immediately to the squadron’s commanding officer who appended his own report 
with notations on the findings of his men, before sending it up the chain of command.19 
These reports, which were filed by observation flights every day, served as the life blood 
of information for the Generals tasked with directing the moment of hundreds of 
thousands, and sometimes millions, of men on the Front. 
The environment that shaped the photographs taken by aerial observers also 
played a significant role in proving the military value of the photographic camera and the 
airplane. By October 1914, the Western Front had stalled, and what was a rapid war of 
mobility and maneuver had stagnated into dug fortifications. As the autumn passed, those 
dugouts turned into well engineered and complex trench fortifications, the effects of 
which influenced the mentalities of those serving on the ground as much as it shaped the 
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role of the airplane up above.20 Aviation’s relative frailty at such an early stage of the war 
meant that aircraft could not easily travel long distances without mechanical fault. They 
were also incapable of carrying significant payloads. Static trench warfare, the kind 
established by the end of 1914, complimented the mission of aerial observation by 
providing a relatively stable area to photograph.  
With that stable environment established, aviators began the daily work of 
mapping out the enemy’s front line positions - complete with information on troop 
numbers, artillery positions, new entrenchments, significant shifts in materiel. Their 
observations were vital to military planners; discovering new enemy reinforcements, or a 
new buildup of artillery, could signal the coming of an offensive action. Noting these 
changes could thus prevent the enemy from achieving the all-important breakthrough 
sought on both sides. The best machines for observing and documenting these changes 
were large, lumbering two-seat reconnaissance aircraft big enough to fit the necessary air 
crew and equipment, and stable enough in the air for clear photos. These machines, while 
not as evocative as the nimble, single-seat scout aircraft which would follow by 1915 and 
1916, provided the backbone of the Army’s need to know ever increasing amounts of 
information about the war on the ground.  
German observation units, usually designated with the moniker of Flieger-
Abteilung, or “flying detachment,” were assigned to individual armies serving on front 
line positions. These observation crews often cultivated a different kind of squadron 
culture from their counterparts in Jasta or “hunting” units. Pilot and observer had to work 
                                                     
20 See Ross J. Wilson, Landscapes of the Western Front: Materiality During the Great War (New York: 
Routledge, 2012).  
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in such unified action that many referred the pair were referred to “one individual.”21 
Reconnaissance aircraft were large machines, and with no radio communication, pilots 
and observers could not verbally interact while in flight. Even shouting was rendered 
mute at altitudes exceeding 12,000 feet.22 Equipped with heavy protective equipment, 
including helmets, it was simply impossible to hear one another. Instead, each pilot and 
observer developed an intricate system of non-verbal communication, allowing each to 
know the intention of the other and to better perform their mission during each sortie. The 
difference between effective and ineffective communication could often mean the 
difference between life and death. The pilot of most observation aircraft, particularly 
during the early-war period, often had no forward-firing weapons and could not 
maneuver the machine effectively to counter an enemy scout. Rather, it was his observer, 
armed with weapon like the MG08, who was tasked with protecting the pair while on 
mission. Firing from a moving platform in the air, too, was incredibly difficult, and close 
coordination with the pilot in control of the aircraft was vital in guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the observer in protecting them.23 
Flieger-Abteilung units were later tasked with bombing sorties, but, here too, 
technological limitations played a deciding factor: while aircraft could carry larger bomb 
loads, the task of observation flights remained the priority of the Luftstreitkräfte for its 
                                                     
21 See Georg Paul Neumann, Die Deutschen Luftstreitkräfte in Weltkrieg (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 
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23 Norman Franks, Above the Lines: The Aces and Fighter Units of the German Air Service, Naval Air 
Service and Flanders Marine Corps: 1914-1918. (London: Grub Street, 1993), 12-14. 
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FA units.24 These sorties were conducted daily and, during periods of heavier activity at 
front-line positions, multiple flights were required each day to provide as much 
information as possible to the General Staff. Observation crews, armed with their 
machine gun cameras, were responsible for both photographing these positions as well as 
making appropriate notations. Once on the ground, the written and photographic data 
were combined into reports so that the General Staff could identify the subjects in each 
picture and take appropriate action. 
Aerial observers were meticulously trained in the use of their photographic 
equipment. Documents from the Luftstreitkräfte illustrate the multiplicity of 
circumstances observers faced in the air: how to shoot effective photos through cloud 
cover, from different altitudes, and various angles of attack were explained in intricate 
detail in their training materials. But while the Luftstreitkräfte wanted air crews trained in 
the methods of photography, they were not educated in the development and processing 
of the film they shot in the air. Once safely back on the ground, air crews simply handed 
their glass plates over to a trained film developer assigned to each observation squadron. 
One photograph in the photo album of a German observer named Peter Supf’s, shows the 
squadron dark room and the officer charged with developing all of the unit’s images.25 
Stationed in a simple room in the squadron’s quarters, which has been converted to the 
task. Hanging above the officer are lines with photos drying from the bath of chemicals 
used to develop the image captured on glass plate negatives. The room is also filled with 
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the General Staff regarding the damage inflicted by various size explosives, all small enough to fit in the 
confines of observation aircraft. 
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small electric fans to aid in the process. It was a makeshift facility, to be sure, but one 
that removed the need to train observers in the technical task of film development.  
The photograph of Supf’s dark room perfectly illustrates the type of setup 
typically found at front line airfields during the First World War. This division of 
technical knowledge, at first, seems curious, but the rationale behind this choice is coldly 
logical: observation crews were, ultimately, expendable. A flying accident or successful 
attack by an enemy aircraft could kill an observer, and cost the Luftstreitkräfte months of 
valuable time spent training crews in the use of sophisticated photographic equipment. 
Instead, training permanently grounded service members in the process of developing the 
film exposed in the air prevented such a loss from ever occurring. Additionally, the 
simple “point and shoot” nature of the machine gun camera also removed the need for 
extraneous training, as observers would already be familiar with the mechanical operation 
of one weapon, and could apply those methods to the camera. Simply stated, the 
photographic equipment used by observers was of a sufficient simplicity as to render 
training as easy and efficient as possible, providing more trained crews for a combat 
environment that only grew in risk as the war progressed. 
 
Militarized Photography: Images, Aviation, and Total War 
Aviation’s relationship with photography extends to the beginning of powered 
flight and from its inception, the iconography of the aviator was largely shaped by visual 
culture. As seen in Chapter One, the airship dominated German popular imagination in 
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the years preceding the First World War.26 In August of 1908, the Luftschiff Zeppelin or 
LZ 4 made a grand tour over Germany. Images of the massive airship, with its imposing 
appearance, were splashed across German newspapers as its progress across the 
Fatherland was eagerly tracked by the popular press. Some compared the excitement 
shown by Germans as comparable to the 1870 declaration of war against France.27 
Newspapers, magazines, and local book shops all sold images of the famous airship 
before its catastrophic accident a few days later.  
By the start of the First World War, the camera had already distinguished itself as 
one of the few “weapons of war” that could also double as a means of meaning making 
and self-expression. The aviators tasked with photographing the trenches of the Western 
Front in intricate details also took hundreds of photographs of everyday life on the 
ground. When placed in conversation with the photographs created for their formal 
military duties, as well as other images constructed expressly for popular consumption, a 
litany of new insights into the lives, identities, and culture of German air crews comes to 
light. 
Germany’s fascination with air power continued during the First World War and 
popular photography adapted to meet the growing romanticization of German aviators. 
W. Sanke & Company was an established photographic firm at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Advertisements for Sanke’s company before the war described his firm as 
dedicated to “Postkartenvertrieb,” or “postcard sales.”28 An entry in an 1899 address 
                                                     
26 See “Giant Airships and World Politics” in Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the 
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27 Fritzsche, 9. 
28 Lance Bronnenkant, The Imperial German Eagles in World War I: Their Postcards and Pictures. 
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book describes Sanke’s company as “Landschaftsphtotographie, Stereoskopfabrik, 
Kunsthandlung,” “landscape photographer, stereoscope manufacturer, and art sales / the 
art trade.”29 Sanke’s business chased the increased interest in aviation in the decade prior 
to the First World War, publishing photographs of early aviation pioneers and machines 
like the Rumpler Taube, or even the Wright Flier.30 As the importance of aerial 
reconnaissance increased into 1915, air services on both sides of the lines built machines 
designed to protect friendly observation planes and destroy those of the enemy. The 
subsequent rise of this new single seat aviator, which in Germany, included well-known 
pilots like Max Immelmann and Oswald Boelcke, drove popular demand for Sanke 
postcards dedicated to this new kind of aviator, called the Kampfflieger, or “battle-flier.”  
In addition to the genre of Sanke’s postcards – that of the realm of aviation – the 
type of images produced within that genre is important to note. The men photographed 
for Sanke’s cards were nearly all single seat scout pilots: men like Manfred von 
Richthofen, Ernst Udet, and Erwin Bohme to list a few of the dozens of fighter pilots 
included in the collection. Curiously, reconnaissance and observation air crews were not 
featured in Sanke’s postcards. The choice of Sanke’s subject matter speaks not only to 
the continued popularity of aviation during the war, but also addresses the question of 
audience. While historical works addressing these popular postcards argue that German 
aviators were universally popular, the choice of the Kampfflieger suggests that Sanke’s 
audience was largely favorable to the Kaiser and the military in general.31 
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The popularity of these postcards, combined with the characterization of the 
aviators pictured, largely contributed to the invention of the Flieger-helden (sic), or 
“flying hero,” a narrative that resonated with conservative Germans who supported the 
war and the Kaiser. The flying hero was also depicted as predominantly upper-class in 
standing. The style of photographic pose employed for these portraits are so similar as to 
appear almost monolithic in style. Early publications, which featured both Boelcke and 
Immelmann were staged in front of rich tapestries, while the pilots posed in full dress 
uniform. Medals were of visual importance to Sanke cards, with each award highly 
polished and prominent in each portrait. Uniform hats, often worn at rakish angles, 
complimented leather gloves and, in many cases, cavalry style riding crops, further 
expressing the cultural markers of nobility. The awarding of new medals often warranted 
a re-issuing of previous cards. Again, this attention to military decorum indicates that the 
purchasing audience would be intimately familiar with the detailed minutia of often 
complicated award procedures. Given the logistical difficulties of bringing a combat pilot 
back for a new portrait, the new medals were often added in by an artist who edited the 
original image by hand, and a new portrait using the edited photograph was issued.32 
An analysis of the style of portrait - the pose of the pilot, the clothes worn, the 
background, even accessories in the aviator’s hands elucidate much about class, status, 
identity, and gender performance. The subject captured on Sanke’s cards appears at all 
times to be stoic, hyper-masculine, dedicated to duty, and embodying the identities of a 
                                                     
32 In the instance of Rudolf Berthold’s Sanke Card, a new edition was printed after he was awarded the 
Pour le Mérite. Since Berthold could not sit for another portrait, the medal was drawn carefully around his 
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good aristocratic background.33 Uniforms are immaculately worn. The subject never 
smiles and is often posed looking into the distance with a stoic glare. Early cards were 
photographed at Sanke’s Berlin studio, with expensive tapestries draped behind the pilot 
as he is posed either standing nearly at attention, or sitting dramatically in a fine, high-
backed chair. When photographed outside, hunting dogs or other expensive pets feature 
extensively in the images. At times when it was not possible to send a combat aviator to 
Berlin, on site photography was used. In these instances, pilots pose either against a 
Heimat inspired background of greenery or stand in front of their machines, recreating an 
image reminiscent of an earlier time when a rider and his horse would pose for a portrait - 
a mechanical steed now replacing its nineteenth century predecessor. In other instances, 
captured enemy aircraft, either brought down intact by air crews who surrendered to their 
German adversaries, or the horrific site of the machine’s crash, set the stage for a portrait 
not out of place in the genre of big game photography of nineteenth century male 
aristocracy. Later photographs from 1918 feature a grimly determined aviator, staring 
with cold eyes and, often, a scowling visage. Despite having published over 600 images, 
Sanke cards embody a handful of recycled tropes: masculine camaraderie, stoic 
temperament, control over one’s emotions, mastery over one’s machine and with it, one’s 
destiny. Even when facing ever more daunting odds, the masculine German aviator only 
sets his jaw more firmly, and proves himself equal to the task. Then men photographed in 
Sanke’s cards then, epitomize the outward, public expectations placed upon them. They 
are not frightened, they do not shrink from the fight. Their image is singular: they are 
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heroic. 
Even death failed to terminate the narrative of Sanke’s Fliegerhelden. Both 
Boelcke and Immelmann’s images were republished after their respective deaths. 
Immelmann reappeared on a Sanke card after he died in June, 1916. When Boelcke’s 
death followed four months later, Sanke republished both of their images under the 
heading, “Unsere Flieger-helden,” “Our Flying Heroes.”34 Pilots’ images were re-
appropriated for morale improvement, and even war bond and pilot charity drives, as the 
republishing of Otto Parschau’s Sanke image on a bond stamp demonstrates35. Perhaps, 
not surprisingly, the aviator whose image was published in the highest volume was 
Manfred von Richthofen, known during the war as Der rote Kampfflieger, or Red Battle 
Flier. Richthofen posed for multiple portraits over the course of the war and his Sanke 
card catalog is immense. Following his death in 1918, Richthofen’s image appeared in 
magazines, newspapers, and again on new Sanke cards, as the German government, and 
the Army General Staff, sought to elevate Richthofen’s popularity to that of a fallen 
German hero.  
It is of interest to note the shift in terminology as well. While living, the caption 
“Unser erfolgreicher Kampfflieger,” “Our Successful Combat Pilot,” appears under most 
of the pilot images36. In death, their title changed to “Unser Fliegerheld,” “our flying 
hero.”37 The transition in distinction elucidates much about attitudes towards the death of 
a German combat pilot. Even aviators with fewer victories, a distinction among combat 
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fliers regarding their respective prowess in the air, received the new moniker. The change 
in title denotes an air of martyrdom, in dying a heroic, sacrificial death for the Fatherland. 
Newspaper obituaries share this terminological distinction. One German pilot, Ernst Heß, 
who died in December of 1917, had his obituary republished over a dozen times between 
the end of the year and the following autumn. Each time, Heß is denoted with the new 
title Fliegerheld upon the announcement of his death.38 
When placed in conversation with candid photographs taken at the Front, 
important distinctions in identity, duty, formality, and gender performance become 
readily apparent. Sanke images feature pilots as individuals, or as groups standing in a 
rigid, highly formal stance.39 Comparing the imagery of Sanke’s postcards with private 
images clearly demonstrates this difference. A series of photographs of Lt. Walter 
Höhndorf illustrates these distinctions. Höhndorf was a pre-war aviator, having learned to 
fly right before the outbreak of the First World War. He served ably in several Jasta 
squadrons during the conflict, and was assigned as a test pilot at Johannisthal before 
dying in a testing accident in 1917.40 Lt. Höhndorf provides an excellent case study in the 
discourse of public versus private photographs, as well as outward versus inward 
projections of masculinity. In his published Sanke card, Höhndorf is featured sitting in a 
rigid pose, holding a riding crop in his left hand and facing at a three-quarters seating 
position.41 His face is nearly expressionless and his uniform, as well as his appearance, 
                                                     
38 The sheer volume of obituary republications is another avenue of investigation that I will follow over the 
course of this dissertation. Heß was a gifted pilot, but not a particularly remarkable example, yet his death 
is reprinted repeatedly during 1918 and again following the end of the war. See Ernst Heß, Nachläss N208-
3, Freiburg Bundesarchiv.  
39 Bronnenkant, 141-142. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
  97 
are immaculately neat. Other photos of Höhndorf, likely taken the same day, feature him 
standing, his riding crop still firmly in hand, and projecting the same stoic expression to 
the camera. Höhndorf’s postcards epitomize the format and style of Sanke’s creations 
perfectly. 
A second series of photos, taken privately, shows a rowdy dinner party at Jasta 
14’s headquarters. Höhndorf visited the unit and met their commanding officer, German 
ace and future Freikorps member, Rudolf Berthold. Here, with the aid of privacy and 
what appears to be a liberal consumption of alcohol, all formal pretenses demonstrated in 
Höhndorf’s studio portrait vanish. Höhndorf sits astride Berthold’s lap, as he and another 
compatriot embrace each other. Also included in the image are a half-dozen other 
German aviators, all sitting informally, and often caught mid-embrace.42 Besides the 
seemingly disparate expressions of gender performativity - distinctions of public versus 
private behavior - are derived from the dueling culture of the Mensur, largely seen in 
German university fraternities prior to the war. These expressions - of stoic masculinity 
and private performativity - both originate in elite university culture. 
The Mensur mirrored so-called “academic fencing” and followed a strict set of 
rules and occurred on a daily basis in elite German universities. The weapon used by 
those participating in the Mensur was known as the Schläger, a special, purpose made 
sabre.43 While death was not a risk faced by fraternity students taking part in the duel, 
there remained a significant risk of facial injury that could scar them permanently. 
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German fraternities in the nineteenth century stressed that masculinity was not innate; it 
was a trait to be acquired. That acquisition meant earning it through the respect of others 
through the Mensur. Interestingly, the duel was fought “within the community and for the 
community.”44 In other words, while the duel itself was an individualistic act, its impetus 
originated from within the community. Thus, German university students learned through 
their experiences in fraternities that masculinity was earned by individual achievement 
for a greater community. While other images of masculinity pervaded the early 
nineteenth century, military masculinity came to be the dominant ideal by the beginning 
of the twentieth century. Taking part in the duel showed an “unconditional willingness to 
give satisfaction,” the kind of mentality required during the outbreak of the First World 
War.45 Curiously, the types of masculinity often associated with the duel, that of “strong, 
sinewy, slender students,” was not the norm among German fraternity students; rather, 
their physiques were characterized by “fat stomachs” which resulted from “hard 
drinking,” with fellow fraternity member.46  
Returning to Höhndorf’s private photographs, a continuum of gender performance 
is demonstrated by the actors’ perception of their own masculinity. Höhndorf, Berthold, 
and the other elite pilots carousing after hours, likely descended from the mentality 
forged in elite German universities at the end of the nineteenth century. Their duties as 
fighter pilots naturally progressed from the masculine ideals of the Mensur. Höhndorf, 
like his peers in the photographs, fought individual duels for the greater community of 
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the Jasta, the Air Service, and ultimately, the Fatherland.47 These actions mirrored the 
Mensur in their inherently offensive nature, which marked another difference between the 
fighter pilot’s understanding of his job when compared to his observation unit comrade. 
The ideals of elite university culture are also expressed by those who did not descend 
from the social order of Höhndorf and Berthold. Some members of Jasta 14, likely non-
commissioned officers, appear distinctly uncomfortable with the proceedings happening 
around them. They stand as rigidly and formally as those pictured in Sanke’s cards.48 
There are no smiles, no relaxed body language emanating from these men. Another party 
photo, featuring a half-dozen open bottles of wine and champagne, demonstrate these 
differences yet again. Once more, Berthold and Höhndorf are the center of attention, with 
Höhndorf captured singing loudly with flushed cheeks. His fellow pilots, by this point, 
look very much worse for wear and any sense of formality remaining has vanished from 
the majority of them, with more pilots sitting on each other’s laps and embracing.49 This 
again, hearkens back to the hard drinking Mensur culture of individual achievement for 
the greater good of one’s community. One officer to the left of the image, as well as a 
compatriot at the rear of the photograph, stands uncomfortably, nearly at attention, as the 
image is captured. 
A close reading of these images elucidates much about public and private 
performance, audience, and notions of masculinity in ways that even personal texts 
struggle to capture. When placed in conversation, the images of Höhndorf’s Sanke 
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portrait, compared with his private parties with Jasta 14, demonstrate the range of 
German notions of masculinity and gender performance and where such a continuum 
originated. Further, performance is clearly influenced by audience. Höhndorf’s portrait is 
for sale, and purchased by members of the German public. Their expectations are 
different from Höhndorf’s own and his pose, body language, even his blank facial 
expression, show us this. He is stoic, neatly kept, and posed in a way that demonstrates 
utter and complete control over his emotions and his actions. The party images, by 
comparison, show German aviators responding to the extreme stresses of combat: alcohol 
consumption, rowdy behavior, and a return to the type of gender performance that 
epitomized fraternity culture. Even the spacing of their bodies elucidates this fact: as 
posed group portraits show men in uniform with a significant gap between them, and 
private photos that show a complete inversion of that expectation. 
Whether intentional or otherwise, the Sanke card played a significant role in 
shaping the popular iconography of the German aviator. Most importantly, it is the choice 
of Sanke’s subject matter, the fighter pilot, that most shaped the public perception of 
German aviators. Sanke’s images, while elevating the already prominent notoriety of 
German fighter pilots, omit the observation air crews that flew over the Western Front 
every day. The absence of observation crews from Sanke’s repository of images suggests 
several underlying narratives. First, many German aces, including Manfred von 
Richthofen, began their flying careers as observers in reconnaissance aircraft before 
“progressing” to fighter squadrons. This suggests that fighter pilots possessed a greater 
level of acumen and skill than their counterparts in observation units. It also suggests that 
fighter pilots were, in the mindset of middle-class, conservative Germans born in the 
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nineteenth century, more relatable. Holding a riding crop, the inference of the plane as 
mechanical horse is hard to miss. Indeed, post war narratives cultivated the image of the 
“Knight of the Sky,” and cemented this identity in German popular memory.50  
Second, the prominence of the fighter pilot suggests the popular preference of 
offensive warfare in contrast to the seemingly defensive experience of reconnaissance 
crews. Pilots, too, embodied this partialness to the perceived empowerment of single-seat 
aerial combat. Rudolf Stark, who served in a two-seater squadron before finding transfer 
to a Jasta, or hunting unit, recalled of his time as an observer: “The battles we fought 
were defensive ones, thrust on us by necessity.”51 The lumbering nature and slow speed 
of observation aircraft dictated the terms of Stark’s experiences in battle. Two-seater 
aircraft could only defend themselves utilizing rear-facing machine guns, often operated 
by the observer as the pilot worked to place his assailant into firing range.  
Engaging in offensive action, the kind Boelcke advocated with the advent of the 
single seat fighter, appeared more romantic, more courageous, perhaps even more 
masculine then fighting defensive engagements only. In other words, this kind of 
offensive action appealed to the kind of audience prone to buy copies of Sanke’s 
postcards. Boelcke and his successors embodied the militaristic spirit that conservative 
Germans favored by taking the fight to the enemy. But the focus on the offensive nature 
of aerial combat obscured the value of the observation crew’s contribution. Images, 
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notations, and observations captured by reconnaissance crews over the Western Front 
could impact the outcome of an offensive action on the ground. While the lives of 
individual men lay in the hands of the Jasta pilot, an astute observation regarding a new 
influx of enemy troops in a particular section of the Front, could alter the fate of 
thousands of men’s lives.  
Finally, the pilots tasked flying these machines were ranked lower in the social 
order of German aviators. They were often referred to derisively by the title of 
“chauffeur,” designated to “drive” their aristocratic senior officers around the skies over 
Flanders. Manfred von Richthofen comments on this distinction upon meeting an officer 
who did not recognize him: “in the eyes of that kind gentleman, I had obviously lost caste 
when he discovered that I “drove” my own airplane.”52 Clearly, officers of a certain class 
did not “drive” themselves.  
This omission then, perhaps explains the false narrative of the aviator in the 
popular consciousness of the German public both during and, especially, after the 
conflict. Counter to the narrative of Germanic knights of the air - of air aces dueling in 
the skies over Flanders - the reconnaissance and observation crews faced a starkly 
different reality. Their lived experiences received scant attention in popular culture - that 
of the daily task of photographing and notating changes in the makeup of the Western 
Front, while fending off harassment from allied aircraft, as well as anti-aircraft fire and 
the ever-present risk of mechanical or structural failure. The images then, captured by 
these crews, are dramatically different to the tropes presented in Sanke’s heroic cards and 
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further cultivated by their Fliegerhelden subjects. 
 
The Photo Album as a Textual Source 
Beyond the technological history and a study of the implementation and popular 
consumption of photography, an analysis of individual images, or groups of images, 
presents fascinating insights into the experiences of German First World War aviators. 
Employing such an approach compliments existing written sources, such as war dairies, 
letters home, or official reports. The addition of photography also compensates for a 
source base that was heavily damaged in the Second World War. In particular, the dual 
nature of the work performed by the camera can provide insight into the culture and 
mentalities of German aviators and introduce new complexity to the traditional narrative 
of the First World War pilot. The same technology that allowed aviators to capture the 
strategic movement of the massive Western Front, also allowed them to snap the 
everyday experiences that defined their lives as pilots and observers on the ground. 
Personal photo albums, individual snapshots, and even squadron produced ephemera 
provide remarkable insight into the mentalities of individuals whose daily task involved 
imaging both the war on the ground, and the war’s influence on their own lives. Thus, 
when placed in this context, photography acts as a textual source. The composition of the 
photograph, the subjects captured by the shutter, the intent of the photographer, all open 
windows into the mentalities of not just the individual capturing the image, but of those 
caught in the gaze of the lens. 
Housed at the Deutsches Museum in Munich is a remarkable collection of photo 
albums and scrapbooks from the First World War. One such album was created by Peter 
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Supf, who served as an observer during the First World War. Nicknamed the “poet flier” 
by his contemporaries, Supf published multiple volumes of poetry and prose before and 
after World War I.53 Supf’s private album is important for several reasons. First, it 
provides incredibly personal details into the mindset of Supf and his comrades. The 
album was also clearly assembled during the war and runs chronologically, from 1914 
until late 1917. As a result, Supf’s photographs elucidate the construction of memory in 
the present rather than projected in hindsight. Finally, the contextual organization and 
marginalia of the album demonstrates that its intended purpose was for private 
consumption among Supf and his comrades, making it a very different source from the 
public Sanke cards bought up by the German public. 
Immediately apparent is the private, personal nature of the images captured by 
Supf. The tropes seen in Sanke’s cards - of stoic poses, neatly performed masculinity, and 
the ever-present warrior ethos of German knights of the skies, vanishes. Supf’s unit, 
Bayern Flieger-Abteilung 286b served as a reconnaissance unit on the Western Front. 
The first image in the album is of the unit’s formation photo in the summer of 1914. The 
photograph is less formal than the staged Sanke photos. Some are smiling, others have 
arms interlocked, while still others maintain a stoic pose for the camera. Also of note is 
the squadron mascot, a black and white puppy sits proudly in the center of the group.54 
The images that follow set the tone for the subject material that captured Supf’s 
attention. Aerial images of Heimat landscapes dominated by lush green valleys, old 
                                                     
53 Supf also published a thesis in 1912 entitled: Alsace-Lorraine and the Constitutional Nature of the 
German Empire. He also wrote several favorable histories of the Luftwaffe during World War II. See, 
Biographical data from finding aid for Peter Supf, Finding Aid: NL 063, Archiv der Deutsches Museum, 
Munich. 
54 Peter Supf, Photo Album, Finding Aid: LR-02118, Archiv der Deutsches Museum, Munich. 
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growth forests, and rolling countryside fill the first page of the album. From there the 
album reveals images showcasing the private, daily, lived experiences of Supf and his 
comrades. Early on, the destruction of the war is made apparent with images of bombed 
out churches and shell craters lining the roads traveled by Supf’s comrades.55 In a stark 
contrast to the Sanke images, a photograph captured by Supf shows the men of his unit 
bathing naked in a nearby river. Yet, by the album’s fifth page, the dark reality of the 
war’s cost is made readily apparent. The page is dominated by images of smashed 
buildings, wrecked equipment, and fittingly, the fresh graves of German soldiers, each 
marked with a makeshift wooden headstone and covered by raised mounds of dirt.56 The 
following pages show marshy landscapes of recently bombed out trench positions, newly 
established airfields, and what appears to be a captured enemy aircraft. Interspersed 
throughout, remain the images of Supf’s friends and fellow officers, captured in their day 
to day experiences.57 
The composition of Supf’s photographs speaks to a different discourse regarding 
the realities of war. They are in direct opposition to those of Sanke’s war postcards. Each 
shot is either candid or candidly posed. Supf and his comrades stand close to one another; 
they smile; they lock arms with one another. Posed photographs almost universally 
include pairs of men, likely pilot and observer, rather than a single stoic figure.58 They 
are almost always in their flying kit, rather than their dress uniforms. Helmets, heavy 
gloves, goggles, and fur lined jumpers create a dramatically different narrative: one of 
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fragile bodies tackling an impossible task. Each of Supf’s images reveals information, 
and deserves a close analysis of the embedded messages within. When placed in 
conversation with each other, through the composition of an album, a remarkably 
complete narrative emerges: one that details the pseudo-schizophrenic nature of the 
experiences of Supf and his comrades. The album is a fascinating blend of the mundane 
and macabre. Christmas parties, social events, photographs of the squadron’s large, 
lumbering reconnaissance aircraft sitting on the field awaiting take off, fill Supf’s pages. 
Placed in conversation with those photos are images of death: crashed aircraft, bombed 
out buildings, and funerals for Supf’s compatriots. Their placement in close proximity, 
often on the same page, elucidates much about Supf’s mentality.59 
The album serves both as a method of documenting the war through Supf’s eyes 
and also as a means of constructing memory. Accompanying these images are hundreds 
of lines of marginalia, detailing who is in which photograph, what was happening at the 
time the photo was snapped. The album also designates who has died since the respective 
image was captured. Supf details these deaths with an ornate cross in the marginalia, 
usually with an accompanying date. The album is clearly meant for personal 
consumption, the product of Supf crafting his narrative of the war, documenting his 
experiences, and his personal losses, which makes the mid-point of the album all the 
more extraordinary. It is here that we find the intersection of the lived realities of the 
war’s aerial operations and the Romantic notions provided by Sanke’s postcards. At the 
mid-point of the album, around October 1916, Supf creates several pages of large 
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photographs drawn from Boelcke’s funeral. These images are iconic, and are all 
reproductions taken from his funeral and republished by Sanke for purchase by the 
German public.60 These images included a reproduction of Boelcke’s studio portraits as 
well as several photographs taken at this funeral. 
Two points make this part of the album significant. First is the utter lack of any 
marginalia from Supf, save for a short note under first photo of Boelcke, which features a 
brief biographical caption that reads, in part, “Oswald Boelcke: Killed, 28 Oct 1916… 40 
victories.”61 The first page of funeral photographs show Boelcke standing, hands on hips, 
gazing into the distance, with his Pour le Mérite proudly displayed on his dress uniform. 
The next photo shows the litany of medals he won, carefully arranged for display at his 
funeral. The next several pages are entirely blank, filled only with the postcard images of 
Boelcke’s lavish burial. It infers that the viewer of the album, Supf and his comrades, 
need no explanation. The deaths of individual comrades, which came at an alarming rate, 
began to blur together, requiring intricate note taking. The memory of Boelcke’s death, 
though, is seared into their collective consciousness. A second notable detail is Supf’s 
editing of the Sanke cards. Each one is cut irregularly, by hand, and removes the card’s 
trademark and notations from the margins of the image. Supf’s actions here denote a 
desire to personalize the postcards to match his personal photographs. Following 
Boelcke’s funeral, the album resumes apace - replete with marginalia and the same 
unsettling construction where Alltagsgeschichte and death are synonymous. It is 
                                                     
60 A further discussion of the multiplicity of the types of memorials constructed for pilots will be discussed 
later in my dissertation. 
61 Peter Supf, Photo Album, Finding Aid: LR-02118, Archiv der Deutsches Museum, Munich.. 
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significant then, that no other fighter pilot, no other Fliegerheld, appears in Supf’s album, 
which terminates in late 1917, well after the rise of Boelcke’s successor, Manfred von 
Richthofen.62  
Supf’s album concludes with a few photographs of his commanding officer 
training a recruit in the techniques of artillery ranging, the next major technological 
innovation to sweep aerial observation units. The images show the unusual methods used 
to train observers in directing ground fire onto a designated target through the use of a 
wireless transmitter. Sitting high atop a ladder is the observer, who wears a radio headset 
and sits with a telegraph device, from which a long strand of wires descends to a wood 
table, reminiscent of a diorama. The table features a small model artillery gun and a set of 
enemy trenches, replete with a bombed out landscape. Sitting beneath him is the 
squadron’s commanding officer, also wearing a headset and manning the model artillery 
gun. It is clear from this photo that training involved an observer, looking over the board 
from above, would wire in the coordinates needed to hit his target. His commanding 
officer would then send a volley of fire and see if he was correct. It is perhaps fitting that 
the album – for reasons we are not privy to – ends here, as photographic work gave way 
to burdening the observer with yet another new piece of equipment to learn, this time, 
one far more complicated than his machine gun camera.  
Supf’s album also problematizes the notion that reconnaissance pilots held a 
certain disdain for their Kampfflieger comrades. Combat pilots serving in Jasta squadrons 
hunted in packs and embodied a group mentality that did not sit well with some German 
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aviators. Some observation crews in particular found hunting pack mentality distasteful. 
Hans Schröder, a reconnaissance observer, referred to Jastas as the “level of the masses,” 
and called the groups a “mass institution.”63 Schröder’s comments are telling. They 
demonstrate differences and delineations of understanding on what an aviator’s ultimate 
responsibility was. At the time of Schröder’s comments, mid-1916, Aerial warfare had 
yet to be fully industrialized - that was to come. But even at this early point, some like 
Schröder viewed his work as one of the last bastions of nobility in war.64 Yet Boelcke, 
the very architect of the Jasta system, transcends this sentiment for Peter Supf. Again, 
this suggests that Boelcke resonated on an intensely personal level.65 
Yet Supf’s album, as well as his personalizing of Boelcke’s Sanke images, 
demonstrates that he viewed Boelcke not only on a national level - the kind described by 
Peter Fritzsche in A Nation of Fliers - but also as a deeply personal figure. The album’s 
composition reads like that of a family scrapbook, filled with memories of happier times, 
of fallen comrades remembered. But the omission of any other famous aviators suggests 
that Boelcke alone resonated with Supf. The popular slogan of the time: “I want to be a 
Boelcke” spoke to Supf and the men of FA-286.66  Boelcke’s appearance, seen first as an 
anomaly in Supf’s album, sits comfortably with the close sense of camaraderie 
demonstrated throughout the rest of the alum. Supf and his comrades enjoy card games, 
cigars, and rowdy Christmas parties. One of Supf’s comrades is photographed swimming 
while wearing only his uniform hat at a jaunty angle. 67 They also pose for individual 
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portraits, albeit of a different type than the rigid Sanke images. Other images are 
classically Romantic, featuring squadron aircraft taking off in early morning skies - with 
heavy, somber cloud cover flanking the background. Other images feature fellow pilots 
flying over near Heimat type scenes of rolling countryside, forests, and streams.68  
Destruction also dominates the themes seen in Supf’s album. Bombed out ruins, 
crashed aircraft, burning wreckage, and a long, almost unending string of squadron 
funerals, litter the album throughout. It is here that photography and Benjamin’s post-war 
thoughts intersect. Modernity, as experienced by Supf and his fellow aviators consisted of 
a series of “shock experiences.”69 It is not difficult to extrapolate Benjamin’s philosophy 
and apply them to Supf’s own constructed memories of the war. These series of “shocks,” 
of death, destruction, and dismemberment, sit with an unnerving ease alongside the 
mundane experiences of the everyday. Included too, are images of a fellow comrade 
whose face is horribly disfigured from frostbite burns, suffered at altitude while operating 
one of Oskar Messter’s machine gun cameras. 
Finally, death is, not surprisingly, an important and recurring theme in Supf’s 
album. These funerals, captured by Supf’s camera demonstrate a vast difference between 
the services afforded famous fighter pilots and their observation unit comrades. Rather 
than a massive state funeral, Supf’s photos show small honor guards, relatively simple 
wooden caskets, and plain grave sites: sometimes marked with a propeller headstone. 
While stationed at the same location on the Western Front, a nearby graveyard served as 
the squadron’s memorial site, and additional graves appear over the course of the album, 
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as one plot grew into a half dozen, and then more. The men killed in Supf’s unit do not 
feature in Sanke’s ornate “Flieger-Helden” postcards. Their title is never elevated from 
“successful” to “heroic.” Their deaths, suffered through gunshot wounds, horrific burns, 
or the terrifying end of crashing into the ground with no parachute from ten thousand 
feet, are not romanticized like their Jasta counterparts. 
 
Identity and Experience in Observation Units 
As witnessed at the end of Supf’s album, the burden endured by observation units 
only increased as the war progressed, and that burden found multiple forms of 
expression. Supf’s albums, with his intricate marginalia, and his insistence of 
photographing each funeral and memorializing his comrades, were one method. Another 
came in the form of material and ephemera generated by these units in the form of 
squadron newsletters, Christmas postcards, and even cartoons. One such example comes 
from FEA 5, a reconnaissance unit serving on the Western Front, and their publication of 
a Christmas newsletter entitled Weihnachten 1916.70 
The air war had transformed by the end of 1916. Both Immelmann and Boelcke, 
the embodiment of the successful, even invincible Germanic air hero, were dead. 
Technologically, the war of late 1916 bore little resemblance to the world known by the 
conflict’s aviators a year before. Fragile scout aircraft, notably the infamous Fokker 
Eindecker, had been replaced with faster, more lethal scouts.71 The lives of Germany’s 
                                                     
70 Unknown Author, “Weihnachten 1916: FEA 5.” Microfilm, Finding Aid: PH-19 / 18, Freiburg: 
Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv. 
71 The Eindecker, Fokker’s early monoplane fighter and the first to feature the ability to fire through the 
propeller arc, was responsible for what the British labeled “The Fokker Scourge” of 1915. A period so 
terrifying for British airmen that they simply ran form anything that resembled the German scout. 
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observation crews were under ever-greater threat, as their lumbering two-seat machines 
remained almost stagnant in their development. Adorning the inside cover page is an 
exhausted reconnaissance pilot or observer, asleep in his flying gear, on the wing of one 
of his machines.72 A bird sits atop his helmet and the machine sits askew from a recent 
crash. The propeller is broken and the landing gear is flattened against the underside of 
the fuselage. The aviator is in no hurry to rush home; around him is deep snow, which 
also blankets the upper wing of his aircraft.73  
The pages of this Christmas newsletter are fascinating insights into the 
experiences and mentalities of the unit’s airmen. One page features, in the author’s 
handwriting and bordered with an ornate illustration, the story of the Fliegerlied, or 
“flier’s life.”74 The next page shows an illustration of an officer holding his men hostage 
with marionette strings. The men at the end of his tethers look exhausted as he yanks 
them erratically across the page. Another illustration makes light of an over-zealous 
Hauptmann who, in one frame raises his hand to the heavens, and the next shows him 
rubbing the back of his neck with embarrassment at the site of his crashed machine, 
which appears to have rolled over on landing. Yet another image shows a giant officer 
looking down on his machines being repaired by a small army of mechanics.  
The most telling image, however, arrives on page eleven of the FEA 5 newsletter. 
Figure 2 features an image of two airmen with the caption: “Der Beobachter: ‘Einst und 
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73 Unknown Author, “Weihnachten 1916: FEA 5.” Microfilm, Finding Aid: PH-19 / 18, Freiburg: 
Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv. 
74 Ibid. 
  113 
Jetzt;’ Vor und Nach September 1916.”75 
 
Figure 2. “Weihnachten 1916: FEA 5.” Source: PH-19/18, Bundesarchiv Freiburg. 
 
Featured on the left frame is an aviator, either pilot or observer, embodying the 
perceived experiences of fliers of the time. He is wearing a uniform hat with a neat pair 
of goggles. An impish grin emanates from his face, while his eyes are obscured by his 
uniform hat. He wears a lightly lined fur coat and cavalry riding paints. His uniform 
includes a riding crop, riding boots, and even Western style spurs. He embodies the 
nineteenth century, aristocratic notion of aviation as analogous to horsemanship. The 
notion persisted, especially amongst older members of the General Staff, that one’s 
ability to control a horse would translate to the mastery needed to control an airplane. 
                                                     
75 Translation note: The Observer: "Then and Now," Before and after September 1916. 
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The image on the right frame tells a far different story. Here we see an exhausted 
observer on the verge of collapse. His uniform has transformed from the neat riding 
clothes of his predecessor to a heavier, far bulkier flying suit. The lining is clearly much 
thicker, to keep him warm at the far higher altitudes traveled by late 1916. His eyes are 
heavy and laden with deep ridges and bags. He is smoking a cigarette to calm his nerves. 
Most telling, however, is the utterly massive load of technology he now carries. While his 
pre-September 1916 comrade travels with only a riding crop and a grin, the new observer 
buckles from the weight of two machine guns, bombs, binoculars, maps, his machine gun 
camera, his helmet, additional coat, heavy scarf, and a wireless transmitter. Thus, the 
strain, rather than the perceived empowerment of technological evolution weighs heavily 
on the FEA 5 observer. His sleeping comrade on the first page then, resonates on a far 
deeper and more human level than his Sanke counterparts. These men are exhausted, 
overburdened, and overworked; and, at least in most of the popular ephemera produced 
during the period, ignored.76 
 
Conclusion 
The intersection of two technologies, the camera and the airplane, influenced the 
development, acceptance, and importance of both. The camera provided greater 
legitimacy and impetus for the development of aviation technology as a weapon of war. 
The complex trenches of the Western Front were suddenly rendered “knowable” by the 
general staff with a degree of detail and fidelity far greater than anything imagined before 
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the war. Further, the camera served the personal and private needs of aviators: candid 
snapshots captured on the ground, romantic images of aircraft taking off into brilliant 
sunrise landscapes, and memorial photographs of death, dismemberment, and loss, 
provided an outlet for expression by air crews during the war. In doing so, they created a 
cache of sources that provides intimate insight into the everyday lives of fliers. 
Technology’s ruthless evolution gave rise to the Fliegerhelden so popularized by 
Sanke’s publishing house. The single seat fighter, designed to destroy enemy 
reconnaissance aircraft, created the combat pilot, and his subsequent popularization. 
Perhaps the fighter pilot grew in popularity not only for his aggressively offensive stance, 
but also because his skill set, that of singularly commanding an airplane, resonated with a 
generation of Germans who admired cavalrymen. But the same technology that 
empowered the Kampfflieger served only to overburden the observer, as seen in both 
photographs and illustrations from the men who served in those roles. 
A close reading of these sources provides insight into a narrative long overlooked 
by historians. Aviators held no singular identity. They were “technologically capable and 
ruthlessly chauvinistic,”77 but they also embodied a host of other identities. When posed 
for Sanke postcards, they were rigidly embodied the noble traits of being “German” 
warriors: exhibiting a dedication to duty and a calm control over their emotions that 
would ultimately elevate them to Helden upon their death. They operated within a duality 
of public and private gender performance: standing stoically for public acclaim, and 
reliving the comfort of elite university fraternity culture in private. Personal photographs 
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show the value of close friendships, elucidate the impact of loss, both on a national and 
deeply personal level, and of the daily lived experiences of men tasked with 
photographing the Western Front. Even in death, the men of these observation crews 
experienced a delineation of memory, with funerals that appeared paltry when compared 
with German “heroes” like Boelcke, but far more ornate, even personal, than those given 
for their comrades serving in the trenches.78 
As the war progressed, the role of the observer evolved and incorporated every 
more technological innovations. Rather than releasing him from the burden of war, these 
new tools only increased the strain on his everyday experiences over the Western Front. 
Here, images illustrate both the pressure placed on observation crews, and fatigue they 
felt by the end of 1916. The end of Supf’s album also denotes the devaluation of one 
mode of warfare, that of gathering intelligence, and another, that of directing artillery fire 
on enemy positions. With the increased capabilities of aircraft by the mid-point of the 
war, observation crews would transition from relatively passive experiences of violence 
in the air, to far more direct involvement in the killing of men below. Here too, aviation 
would act as a disruptive force in the human relationship with killing, and created new 
spaces of privilege within the realm of violence.  
 
  
                                                     
78 If such funerals were ever given at all. Many of those killed during the war on the ground were given 
mass graves, or were forever lost when their bodies disappeared into the quagmire of the Western Front.  
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CHAPTER THREE: PRIVILEGED KILLERS 
 
Introduction 
Aviation had been a perilous occupation from its inception. The same machine 
that lifted Paul Emil Engelhard into the skies above Johannisthal airfield in 1910 would 
ultimately kill him a year later.1 The alarming frequency with which airplanes crashed 
during the first decades of the twentieth century was reflected even in satirical newspaper 
cartoons. One illustration from the period of pre-war flight portrayed the hazards that 
aviation posed to the public. The image depicted the tumbling remnants of a broken 
aircraft falling to earth; the caption reading, “There are three sorts of falls: The fall of the 
aviator (rare). The fall of the airplane (very rare). The fall of everything (much more 
frequent).”2 Pre-war air shows across Europe drew capacity crowds, but often ended in 
tragedy with the death of aviators and spectators alike when aircraft failed and crashed to 
the ground.3 The outbreak of war in 1914, however, fundamentally changed aerial 
violence. For the most part, the airplane no longer killed and maimed by accident or 
mechanical fault; aircraft became weaponized to suit the needs of the army. The resulting 
machines, designed to directly and indirectly inflict violence, shaped new and complex 
understandings of killing for Germany’s aviators and created a new relationship between 
the flier and the brutality of war.4 
                                                     
1 Photo, Bild 146-1972-026-35, Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 
2 Illustration as cited in Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination, 1908-
1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 134. 
3 One particularly horrific incident occurred in France, when at the start of the Paris-Madrid race in 1911, 
one aircraft lost control and crashed into a crowd of dignitaries, killing the French Minister of War. The 
event was captured on film and screened across France. See Robert Wohl, A Passion for Wings, 276. 
4 For more on placing violence in a more direct historical context, see: Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and 
Anette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2002). 
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This chapter examines the ways in which aviation formed new relationships with 
violence, the perspectives that aviators developed towards violence, and how military 
rhetoric contributed to that perspective. To best understand the new relationships to 
violence that aviation created, we must approach the question from the perspective of 
privilege. For the purposes of this chapter, privilege is the special right, or choice, to 
either engage or not engage with something, in this case, killing. We must also examine 
the ways aviators cultivated and reinforced this sense of privilege, and how the discourse 
around them served only to strengthen this narrative.  
To access the question of violence in aviation, we must explore how killing was 
fundamentally embedded in the way aviators interacted with and experienced killing 
during the First World War. This relationship between flier and killing was expressed in 
four key ways. First, aviators cultivated a personal perspective on killing and violence, 
and viewed powered flight itself as an inherently violent undertaking. Second, aviators 
often exercised the willful choice to simply ignore their acts of killing and constructed 
both an explicit and an implicit discourse to do so. Third, fliers treated those they killed 
in a privileged manner which placed violence into a discourse that was distinct from the 
killing on the ground. Within this act, the role of official rhetoric and the formation of 
systems of knowledge cemented this narrative as legitimate. Finally, we will examine the 
ways aviators were treated after being killed, and how that treatment was both starkly 
different from their comrades in the trenches, and an expression of remarkable privilege 
in the middle of a war that took the lives of millions. 
Militarized aerial violence placed aviators in a novel space during the First World 
War. The act of killing in the air could embody a wide spectrum of encounters that 
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ranged from the abstract to the intensely personal. Violence in the air took many forms, 
from gathering intelligence that led ground commanders to launch assaults on hostile 
troops, to opening fire on enemy aviators and killing them, leaving their machines to 
plummet to the ground in a horrific fashion. Such disparate experiences were the result of 
several interconnected circumstances, including the proximity of the aviator to the killing 
that took place, and how much of the violent act could be seen from his vantage point 
while moving rapidly through the air. This novel space of killing extended to the 
experiences aviators had on the ground, and only served to reinforce a sense of unique 
privilege. Upon landing, an aviator could elect whether to visit the crash site of his victim 
to inspect the efficacy of his aerial gunnery.5 Aviators also found themselves enmeshed in 
a new system of knowledge that quantified violence in abstract statistical terms that 
further amplified their privileged relationship to killing. That system also sought to 
incentivize further killing through official and popular means, through the rewarding of 
medals, silver goblets, and the growing attention of popular acclaim.  
This sense of privilege was reinforced by the fact that violence in the air was 
systemically different from the experience of killing on the ground. While the defining 
weapon of trench warfare, the machine gun, was adapted for use in the air, the nature of 
aerial violence, that of firing at moving objects at high speed, created a distinct kind of 
killing. The physical and mechanical challenge of firing these weapons at moving objects 
                                                     
5 It was fairly common practice on the German side of the lines to investigate reported crash sites to verify 
kill claims made by their pilots. For more information about this system, see Norman Franks, Above the 
Lines: The Aces and Fighter Units of the German Air Service, Naval Air Service, and Flanders Marine 
Corps: 1914-1918 (London: Grub Street, 1993). As will be examined later in this chapter, some pilots 
willingly chose to land their aircraft at the site of the demise of their victims. The famous fighter pilot, 
Manfred von Richthofen, often chose to land and collect souvenirs of his violent handiwork. Aviation 
designer, Antony Fokker, posed for publicity photos next to mangled enemy wrecks. 
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which often obscured the body inside, could create the visual evident to complete the 
rationalized illusion that one was not so much killing a human being as destroying a 
machine; a reasoning that was only reinforced by the official discourse of military 
aviation. Killing, however, could also be experienced on an intensely visceral level. First 
World War era machine guns were incredibly inaccurate weapons, which often 
necessitated placing dozens of them to cover relatively limited areas of the Front. This 
inaccuracy forced pilots to open fire at extraordinarily close quarters in the air - often at 
distances of less than thirty feet from their opponents. Compounding the difficulties of 
inaccurate fire, the placement of these weapons were often awkward and cumbersome to 
use. In order to accommodate the mechanical limitations of bi-wing aircraft and the 
equipment needed to perform their assigned duties, multi-seat machines were often 
defended by an observer who was left to stand in his seat to reach his weapon.6  
These technical details, which have long been examined by flight enthusiasts and 
historians of aviation’s mechanical development, reveal the driving reason why so many 
aviators experienced violence in dramatically different ways. The physical and 
mechanical challenge of inflicting violence in the air meant that some aviators were 
incredibly close to the men they killed, and the bloody and horrific effects often 
contradicted the official narrative of destroying enemy aircraft rather than killing men. It 
is within this spectrum of killing, either directly at the end of a machine gun or indirectly 
through a multitude of other mediums, that we find a range of unexamined reactions to 
killing, which are often contradictory. Rudolf Berthold, for example, used intense 
                                                     
6 An early German observation plane, the Aviatik CI, was retrofitted with defensive machine guns, forcing 
the observer, who sat in front of the pilot, to fire his machine gun directly past his pilot’s head. 
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violence to make sense of the personal tragedy of the loss of a close friend and comrade. 
Following his friend’s death Berthold viewed the act of destroying a French airplane, any 
French airplane, as a personal vendetta which directly vindicated the loss of his friend 
and observer.7 Yet, Berthold also refused to visit the site of his fallen adversary’s 
wrecked airplane, choosing instead to remain on base while his fellow airmen and 
mechanics drove out to inspect the damage. Violence then, was experienced from a 
multitude of privileged perspectives in the air and on the ground.  
The diverse range of responses to killing in the air reflect important aspects about 
the First World War’s aerial component. Aerial violence was a complex and dynamic 
experience that changed rapidly over time due to technological change and strategic 
evolution. Violence embodied a wide range of meanings as aircraft rapidly evolved from 
pre-war civilian machines to purpose-built fighter planes whose sole mission was the 
destruction of enemy airplanes. The precarious nature of powered flight in the early 
twentieth century meant that aviators were constantly exposed to the risk of mechanical 
failure and accident. In an era where aircraft were inherently dangerous, any crash meant 
almost certain death or dismemberment for an aviator. This embedded the flier within a 
discourse of violence from takeoff to landing, with actual combat representing another, 
albeit heightened experience within a spectrum of violence. This dynamic experience led 
aviators to frame violence in a variety of ways. While Berthold might have eschewed 
viewing his victims, Manfred von Richthofen openly relished the act of killing, and 
embedded his description of aerial violence within the discourse of wild game hunting. 
                                                     
7 Rudolf Berthold, Persönliches Kriegstagebuch, MSG2-10722. Freiburg Bundesarchiv, 40. 
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He often landed to observe the results of his marksmanship on the mangled wreckage and 
twisted corpses of the enemies he shot down.8  
Aviators, however, performed a range of missions beyond aerial combat. As the 
duties of Germany’s aviators evolved over time, so too did their relationship to violence. 
Throughout the war, the majority of Germany’s aircraft were observation planes, not 
fighter scouts. These airmen were tasked with directly aiding the war on the ground and, 
as such, violence between the air and the ground encompassed a range of activities that 
inflicted suffering through both direct and indirect means. Aerial observation, the passive 
act of reconnoitering enemy positions and relaying intelligence back to the commanders 
on the ground, resulted in the deaths of enemy soldiers from counterattack. As the war 
progressed, aerial reconnaissance expanded to include detailed the photographic mapping 
of enemy fortifications which provided even more detailed information when planning an 
offensive. Still further, the development of radio transmitters soon allowed observers to 
directly range artillery fire on ground troops. A single observer who successfully guided 
hundreds of artillery pieces behind the lines could kill more soldiers in a single strike 
than all of the men that Germany’s fighter pilots could shoot out of the skies during the 
First World War. 
These delineations of experience within a spectrum of violence highlights the way 
in which killing was privileged by and for aviators. The very act of killing and being 
killed, a horrific event that sometimes transpired tens of thousands of times a day, was 
elevated to a privileged experience for fliers. Air services went to extraordinary lengths to 
                                                     
8 Manfred von Richthofen, Der rote Kampfflieger (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein & Company, 1917), 141. 
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recover lost fliers, filing detailed reports when they successfully recovered a dead pilot. 
Upon retrieving their fallen fliers, German squadrons often held elaborate funerals never 
afforded to those on the ground. Even enemy combatants were treated in a similarly 
privileged manner to German fliers. These practices only strengthened the sense of 
aviators as representing a distinct and entitled class of combatant. Additionally, aviators 
were housed in significantly better quarters than regular infantry, and away from the front 
lines of the war, which further reinforcing this sense of special identity. In short, every 
experience an aviator had, from their quarters to their daily activities to the attention 
lauded on them through the act of killing their enemies, all formed a concrete sense of 
inhabiting a privileged and entitled space. 
The systems of information gathering, synthesizing, and analysis that grew around 
aviators, used to quantify and track their activities in the air, created an intellectual 
ecosystem that reinforced this identity. The German military responded to the disruptive 
force of aviation by developing complex metrics that systemized the acquisition of 
knowledge and translated aerial violence into statistical analysis. Reports detailed 
weapons tests and measured the destructive capabilities of a range of handheld and, later, 
wing-mounted bombs. Experiments were also carried out in the destructive use of hand 
grenades tossed from low-flying infantry attack planes. Germany’s aviation industry 
responded to the needs of not only the military, but in some cases, the specific demands 
of its fliers, by creating purpose-built machines designed with these new and horrific 
tasks specifically in mind. The results created nimble fighter planes designed for 
dogfighting and, in the cases of multi-seat machines, moved the observer from ranging 
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artillery from thousands of meters up to personally firing on passing troops from 
extraordinarily low altitude and exposing himself to great personal risk.  
As the war in the air progressed, however, German commanders’ growing 
fascination with the destruction of enemy aircraft moved the importance of aerial activity 
on ground operations to the background as the exploits of its fighter pilots gained ever 
more attention. The spoils system which subsequently developed early in the war, that of 
rewarding aviators for destroying aircraft rather than photographing or bombing troops, 
only served to reinforce a myopic view of aerial operations and encouraged aviators to 
become fighter pilots. The resulting arms race between German aviation firms and their 
adversaries created ever more capable aircraft. And as single seat fighters came to 
dominate the aerial battles in the skies over the Western Front, the German military’s 
obsession with counting the victories of its pilots and rewarding the most prodigious of 
its “hunting squadrons” created a system more concerned with shooting down enemy 
planes rather than winning the war. Aerial violence then, elucidates the social and 
cultural conceptions of killing in the air and on the ground, and illustrates both the 
remarkably disruptive nature of aviation in war, and the ways Germany’s military figures 
and industrial designers responded to that disruption. 
Finally, the language of violence further enmeshed aviators into a space of 
privileged suffering and killing. In German, the broad term for violence, Gewalt, is 
defined as “a storm; power; the ability to project force or power.”9 Violence then, 
included not only the direct infliction of physical suffering on another, but also the 
                                                     
9 Gerhart Streitberg, ed, Duden: Stilwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (Mannheim: Bibliographisches 
Institut, 1963), 256. 
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projection, imposition, and threat of force on another.10 In doing so, Gewalt represented 
the anxiety of being a victim of that force as well as possessing the ability to impose 
power. Violence encompassed the myriad of manifestations in the air. This definition of 
violence was technologically driven, positionally experienced, and expressed by the 
power to directly or indirectly inflict suffering, as well as the threat of suffering, which in 
powered flight was viewed as inherent and perpetual. From the moment they left the 
ground, aviators faced a struggle against gravity, the corporal suffering of dangerously 
cold temperatures and high winds against exposed skin in open cockpit aircraft, the 
psychological threat of suffering violence from their enemies, and the visceral horrors of 
killing or being killed in the air. The experience of suffering shaped their views on 
violence and created an elevated and sense of privilege and purpose as the war progressed 
and grew increasingly violent over time. 
 
Accessing Violence in the Air 
Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Anette Becker reminds us that a history of, “the 
violence of war inevitably takes us back to the history of the body. In war, bodies strike 
each other, suffer and inflict suffering.”11 While research on the subject of killing, 
destruction, and suffering has produced an immense body of literature in the last fifteen 
years, the subject remains underdeveloped within the history of aviation during the 
                                                     
10 German aviators used other terms for violence in the air. The grammar of aerial fighting included terms 
like schießen (to shoot), Jagd (to hunt), töten (to kill), and zerstören (to destroy). Gewalt, however, 
encompasses a breadth of experiences expressed in the writing of German aviators. Rudolf Berthold, for 
example, describes his horrific crash in 1918 by using Gewalt to express the force of the impact he 
experienced after he was shot down. 
11 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Anette Becker, 14-18 Understanding the Great War (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2002), 15. 
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period.12 From the struggle of the pilot against the unyielding laws of physics, to the 
exchange of gunfire in the air which did more than break wings, engines, and wires, but 
shattered bone, pierced flesh, and inflicted immense suffering; powered flight was 
viewed as a fundamentally violent and dangerous endeavor.  
Sources on aerial violence, however, present challenges to historians who attempt 
to access the experience of aviators during the conflict. For this chapter, I will make use 
of a small but diverse range of source material. Personal photo albums, like the one 
produced by Peter Supf provide glimpses into the ways in which violence was 
experienced by German observation and bombing crews – those men who were not 
actively looking to inflict violence on other aircraft. Personal diaries, like the one kept by 
Rudolf Berthold, reveal extraordinary insight into the mentality of an aviator transitioning 
between the role of observation pilot to fighter pilot, and his words, kept only for himself 
to make sense of the war, allows us to access a private discourse on violence and its 
manifestations during the war. I also use one of the most famous sources from the 
German experience in the war, that of Manfred von Richthofen’s published 
autobiography. Richthofen’s words, while not private in any way, give us the perspective 
of what aviators – and military personnel in general – wanted us to see in regards to 
violence in the air. Even within this public discourse, we find the ways in which aerial 
violence could embody everything from a transformative experience to a harsh reality of 
war. Lastly, I incorporate other ephemera, such as newspaper accounts of flight, to look 
                                                     
12 For more recent contributions to this field, see Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass 
Killing in the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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closely at the language of aviation during this early period, and to locate the ways in 
which violence could be expressed literally.  
It is important to note, that in accessing violence in the air, we must keep both the 
physicality of flight and the physical relation of the body to violence while airborne in 
mind. Thus, both the kind of violence experienced, as well as its intensity, were directly 
related to where one was both in the air, and in the machine one flew in. The majority of 
machines flown during the First World War were multi-seat aircraft, with each individual 
on board assigned a specific task.13 The pilot, of course, operated the aircraft and kept the 
crew aloft.14 The observer, or observers, depending on the size of the machine, faced 
multiple tasks that grew in complexity as the war progressed.15 Their most important role 
was protecting their machine from attack, usually with a mounted machine gun.16 Their 
secondary role was observing the enemy, either through note taking or by photographing 
activity on the ground. As the war progressed, observers would also be tasked with 
ranging artillery through the use of wireless telegraphic equipment.17 Finally, observers 
                                                     
13 Aviation history has done little service to the multitudes who served in multi-seat aircraft roles. The 
exploits of single-seat fighter squadrons and the experiences of men like Manfred von Richthofen have 
received considerable historical and popular attention, while multi-seat crews have been all but ignored in 
the historiography of the First World War’s aerial component. 
14 The command structure of the Fliegertruppe often placed the ranking officer in the position of observer, 
rather than pilot. Consequently, the pilot was ordered where to go by the observer, creating the notion that 
pilots were little more than “chauffeurs” for officers in the air. Manfred von Richthofen mentions this in his 
autobiography. See, Manfred von Richthofen, Der rote Kampfflieger (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein & Company, 
1917) 
15 As cited in Chapter 2, FEA5 published a cartoon in Christmas of 1916 that depicted the overwhelmed 
observer who was weighed down by the numerous pieces of technology now required to perform his duties. 
16 By the advent of the fighter plane in 1915, few if any multi-seat reconnaissance machines engaged in 
offensive attacks in the air. 
17 Neumann notes that aerial observation crews, by the latter half of the war, engaged in artillery spotting in 
three ways: “directing fire at targets agreed on before the flight; at targets the observer has picked up during 
the flight and indicated to the artillery for instantaneous engagement; and, finally, the control of drum fire 
(preparatory barrage, box barrage, creeping barrage, etc.). See Georg Neumann, Die Deutschen 
Luftstreiträfte im Weltkriege (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1920). 
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would bomb the enemy, first by dropping small, hand held bombs from the side of their 
machine and, later in the war, by releasing larger bombs attached to the wings of their 
aircraft. 
Thus, the role of the aviator influenced the proximity and intensity of his 
experience of violence in the air which defined his view of killing. The pilot in multi-seat 
machines often had no weapon to fire.18 His role was to position his machine in such a 
manner that his observer could fire at their assailant.19 For a pilot, then, the inflicting of 
suffering on his enemy happened through the medium of his observer. The pilot was a 
witness to violence in this instance, and in many cases, did not see the downing of his 
observer’s target. The pilot, however, was still under the same shared threat of violence 
as his observer when under attack from an enemy aircraft. The observer, too, experienced 
violence in a positional manner. He might view killing quite personally when firing his 
machine gun at an attacking aircraft.20 When ranging artillery, the observer could inflict 
suffering on hundreds, or potentially thousands of troops on the ground, without ever 
                                                     
18 Later machines would introduce a fixed, forward-firing machine gun. The pilot of large, multi-seat 
machines, however, would rarely be in a position to fire his weapon and still relied on his observer for the 
bulk of the plane’s defensive fire. 
19 An important note about the complex physics involved in this scenario. Firing at a moving object in the 
air is an inherently difficult task, as the shooter has to range his target - based not on where it is at the time 
he fires his weapon - but on where the target will be by the time his bullets reach the target area. This skill 
was described by aviators as “lead shooting.” Complicating this task, the observer is firing, not from a fixed 
stationary platform at a moving target, but rather from a moving platform that is oscillating in three 
dimension of space. The observer is also not in control of the movement of this platform, and must rely on 
his pilot to position the aircraft in such a manner that he can fire with a relative degree of confidence on 
where his rounds will travel. With limited ammunition, the observer’s task, that of protecting a heavy, slow, 
and vulnerable machine while firing from a moving platform, is immense. Understanding this task is not 
just important to understand the military history of First World War aviation. Rather, it is vital to 
elucidating the everyday, lived realities of these individuals, and how those experiences influenced their 
identities, memories, mourning practices, and later, their comprehension of Germany's defeat in the 
conflict. 
20 This killing, if successful, was of course, defensive in nature, further distancing his involvement in the 
death of his assailant. 
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being directly involved in their deaths.21 When dropping handheld bombs from lower 
altitude, the observer would have a more involved role in inflicting violence, even if such 
violence was less direct than when firing his machine gun at an enemy attacker in the air.  
The pilot of single-seat fighter aircraft, however, had a very different relationship 
to violence from his comrades in multi-seat machines. The spatial arrangement of the 
single seat fighter, that of placing the individual, the machine gun, and the aircraft in a 
linear alignment, created a direct and visceral relationship with violence. Unlike the pilot 
of the multi-seat aircraft, the flier of a single-seat machine also operated the primary 
weapon and was required to be utterly self-reliant.22 He also differed from his multi-seat 
counterpart in that he used his controls to position himself, rather than his observer, into a 
firing position to kill his enemy. Thus, the relationship between aviator and killing 
transformed from a positional experience - that of providing a stable gun platform for an 
observer to open fire - to a direct experience, that of moving his body, machine, and 
weapon in unison to perform the act of killing.23  
The experience of a fighter pilot then, was intensely visceral. Success in combat 
required positioning one’s body, machine, and weapon dangerously close to one’s enemy, 
                                                     
21 Visual proximity to those enduring suffering is ultimately what defines the positional role of violence in 
the air. Ranging artillery from thousands of feet in the air was an abstract experience. Observers could see 
shells impacting trenches and shattering earth, but likely not see the bodies beneath the cloud of smoke and 
debris being destroyed. By comparison, the close proximity of firing distances in the air often meant that an 
observer would see his rounds hitting his assailant and possibly killing him. 
22 Georg Neumann, in his post-war examination of the German Luftstreitkräfte, commends the combat pilot 
has possessing all of the attributes of a talented observer with the tenacity and self-reliance needed to 
survive in the air. See, Georg Neumann, Die Deutschen Luftstreitkräfte in Weltkriege (Berlin: E.S. Mittler 
und Sohn, 1920). 
23 Weapons of this period also required aviators to engage at unprecedentedly close proximity to one 
another. Machine guns of the period could not fire accurately and were prone to jamming under stressful 
operating conditions. As a result, pilots had to place their machines dangerously close to their targets in 
order to direct fire on their opponents. 
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and seeing clearly through the propeller, the shattering of the enemy’s machine and the 
physical destruction of his body. This new kind of violence created an extraordinary 
sense of agency for combat pilots, and heightened their sense of privilege as being a truly 
distinct type of warrior. The fighter plane and the Kampfflieger represented the 
culmination of aerial violence, and both its physicality and intensity resulted in a 
narrowly-expressed definition of violence; one that has remained unexpanded until now. 
To access these different forms of violence, we must first begin with the act of flight 
itself as a violent but transformative experience.  
 
Perspectives on Violence and Killing in the Air 
The experience of violence in flight took on many forms, from the struggle 
against gravity, to the terror of opening fire on another human being. The delineation of 
experiences formed multiple perspectives on violence and killing in the air. Beginning 
with the very act of flight, that of pushing against gravity and breaking one’s bond with 
the earth, aviators viewed their task as a struggle. Failure to win the contest of flight, 
which incessantly sought to drag the airplane crashing back to earth, resulted in pain and 
suffering inflicted on the body. Early twentieth century aircraft were inherently 
dangerous, and provided the aviator with no protective means of surviving a crash.24 
                                                     
24 Two primary factors contributed to the inherent danger in early twentieth-century flight. First, machines 
made during this period were constructed out of light, and therefore, structurally vulnerable materials. The 
forces of physics upon wings, support struts, and control surfaces could become excessive to the point 
where vital components of the machine would fail in flight. Wings collapsed, canvas fabric tore, and 
controls broke. Second, the power in early twentieth-century engines was exceedingly low. Aircraft motors, 
then, were heavy and underpowered, creating low quantities of the lift required for keeping a machine in 
flight. As a result, an aircraft’s cruising and stall speeds were often perilously close to one another, leaving 
an aviator with little tolerance between flying and falling. 
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Control sticks could impale a pilot on impact.25 The wood frame of the machine, 
designed solely for lightness, would shatter to splinters in a collision, leaving the 
aviator’s body broken and mangled. Fire too, represented a constant risk, with the fuel 
tank often located under the pilot in order to balance the air frame. With no parachute, an 
aviator caught in a fire was left either to burn to death or leap helplessly from his 
machine, plummet to his demise, or take his own life with his issued sidearm. It was 
understood then, that an aviator would either return to earth by safely landing his 
machine, or he would likely not return at all.  
Gewalt, broadly defined, could incorporate this variety of experiences within the 
realm of violence. When coupled with the physicality of early flight and the materials 
used to construct aircraft of the period, German aviators often viewed the very act of 
flying as an inherently violent experience. Early flight was a struggle for survival against 
the laws of physics rather than enemy fire. Underpowered, unreliable, and heavy engines 
strained to lift lightweight airframes and adventurous aviators aloft. The language used 
by those who experienced this type of flight was filled with the vocabulary of the 
visceral, the dangerous, and the exhilarating. Violence in early aviation then, came not 
from the direct threat of enemy gunfire or anti-aircraft shells hurled into the sky. Instead, 
violence was experienced in an indirect yet menacing fashion, framed around the 
potential for the occupants in an aircraft to die in an accident.26 Much like the violence of 
war, this type of threat created both a sense of fear at the potential for harm to be 
                                                     
25 Oswald Boelcke’s death in October 1916, resulted from a collision with a flier in his own squadron. 
Boelcke’s plane fell out of control and the famous German aviator died on impact. His flight controls 
crushed his ribs in the crash. 
26 For more on the discourse of pre-war aviation and the violence of flight, see Robert Wohl, A Passion for 
Wings: Aviation and the Western Imagination. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
  132 
inflicted, but also a sense of elation in having escaped that danger afterwards. Surviving 
flight became a defining, even transformational experience in the process of becoming an 
aviator. 
For military aviators, the dangers of flight represented a crucible for those who 
were determined to become combat fliers. Manfred von Richthofen recalled in his 
autobiography the experience of flight as intensely disconcerting and violent. After 
climbing aboard the two-seater machine, Richthofen recounts the force of the engine. 
“The wind from the propeller disturbed me enormously.27 The sheer power of the wind 
generated by the machine, even while still rooted to the ground, left the future combat 
pilot at a loss. “Everything flew away from me. If I took a piece of paper out, it 
disappeared. My flying helmet slipped, my scarf loosened, my jacket as not buttoned 
tight enough - in short, I was miserable.”28 Once the plane was in motion, Richthofen’s 
unease grew to outright fear. “Before I knew what was happening, the pilot got the 
engine up to full throttle and the machine began to roll. Always faster, ever faster. I hung 
on frantically. Suddenly the shock ceased, and the machine was in the air.”29 
Richthofen’s account is not that of a “natural aviator” suited to the shocks of flight. 
Instead, it is the narrative of a violent assault on the aircraft’s occupant. Richthofen is 
blasted by wind, disoriented by the force of the machine, and miserable despite his best 
preparations. In this first passage, he has no agency, he is merely strapped into a machine 
that might kill him, and can only do his best to literally hang on. 
                                                     
27 Manfred von Richthofen, Der rote Kampfflieger. (Berlin:Verlag Ullstein & Company, 1917), 45. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Richthofen, writing his account in 1917, frames his first flight as a transformative 
experience. Despite the brute force of aviation, and the violence that powered flight 
imposes on Richthofen’s mind and body, his tone changes once he is airborne. At first he 
is still a disorientated observer, “We flew a bit straight, then my pilot turned around 
again, right, left, and I had lost my bearings over my own airfield. I had no idea where I 
was!”30  Between this passage and the very next sentence, however, Richthofen becomes 
an aviator, and embraces the joys of flight. “I started to watch the area below me. The 
people are tiny, the houses like a child’s toy, everything was so small and elegant… It 
was sublime to sail over everything. Who could have touched me? No one! I didn’t care 
where I was, and I was quite sad when the pilot said he thought we had better land.”31  
By the time his machine sets back down on the earth, Richthofen depicts himself 
as having utterly changed during his time aloft. Despite the mechanical frailty of these 
early aircraft, Richthofen feels far more secure while aloft. “I would rather have gone 
flying again. I have never been troubled with vertigo in the air. Moreover, the celebrated 
American Ferris wheel is repulsive to me; one feels insecure in it. But in an airplane one 
has an absolute feeling of security; one sits as peacefully as in an easy chair.”32 Yet, he 
still notes the inherent tension between his internal confidence in flight and the visceral, 
physical sensation of instability in the air. “One does not become giddy in an airplane. 
But it is a damned nervous sensation to whistle through the air, especially as the airplane 
suddenly dips, when the engine stops, and there is a tremendous silence. I held on 
                                                     
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 
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frantically and, naturally, thought, ‘you are going to crash.’ But everything went along so 
naturally and simply… that the feeling of fear was completely absent… I counted the 
hours to the next flight.”33 
Military fliers were not the only individuals to view powered flight as a violent, 
transformative experience. Within the published account of German journalists like 
Georg Wegener, who wrote for the Kölnische Zeitung, we can access the language of 
flight as a violent, animalistic, and untamed experience. From the moment of his first 
encounter with the two-seat aircraft he flew in, Wegener described his experience in 
vivid, inherently tense and dangerous language. The machine, upon starting, “shuddered 
all over,” and rattled Wegener “to his fingertips.”34 The aircraft, however, did more than 
shudder. For Wegener, the machine also shouted directly at him. The engine fitted to the 
airplane had no sound-deadening devices attached. Consequently, the motor ran at a pitch 
that Wegener described as “a wild roar.”35  
Wegener’s piece again shows us the inherent tension within aviation between the 
feeling of fear and the necessity to suppress one’s emotions. These experiences reflect the 
description given to us by Richthofen about his first flight. Even a relatively simple task 
such as warming up the aircraft’s engine by opening its throttle could frighten the 
uninitiated. Wegener wrote anxiously that, “as if he [the aircraft] sensed my disrespect, 
he raised his voice… it was thunder! It was tremendous… the noise and power of a 
hundred lions."36 While Wegener describes the aircraft as a wild, untamed machine, it is 
                                                     
33 Richthofen, 45-46. 
34 Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German Aviation and the Popular Imagination. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 59. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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the threat, the ominous presence of violence, that should be noted in his language. The 
machine sensed Wegener’s disrespect and responded not with reassurance, but with 
malice. This experience reflects the immense sense of disorientation and confusion that 
Richthofen described while sitting in the passenger seat of his first flight. Takeoff too, 
was described in violent terms, with Wegener framing the image of flight as being like a 
“leopard hunting antelope,” as the machine rumbled and bounced down the grass 
runway.37  
Wegener’s language gives us a glimpse into the perception of powered flight a 
century ago. The novelty of the new technology required Wegener in his role of 
journalist, to compose an account that related flight in animalistic terms to render a 
unique experience comprehensible to his audience.38 Beneath the language of untamed 
and wild nature, however, is the implicit vocabulary of violence. At all times, Wegener is 
under threat from the very machine he is entrusting his safety to. The aircraft shudders, 
threatens the occupants with a thunderous roar, and mimics leopards hunting antelope as 
it bounces down the airfield before takeoff. Every part of the experience of powered 
flight, then, embodied a discourse of violence: shuddering, thundering, leaping, hunting. 
For someone like Wegener, who was new to flight, even the normal operation of an 
aircraft felt menacing and dangerous. At every stage of his experience, the threat of 
violence, the impending disaster that would result from a mechanical failure or pilot error 
was apparent. A crack in a wing, a snapped control wire, a failed engine, all could end in 
                                                     
37 Ibid. 
38 In 1914 the overwhelming majority of Europeans had never flown, and many had never seen an aircraft 
in flight. As a result, they simply could not relate to the physical experience of flight. Here, I assert that 
Wegener is merely attempting to address his audience in a manner that makes the un-relatable, knowable. 
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death. The exhilaration described in Wegener’s account, then, expresses elation at not 
only taking part in powered flight, but surviving it. 
Thus, aviators lived between two inherent tension points in the realm of powered 
flight: that of cultivating their internal confidence in their ability as aviators while 
recognizing the inherent dangers in an undertaking that could, at any moment, render 
them utterly without agency. Aviation before and during the First World War as an 
inherently violent occupation. Despite being the pinnacle of aeronautical design and built 
with the finest known materials of the day, aircraft in this period were inherently 
dangerous machines that were prone to technical and mechanical failure. Such failures 
often led to fatal crashes. For observers like Georg Wegener, who experienced flight as a 
journalist and not a combat pilot, aviation was a wild, dangerous, and violent experience. 
Surviving powered flight elicited feelings of elation and relief. For combat fliers like 
Manfred von Richthofen, aviation represented more than just the threat of violence. 
Flight, for the German men who would fly and fight for the Fatherland in the First World 
War, stood as a crucible that separated fliers from everyone else. Despite the initial fear 
and disorientation of his first flight, Richthofen cannot wait to climb aboard and take off 
again after successfully landing back at his airfield. Despite his enthusiasm, however, the 
inherent potential for violence in aviation remains, and even the confident prose of an 
autobiography intended for public consumption cannot belie the internal fear that even 
pilots like Richthofen grappled with on a daily basis. Violence in the air, however, 
extended far beyond the physicality of flight, and embedded itself into every possible 
application of military aviation. 
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The breadth of experiences encompassed by aerial violence expanded once war 
began in 1914, from one experienced inherently in the act of flying, to one that inflicted 
violence on others, both in the air and on the ground. Further, the growth of aerial 
violence was fundamentally shaped by the environment that flight operated in. “It is more 
than doubtful if the airplane would ever have attained such importance as a means of 
attack and a decisive factor in warfare if the Great War had continued as an open 
campaign, and consequently ended in a short time.”39 Georg Neumann, who served in the 
Luftstreitkräfte during the war, penned his personal assessment of the air service and its 
functions following the war. Neumann insisted that the transformation of the war, from a 
dynamic conflict dominated by movement, to a static war defined by trenches, was vital 
in providing the airplane with the environment it needed to prove its worth. Even before 
the war mutated into a conflict dominated by trenches, however, the airplane 
demonstrated its worth through the role of observation of the enemy. It was in this space 
that violence expanded, from an inherent feature of powered flight, to the infliction of 
violence on others.  
Rudolf Berthold, who by this time was serving as an observer with Feldflieger-
Abteilung 23 noted the ways in which he felt the excitement and anxiety of the new 
war.40 Within an aerial reconnaissance unit, the excitement of war manifested itself, not 
in the rush to fire on enemy soldiers, attack a target, or conquer a town, but to fly over the 
enemy’s position. In this sense, Gewalt encompassed the imposition of power over one’s 
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opponent. The potential to be the first to do so was not lost on Berthold’s squadron. 
Competition remained high among the men, who raced to see who could take part in the 
war first. Berthold noted that the unit, which was busy unpacking their equipment and re-
assembling their aircraft, worked with unprecedented speed. “Unloading proceeded with 
feverish haste. Each two-man aircrew competes with the other because each wants to 
achieve the first flight over the enemy…”41  
The expression of violence found shape in the ability to fly over enemy troops and 
note their position for military intelligence to act upon. Without the technical means to 
inflict direct violence on the enemy from the air in 1914, German aviators sought to 
impose their force, their power, over the enemy below in other ways. Here the act of 
observing the enemy and thus, gathering vital intelligence that would help the Germany 
army direct the war on the ground, was an act of imposing force on one’s adversary. The 
rush of Berthold’s comrades to be first to fly over the enemy, then, was not only a race to 
be first, it was a competition to foist their power over others. Flight then, was not just an 
act of observation, it was an exercise in dominance. That act of imposing force, however, 
was not without hazard. While aircraft of 1914 might not directly fire on the enemy, that 
did not prevent those below - both friendly and enemy - from firing at those flying 
overhead.  
Violence in the air during these opening weeks of combat occupied an uneven 
space. While aviators could hope to inflict a sense of Gewalt on the adversarial soldiers 
marching beneath them, troops on the ground could return concentrated fire on the 
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machines flying above. To further exacerbate their circumstances, troops on the ground 
were often unsure of whether a passing aircraft was friendly or not, and would often fire 
indiscriminately at airplanes overhead. Popular stories produced during the war 
propagated stories of adversarial pilots waving out of respect during the opening weeks 
of the conflict, and placed a disproportionate emphasis on the camaraderie aviators 
experienced. The reality, of the desperate need to observe the enemy’s positions, and 
likewise, prevent the observation of their own troops, meant that German air crews flew 
through a hail of hostile shell fire. Berthold recalled from one of his earliest flights that, 
“there – with a loud crash – a small white cloud appeared and then another! There was a 
strange bang in the left wing – we were hit by shrapnel! An anti-aircraft shell almost got 
us!”42  
Such an intensely hostile environment required a clarity of communication and a 
sense of unity in action in the air between pilot and observer. Berthold, who had enrolled 
in flight school in the weeks before the war, had yet to complete his second flight 
examination and, consequently, served as an observer during the opening weeks of the 
conflict.43 As a result, he soon learned that his safety and wellbeing was entirely in the 
hands of his pilot, Johannes Viehweger. Within the confines of their observation aircraft, 
both men were subjected to the potential for violence. Their ability to survive such threats 
required close cooperation and effective communication.  
Here, the physicality of flight dictated and limited the capacity for observer and 
pilot to communicate in the air. Aviators of the period wore heavy flight suits, the type 
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needed to protect airmen against the extreme cold and high winds experienced at altitude. 
Pilots and observers in the First World War also had no radio equipment and most of the 
multi-seat machines of the conflict spaced the pilot and observer several feet apart. 
Between high winds, an engine running without any sort of noise muffling, and thick 
layers of protective equipment, communication between pilot and observer was limited at 
best. As a result, crews had to develop non-verbal means of communicating in order to 
effectively complete their assigned missions and return home intact.  
Within the space of this partnership, the discourse of privilege within aviation 
begins to take shape. Neumann goes to great lengths to elaborate the privileged 
relationship that pilot and observer had with one another, “the observer, invariably an 
officer, was as a rule the person actually responsible for the airplane.”44 Here, the ability 
to impose one’s will, would inspire confidence in the pilot. “His iron will and devotion to 
duty alone was all that the pilot had to rely on in a moment of great danger, for he 
performed his task isolated in the heights, suffering from the most intense cold of 40 
degrees or more of frost…”45 Neumann’s language, particularly in his description of the 
aviator as possessing an “iron will and devotion to duty,” highlights the privileged way 
aviators viewed their work.  
Neumann further differentiates the observer as an exceptional member of the 
battlefield, through the manner in which he had to perform his tasks in utter and complete 
isolation. Neumann explains that the observer was “surrounded by exploding shells, 
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without that moral support afforded to the infantryman by his comrades in battle.”46 The 
observer too, was viewed as far more technically capable than the pilot. Where the flier 
was trained in one specific task, that of flying and maneuvering his machine, the observer 
“had to possess a general knowledge, including every branch of aerial science, and the 
ability to apply this knowledge under varying conditions. The war, which was indeed the 
father of all things appertaining to flying, has also made the observer what he is, and will 
remain for all time. In his comprehensive ability, his mental and physical strength, and 
his devotion to duty, the observer has proved himself to be indispensable under every 
circumstance of war, not only to the higher command, but also to the supreme 
command.”47 The rank of the observer as a member of the officer class – and thus a 
member of at least upper middle class standing – no doubt played a role in shaping 
Neumann’s description of the observer as an indispensable part of the relationship. 
In spite of rank and privilege, however, the observer still surrendered agency to 
the pilot. As a result, the compatibility and inherent trust in the crews in two-seat aircraft 
was of paramount importance to the survival of the crew. The resulting bond between the 
two was so intense that Neumann entitled his discussion on the matter, “the pilot and 
observer as one individual.”48 Without the ability to implement effective verbal 
communication in the air, the crews of two-seat aircraft were connected through their 
dependence on each other and their ability to anticipate each other’s actions. “The two 
must be adjusted to one another so accurately that they worked almost automatically. An 
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instinct had to be developed by which one could understand and almost foresee the 
wishes and actions of the other.”49  A successful partnership, then, worked entirely on 
non-verbal communication and did so efficiently. Neumann described such a fruitful 
relationship as, “the two men were linked together by a bond of comradeship forged in 
many hours of common trouble and danger, and it was unwillingly that such a bond was 
ever severed.”50 Again, the work of the two-seater crews is placed within a highly 
privileged discourse, one that values their work as a mode of bonding that is superior to 
all others. 
Berthold and Viehweger’s relationship was neither fruitful nor long-lasting. On 
August 17, 1914, Viehweger and Berthold flew an observational flight over the rapidly 
moving French front line positions. The weather that day was poor; low fog, mist, and 
heavy cloud cover did not make for ideal flying or observation. The German Army, 
however, placed a greater emphasis on the acquisition of intelligence over the safety of 
its flight crews. Falckenstein sent Berthold and Viehweger to reconnoiter the French lines 
and report back. Appalling weather and poor communication between the two men meant 
that they were soon lost over hostile territory.  
Berthold later wrote, with more than an air of indignation, that Viehweger did not 
respond well under pressure: “My pilot did not concentrate on my instructions; I had 
studied the map very carefully so that we could not fly off course. But in order to avoid 
the clouds, the pilot withdrew ever further to the south and finally had to land and, of 
course, it was on such a bad piece of ground that the airplane’s entire undercarriage was 
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bent out of shape…”51 Berthold’s language in describing the ordeal both condemn his 
pilot while exonerating his own actions in getting lost. The inability to communicate 
information non-verbally on the part of Berthold contributed to their perilous situation. 
The pair abandoned their damaged machine and were later rescued by retreating to their 
side of the lines on foot. The chaotic nature of the battlefield meant that escape was a far 
easier possibility in 1914 than it became after the solidifying of the Western Front. 
Following the mishap, Berthold’s commanding officer wisely reassigned him to a 
new pilot, Otto Freiherr Marschalck von Bachtenbrock.52 Through September 1914, 
Berthold and his fellow aviators flew observation missions over the evolving front line. 
As he and Bachtenbrock overflew the French troops, Berthold noted his glee in what 
appeared to be an unstoppable German advance, “‘Every day I have flown 
reconnaissance missions. First we followed the retreating enemy incessantly to St. 
Quentin. They were on forced marches ... and I was amazed by the relatively good 
bearing of the retreating French columns ... But the soldiers were scarcely across the 
Marne river when there was no longer any restraint: without discipline, they threw away 
their weapons and knapsacks and fled into the countryside ... I went down to 100 meters’ 
altitude and wrote and sketched what I saw ... The Army High Command’s order was 
clear: “Relentless pursuit!”53 
Berthold’s task as an observer, and his language in depicting his contribution to 
the war effort, elucidates the ways in which he viewed his role in the war from a 
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privileged position. By flying over the French positions, Berthold and others like him 
could accumulate intelligence on the enemy; where troops were moving, how many men 
were there and where they were coming from, was then sent up the chain of command to 
the German generals tasked with attacking the French line. The excitement in Berthold’s 
entry reveals his sense that his contribution to the war was influencing events on the 
ground. In Berthold’s mind, the mere presence of German observation planes, lumbering 
overhead, with their stark black Balkankreuze flashing across their wings, imposed a 
psychological force on the beleaguered French troops. Such a point of view, one that 
enabled the flier to impose force on the enemy below without firing a shot, represented a 
truly privileged position in war. 
Observation of the enemy, of course, relied on an established system of trust, not 
only between crews, but between aviators and the generals commanding the German 
army. The relentless pursuit of the French army that Berthold celebrated, however, came 
to a swift end at the Battle of the Marne. Berthold observed French reinforcements 
staging to attack the growing gap in the German line, which would ultimately stall out 
their advance. Despite his detailed notes, the German general staff could not believe the 
report. The complicated relationship between aviation and the older General Staff is 
apparent in Berthold’s notes: “I fumed with rage. At my urging, another plane was sent 
out; it completely confirmed my observations. I could not keep still and flew yet again: 
my second report gave an even clearer picture. Ever more Frenchmen had poured into the 
gap between the 1st and 2nd Armies ... In my third report I stated: “The opposition has 
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passed through and is already behind our lines.”54 Despite the close relationship between 
the Fliegertruppe and the German Army - the air service fell under the jurisdiction of 
Army command – and the thought of a weakness in the German front line was 
inconceivable. Despite incontrovertible evidence from Berthold and other fliers along the 
front line, Army command was slow to react. The consequences of which have been the 
subject of countless military histories. Following the setbacks at the Marne, Berthold and 
the men of FA23 fell into a regular rhythm of observational sorties over a stalling 
Western Front. 
The transformation of the battlefield, from an environment of rapid movement 
and dynamic changes in men and materiel, to the static lines of the Western Front, 
provided an ideal proving ground for the maturation of air power. The airplane was free 
to develop into a fully realized weapons platform. As Neumann notes, “In the spring of 
1915 it became clear that the original standard type, in spite of all of its improvements, 
would have to be replaced by types designed for special purposes, since it would not 
satisfy the new requirements of war, which demanded, among other things, a much 
greater radius of action.”55 Neumann continued, saying, “Furthermore, the old type could 
have never … undertaken raids on the enemy’s [supply] dumps and camps behind the 
lines.”56 In other words, had the Western Front not matured into a static combat 
environment, one complete with fixed trenches and semi-permanent staging areas to keep 
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those trenches supplied, aviation would not have diversified to meet the new and 
changing needs of a long-term, static type of warfare. 
This novel environment created new ways for air crews to inflict violence on 
those below. As the war progressed, specific types of aircraft were designed and 
manufactured for the explicit purposes of photographing the enemy as well as ranging 
artillery against hostile troops. Neumann discusses the evolution of the aircraft for such 
purposes. “An airman engaged on artillery observation should not have to depend on 
wireless alone, but must be provided with several auxiliary means of communication… 
All the following instruments had to be fitted into the narrow space of a cockpit : wireless 
transmitting and receiving set, amplifier, etc.; a drum for winding 40 yards of wire aerial 
in or out; a Morse key, ammeter, electric flash lamp, various cartridges for coloured 
lights, smoke signals, etc., the whole outfit weighing about 220 Ibs.”57 In such a role, 
observation crews inflicted violence on thousands of troops below; ranging artillery 
batteries to better strike their targets and kill countless scores of the enemy. The technical 
requirements of their work, however, moved killing from a direct to an indirect space. By 
ranging artillery, observation crews again occupied a privileged space that allowed them 
to take part in the war – in this instance by ranging dozens of high powered howitzers – 
without directly engaging the enemy. The task of ranging artillery was, by its name, an 
abstract exercise.  
As noted in Chapter Two, these crews provided detailed information about enemy 
positions as well as the effects of artillery on the troops below. Those reports further belie 
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the carnage and suffering below. In the place of suffering is the calculated language of 
“thickness and thinness” of the enemy lines and the assessment on how effective German 
artillery has been at displacing the enemy. In other words, violence for the observer was a 
highly abstract occupation for the majority of his time spent in the air. Only when 
attacked by another plane, when the observer was forced to man his machine gun and fire 
back, did violence transcend from the abstract to the visceral. As the war progressed, 
aerial bombing would bring the observer into closer contact with the troops he was 
responsible for killing on the ground. 
By 1918, the technical development of the airplane reached a point of 
sophistication and capability that it could transcend the realm of merely observing troops 
or directing artillery, to a space where it could openly harass and kill soldiers on the 
ground.58  Within this new and dangerous environment, the privileged space of killing 
occupied by observation crews vanished into the maelstrom of violence below.  The 
reports of Bavarian Schlasta 31 from September of 1918 demonstrate the degree to which 
German aircraft could attack targets on the ground, even as the war turned decisively 
against them. Here again, the language of violence is apparent in the descriptions of the 
actions of Schlasta 31 in combat.  
By the final year of the First World War, aircraft had matured from the early war 
machines that Berthold described in his private diary to become machines that could 
strafe and bomb targets on the ground. The Bavarian ground-attack squadron, Schlasta 
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31, logged a series of reports of their attacks from July through September 1918. The 
reports open with a general summary of activities for that day’s sorties. The log from July 
1918 lists the series of attacks carried out by the unit. “During the night of the 16th to the 
17th, we disrupted traffic on the road [between] Reims - Epernay and Reims - Chalons 
using seven aircraft.”59 The squadron also logged the activity of enemy machines 
attempting to blunt their attacks. On July 17th, the squadron noted that “[enemy] flight 
activity was low in the evening; 1 French two-seater was attacked at 200 meters around 
Baconnes. He immediately turned to the south.”60 As Schlasta 31 used the two-seat 
Halberstadt CLII, which was not a machine intended for aerial combat, successfully 
fending off attack was sufficient.  
Bombing too, was a task carried out by the Bavarian ground-attack squadron. 
Unlike their larger bombing counterparts, who launched raids against cities like London, 
Schlasta 31’s machines were used for punitive bombing against troops at low altitude. 
Their adversaries were, by this point in the war, doing the same on their side of the lines. 
On the evening of July 17th, the unit recorded “In the night 1 enemy airplane above 
Villers-Devant le Thour, dropped a light bomb, then two heavy bombs.”61 Schlasta 31 
responded in kind, using “a 50 kilogram [bomb], a 12 kilogram [bomb], and five 
grenades” south of Courmelois… Further bomb hits were observed against a column of 
cars to the north of the channel bridge.”62 
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Bombing from lower altitudes was not the only way Schlasta 31 harassed enemy 
troops on the ground. Another daily report notes, “attacks with M.G. [Machine gun] to 
disrupt the traffic which was placed in columns. Fired at [artillery] batteries, enemy 
positions, in total 2600 [rounds] fired.”63 This work undoubtedly required the two-men 
crew of Schlasta 31’s Halberstadt CLII’s to move into remarkably close range with the 
enemy on the ground. The risk posed to the crews by ground fire was immense, and the 
observer likely received enemy fire as he used his on-board machine gun to strafe enemy 
positions. This type of violence was much closer and posed far greater risk to the crew 
than the high-altitude artillery ranging that other reconnaissance units engaged in. The 
damage done to enemy positions from mere feet away is noted in the combat reports, as 
well as the ferocity of enemy attack from the ground and the air. A report from 
September 1918 notes that “200 kilograms of bombs were dropped on Champfleury. 9 
SPADs [French fighters] intercepted our way. Short, unsuccessful aerial combat 
followed.”64 Here we see the numerical superiority that the allied air services possessed at 
the end of the war. Violence then, was an intensely heightened experience for observers 
and pilots in 1918. While the observation flights described by Rudolf Berthold in 1914 
had the potential for violence, the sorties completed by Schlasta 31 guaranteed violence 
and great physical risk.  
Aerial bombing moved violence for the two-seat crew from an abstract and distant 
space to a close, personal, and terrifying experience. Crews in these units did not range 
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artillery from thousands of meters up, but rather, dropped bombs just a few hundred feet 
from their targets and directly noted the impact their weapons had. This type of warfare 
in the air moved the spectrum of violence towards a greater emphasis on intensity and 
danger. Moving still farther along that spectrum, aerial combat in single-seat machines 
would epitomize the pinnacle of violence in the air during the First World War.  
 
Privileged Killing, Privileged Deaths 
For many like Rudolf Berthold, the dangerous position of being an observer in a 
large, lumbering aircraft vulnerable to attack, was solved only by liberating himself from 
the position of being a passive observer. “As soon as it can happen, I want to become a 
pilot.”65 As the war progressed, the privileged position of the observer, both in class and 
rank, was soon overwhelmed by the increasing violence in the air war over the Western 
Front. With that increase in risk, aviators like Berthold viewed the transition from the 
observation to the pilot’s seat as a way of improving his odds of survival. Within this 
transition of prestige from observer to pilot, the privileged relationship to killing found 
new resonance with Germany’s rising class of fighter pilots.  
The culture of self-reliance, of technological supremacy, in the belief in one’s 
abilities, were the driving characteristics of Rudolf Berthold’s experiences with powered 
flight. After being at the mercy of his pilot’s competence, Berthold felt empowered by 
taking control of his own plane. By piloting his own machine, Berthold believed 
steadfastly, that his ability to control his aircraft and fight his enemy would allow him not 
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only to survive the war, but to thrive within it. The promise of aviation in peacetime, that 
of transcending time and space, of piercing borders and rendering the old world 
irrelevant, had been married to its peril, that of becoming a fully realized weapon of war, 
and presented itself as an empowering, if incredibly dangerous, new way to fight. The 
airplane’s lethality, however, utterly transformed when wedded to the defining weapon of 
the First World War. 
The machine gun, that technological invention which gave Europeans the ability 
to kill in previously unimagined numbers, would revolutionize war in the air.66 The most 
pressing concern regarding its use in the air was how to fire the weapon accurately from a 
moving object, at a moving object.67 Until machine guns were efficiently employed in the 
air, aviators resorted to bolt-action rifles or smaller caliber weapons to inflict violence in 
the air.68 Rudolf Berthold complained in his war diary as early as August 1915 about the 
lack of machine guns in his squadron.69 Despite the lack of effective weaponry, Berthold 
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would frequently scream at this observer, who was armed with a rifle, to fire at any 
passing enemy aircraft.70 The design which fundamentally altered the scope and 
experience of violence in the air came from Dutch designer Antony Fokker, whose 
monoplane designs for Germany’s fliers would terrify British and French aviators all 
along the Western Front. Fokker patented a design for an “interrupter gear,” housed in the 
cowling of his monoplane.71 When fired, the machine gun would only discharge a round 
if the propeller was not in front if the muzzle. When the blade passed through, the gear 
blocked the trigger from firing the gun, thus allowing it to fire without danger through a 
spinning propeller.72  
The design revolutionized the air war. While Germany’s adversaries employed 
aircraft whose armament was largely the work of compromise, the aviators of the 
Fliegertruppen could now simply point their aircraft in the direction of their enemies and 
shoot. From a structural perspective, this shift in the placement of weaponry appears 
rudimentary and, perhaps, historically inconsequential. To understand the importance of 
such an invention, we must place ourselves within the space of violence that First World 
War aviators inhabited. Rudolf Berthold and his fellow fliers were relegated to shooting 
at enemy aircraft with rifles or movable machine guns fired by their observers. Doing so 
meant trying to hit a moving target from a moving platform, which was incredibly 
difficult. The Fokker design empowered aviators to an unprecedented degree. Now, 
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German fliers could track their enemies and attack without fear of being unable to hit 
their target. Moving the plane into position became a simple corporeal rather experience 
rather than a complicated mathematical exercise. One simply had to place their body 
behind their enemy, and the machine and weapon would follow. 
Upon meeting Oswald Boelcke, Manfred von Richthofen, who had yet to fly one 
of Fokker’s machines, inquired about how the famous combat pilot brought down his 
enemies.  “I wanted to learn how this Leutnant Boelcke really accomplished it. So I asked 
him: ‘tell me honestly, how do you really do it?’” He laughed, very amused, although I 
was quite serious. Then he answered me: ‘Good heavens, it indeed is quite simple. I fly in 
as close as I can, take good aim, shoot, and then he falls down.’ I merely shook my head 
and thought to myself that I had done the same thing but they had not fallen down. The 
difference was, of course, that he flew a Fokker fighter, and I had a large battle plane.”73 
Richthofen’s account shows us how the placement of the machine gun along the axis of 
the aircraft changed the relationship between fliers and violence. For the first time, the 
pilot, aircraft and weapon became synonymous. The Fokker EIII was built with a singular 
purpose, that of destroying enemy machines. The aviator was freed from his observer, 
and was no longer required to work in unison with another person to attack an enemy. 
The Fokker pilot need only to position his machine well, attack, and his machine gun 
would destroy whatever he targeted.  
The physicality of violence, then, changed as well. The aviator worked to place 
himself behind his enemy, and then leaned over in his cockpit to line up his target in the 
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reticule of his weapon, before squeezing the trigger. The visual experience of violence 
became at once, more personal. Staring through the propeller at his target, the pilot could 
see his rounds impacting his victim, shattering support struts, severing control wires, 
wounding, maiming, and killing the men controlling the aircraft. The position of violence 
was so iconic that Fokker company posters in 1915 featured a German aviator staring 
through the sights of his Spandau machine gun at the viewer, as he fired from the controls 
of his Fokker airplane. The Fokker EIII built on a confidence that aviation had instilled in 
its potential fliers since the outbreak of the war and amplified both their sense of agency 
and privilege. Fighter pilots soon discovered that both official rhetoric and popular 
culture would serve only to reinforce that sense of privilege. 
The experience of overcoming, even subjugating aerial violence, combined with 
technological mastery meant that First World War aviators regarded themselves as a 
privileged class among their peers. The perspective from the ground, provided by soldier 
newspapers from the period, illustrate the jealousy and awe with which many viewed 
aviators. “German Flier Songs,” published in the February 1916 issue of Seille-Bote 
included lyrics proclaiming pilots as “German warriors” and “kings of the air.”74 Other 
newspapers like the Deutsche Kriegszeitung von Baranowitschi described a young 
woman who, after encountering a German flier, never found another non-flying male to 
be attractive.75 Another derisively portrayed an overweight, aristocratic aviator who 
refused to fly in bad weather and hated getting cold, two experiences that his mud-bound 
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infantrymen lived with constantly.76 Military aviators embodied privilege in several 
ways: from the extra attention afforded them in the popular press, as well as the weekly 
military intelligence briefings as well as in their comparatively comfortable living 
conditions located well behind the front lines. It was their privileged relationship to 
violence - in their selective relationship to killing - that most personifies their privilege as 
combatants in the First World War. This relationship to violence was expressed in their 
perspective on killing, their willful choice to ignore killing, and the remarkably privileged 
manner in which they treated those they killed, and the way in which they were treated 
after being killed. 
Soldiers serving in the frontline positions of the First World War experienced 
violence on a nearly unending basis. They endured shelling from the enemy, gas 
bombardments, bombing from the air, and the ever-present threat of attack from across 
the lines.77 Further the effects of violence, of being surrounding by tens of thousands of 
corpses, of both friend and foe alike, lingered perpetually.78 Without the necessary means 
to remove bodies from impenetrable spaces like no-man’s-land, bodies were left to 
decompose in the open; often bloating in the heat, and to deteriorate from shell fire or the 
feasting of vermin and maggots. Soldiers had no choice but to endure the sensory 
bombardment of violence and death, and were often left to live with the visual 
consequences of those they had killed. Aviation, however, inserted space between 
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violence and the individual, leaving room for privileged responses to killing. Some 
viewed violence as a transformative act, which was required for an airman to become a 
Kampfflieger, or combat pilot. Others embedded killing within the dehumanized 
discourse of hunting, viewing the infliction of violence in the air as yet another act of 
sport. Still others chose to simply ignore the act of killing, and found solace within a 
system that both incentivized killing while insulating the killer from the act of destroying 
human life. 
Rudolf Berthold’s war diary reflects the complex and often privileged relationship 
to violence that German aviators enjoyed, and his reaction to bodily pain and suffering 
evolves in Berthold’s mind throughout the war. Upon losing his friend and observer in 
1915, Berthold notes in his war diary, “In the following weeks, I only saw my observer 
hanging overboard. Revenge! Struggle! I could not escape thoughts of vengeance. Rest 
well, my friend, Grüner, you will be avenged! I was a fighter pilot!”79 Berthold’s words 
provide a fascinating perspective on his relationship to violence and his sense of agency 
in the war. Berthold, who had served as the pilot of a large reconnaissance machine at the 
time, had no access to a weapon while in flight. Shortly after Grüner’s death, however, he 
moved to flying a fighter plane. His prior perception of offensive warfare was the waging 
of war against the enemy on the ground. After the death of his friend, however, 
Berthold’s definition of violence transcends to the air. It is important to note, also, that 
Berthold’s words reveal an overwhelming desire to avenge his friend’s death. Doing so is 
accomplished, not in finding the French crew that killed him, but by destroying a 
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comparable enemy to satisfy his desire to even the score. This first victory, over a French 
Voisin biplane, is the only one of Berthold’s forty-four victories that is described in 
exacting detail in his war diary. It is clear by the care and time placed in describing the 
event, that Berthold views this as a transformational moment in his life as a combat pilot, 
one which both avenged the loss of his friend and which elevated him from an aviator to 
a Kampfflieger.  
There is a significant disconnect, however, between Berthold’s description of 
shooting down his enemy target, and his willingness to confront the act of killing once he 
is back on the ground. Berthold describes his victory as being confirmed by phone, which 
would have been common during the First World War. “Then came the message from the 
foremost troop that two downed aircraft were confirmed… Half an hour later, cars drove 
towards [the crash.] I did not go with them, as the sight was too ugly.”80 It is in the 
closing this of Berthold’s description of killing his enemy and avenging the death of his 
friend that we encounter the extreme privilege enjoyed by First World War aviators. 
Berthold, who writes with such passion and conviction about his duty to avenge Grüner, 
and who also describes in minute detail the events that transpired to down the enemy 
French machine, suddenly grows reticent about personally witnessing the consequences 
of his actions. His explanation for not listing the crash because, “the sight was too ugly,” 
highlights the choice that aviators enjoyed over their counterparts on the ground. Back in 
his quarters, Berthold could choose, through both the privilege of his social position as 
well as his rank, to simply not visit the wreckage of his fallen enemy. The other enlisted 
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men of his squadron were assigned the task of driving to the site of the wrecked French 
plane, to confirm Berthold’s work. The French crew of the Voisin biplane were indeed 
found dead among the shattered remains of their machine and Berthold was credited with 
the “victory” over his enemy, all without ever having to witness the carnage that he 
inflicted.  
Berthold’s diary further elucidates the privilege of omission as the war progresses. 
A year later, in October of 1916, Berthold was awarded Germany’s highest medal, the 
Pour le Merite, and the event spurred him on to describe what the previous year of war 
had been like for him. It is here that we find a pattern for the rest of Berthold’s diary.  
“Months have passed again. I leave through my notes and I find so many places that 
move me. The first five opponents fell quite quickly, one after the other.”81 Berthold then 
transitions abruptly to describing a horrific flying accident which he suffered when his 
Pfalz monoplane crashed shortly after takeoff. There is no description of who his 
opponents were, what machine they were flying, or even if they were French or British 
adversaries. This omission presents another fascinating window into Berthold’s mentality 
and his privilege. As his accomplishments as a fighter pilot increased over time, and as he 
downed more enemy machines, Berthold’s prestige within his unit increased, thus 
affording him ever more privilege. By October of 1916, he could, at will, simply ignore 
the details of the killing of at least five men in aerial combat.82 It is a striking difference 
in tone from his earlier passage from 1915. 
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By 1916, Manfred von Richthofen had graduated to single-seat machines, and 
began his career as a fighter pilot. His autobiography describes the overwhelming sense 
of joy that he experienced upon the destruction of a British aircraft early in his career. 
While the medium through which we can access Richthofen’s thoughts is a far different 
type than Berthold - Richthofen’s prose was intended from the outset for public 
consumption - his actions, which put him at great bodily risk, confirm the emotion he 
describes on paper. Rather than choosing to ignore the consequences of his actions, or 
electing to send his ground crew out to confirm the destruction of the British machine, 
Richthofen voluntarily landed near the site of the crash to confirm his victory over his 
adversary. It should be noted that his decision to land his machine on an un-leveled field 
was incredibly dangerous, and could have easily resulted in a crash. The desperate desire 
to see the results of his aerial gunnery, however, proved too overwhelming to ignore. 
After landing, he noted “Arriving there, I found that my assumption was correct. The 
engine was shot to pieces, and both crewmen were severely wounded. The observer had 
died instantly, and the pilot died while being transported… Later I erected a gravestone to 
the memory of my honorably fallen enemies.”83  
The language used by Richthofen to describe killing in the air shows us that he 
viewed the act, not as an experience of combat, but rather as an exercise in hunting. In his 
autobiography, Richthofen describes the philosophical differences between his brother 
Lothar, who also served in Richthofen’s Jasta 11, and himself. “My father makes a 
distinction between a hunter, a sportsman, and a shooter whose only fun is shooting.”84 
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Here, Richthofen, either for personal or political reasons, is drawing on older, elite 
cultural tropes of sport hunting. It is entirely possible that Richthofen believed these 
differences mattered in warfare. It is also possible that he was portraying himself as a 
sportsman rather than a warrior for public and political reasons.  
The iconography of hunting, which embodied elite culture, also provided 
reassuring notions of continuity within violence, even the realm of aviation’s wholly new 
technological experience. The notion of an aviator scouting the skies, stalking an 
opponent, and then attacking like a hunter tracking game sanitized the deaths in the air, 
and created a notion of honorable killing that was both reassuring and illusionary. While 
Richthofen did land to collect trophies from the crashed aircraft of his victims, and he did 
find ways of honoring the pilots he killed, Richthofen was first and foremost a killer. The 
way Richthofen packaged the details of his killing, however, resonated with the public, 
and was reinforced by the language employed by official military culture. The resulting 
narrative embodied an extraordinary sense of privileged killing. 
Richthofen’s rhetorical strategies also reflects the terminology used by the 
German army during the conflict. By 1916, the increasing volume of air traffic over the 
Western Front, combined with the French reorganization of its air force into larger 
squadrons, and the subsequent fielding of superior machines by the British Royal Flying 
Corps, left the Fliegertruppe to yet again react to the situation on the Western Front.  The 
German Fliegertruppe created new units, Jagdstaffel, with the singular purpose of 
destroying enemy aircraft. The translation of the term used for these units elucidates 
much about the construction of the discourse of violence within the First World War’s 
aerial component. The term, Jagdstaffel, however, signaled a distinct shift in mentality 
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from the KEK units which had preceded it. Jagdstaffel literally translates to “hunting 
unit” or “hunting squadron.” Rather than scouting units, which would have reflected the 
cavalry background shared by many of the air services aviators, the German military 
choose the more offensively minded “hunting unit.” By setting the language used to 
define what Germany’s fighter pilots did on a daily basis, the Fliegertruppe also created 
the iconography of their experiences. Regardless, the difference in perception reveals 
German sentiments towards violence in the air. Richthofen continues, saying, “Early in 
the war I found that when I downed an Englishman, my hunting passion was quenched 
for the time being. I seldom tried to down two Englishmen, one right after another.”85 
Richthofen references “Englishmen” as his primary adversary rather than French aviators 
due to his location on the Western Front. This mindset, of embodying the identity of a 
“hunter” in the air, was eventually challenged by the increasing demands of aerial 
combat. 
“If one fell, I had the feeling of absolute satisfaction. Only much later did I 
overcome that and also became a shooter.”86 Here, it appears that Richthofen views the 
transition from “hunter” to “shooter” as a difficult one; one that requires perseverance 
and a change in character as well as mindset. “It was different with my brother… We 
attacked a squadron… I looked around and saw my brother sat behind an English 
machine from which flames shot out. Near this Englishman flew a second. Lothar did 
nothing further to the first, who had not yet fallen and was still in the air. He turned his 
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machine gun on the next one and immediately shot at him…”87 Richthofen’s tone in this 
passage expresses frustration, not for Lothar’s success, but for his inability to finish off 
his victim before moving on to the next. Back on the ground, Richthofen reprimanded 
Lothar, “I sent him up forward to determine what the fellows’ names were, etc. Late in 
the afternoon he came back after having only found one.”88 In the following passage, 
Richthofen describes traveling to Pless to hunt rare bison. “I was allowed to shoot so rare 
an animal. In about a generation there will be no more, for they will have been 
exterminated.”89 Richthofen’s conflation of killing Englishmen and hunting bison 
elucidate the extraordinary privilege that Germany’s most renowned fighter pilot enjoyed 
during his career. The utter and complete entanglement of hunting discourse and the 
killing of human beings demonstrates his privilege, not in ignoring death, but in actively 
participating and even reveling in it.  
These passages also highlight the privileged relationship that aviators experienced 
with death. Comrades on the ground would die and ultimately be buried in mass graves, 
often without any means of identifying their bodies for loved ones at home. Aviators, by 
contrast, were enmeshed within a system that not only quantified their victories, but also 
went to extraordinary lengths to recover their bodies in the event of their deaths. One 
such pilot, Lieutenant Ernst Heß, achieved minor notoriety for his exploits as a combat 
pilot during most of 1917. By December of that year, Heß had downed seventeen enemy 
aircraft, and had won both the Iron Cross and the House Order of Hohenzollern. On 
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December 23, 1917, Heß failed to return from a sortie in his Albatros fighter plane. The 
German Army’s elaborate system of tracking all aircraft sighted in a crash eventually 
relayed the message back to his squadron that one of their pilots might be down. Two 
Lieutenants were dispatched to locate the crash site and in the afternoon hours, confirmed 
that the downed plane was Lieutenant Heß. The ensuing paper trail in Heß’ personal file 
in the German archives demonstrates the great lengths the Luftstreitkräfte went to recover 
their dead. The first file is the report from the two officers upon finding Heß’ body and 
his crashed plane. “At 1:30, the aircraft Albatros DVa 5347 - Leader Leutnant Heß has 
been shot down by a French aircraft. At the R I position on the left, Fresnes-Modelin, the 
machine burned to the ground. When I came to the plane, the pilot was dead and partially 
burned. We pulled the body out of the rubble and laid it in a tent. Leutnant Heß was 
apparently killed by a shot to the head.”90 What is remarkable about the report is that it 
further details the items found on Heß’ body. 
“Leutnant Becker and I have taken the following items from the corpse: 
1 wallet with 172.65 Marks 
1 ring 
1 watch 
1 pocket knife 
1 cigarette case 
1 silver lighter 
1 watch bending 
1 key chain with chain  
1 notebook 
1 pair of cufflinks”91 
 
The officers’ report details the remarkable degree of work employed to positively 
identify Heß. First, they identify the number on the burned Albatros as that which was 
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assigned to Heß. Second, they confirm his identity through the items on his person. 
Finally, they wrote, “It is the well-known Leutnant Heß. In his cigarette case was the list 
of the seventeen planes he shot down.” Heß’ personal file details the extraordinary 
lengths to which the Luftstreitkräfte went to notify his relatives and sent not only his 
body, but all of his personal belongings home. Telegrams between commanding officers 
illustrate the effort taken to locate his relatives and arrange to have his affects returned to 
them. Beyond the official communiques, newspapers from Heß’ home region published 
his obituary, not only after his death in December 1917, but through most of 1918 as 
well. Heß’ personnel file shows us the privileged existence of Germany’s aviators led, 
even in their death.92 Heß’ reports of his aerial victories during his life also illustrate the 
complex system of quantification that fighter pilots in the Luftstreitkräfte found 
themselves increasingly enmeshed in during the conflict.  
 
The Rhetoric of Privilege and Killing 
By 1916, the war in the air had grown both in its importance to ground 
commanders, and in the volume of carnage produced. Each of the belligerent air powers 
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created systems for categorizing and tracking the damage inflicted by their aviators.93 As 
the war’s aerial component expanded and transformed, the command structure of the 
Fliegertruppe developed an ever-increasing appetite for data. The fluidity of aerial 
combat, and the inability to know exactly how many enemy aircraft had been produced 
and pressed into service, led to exacting metrics for documenting, categorizing, and 
prioritizing information from front line pilots. The German system for organizing a 
statistical analysis of aerial violence, and its criteria for pilots to claim victories in the air, 
were significantly different from their adversaries across the Western Front. German 
single-seater flights largely operated behind their own side of the lines for the vast 
majority of the war.94 As a result, the preponderance of German aerial victories fell on 
their side of the front. The nature of the war’s air component on the German side is 
reflected in the intricate systems of victory confirmation that was firmly established by 
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April 1917. This system immersed combat pilots in a sophisticated process of reporting 
and analysis. Officially, such a system allowed the air service to track the number of 
enemy machines destroyed in combat. Rhetorically, the system served to incentivize 
killing in ways that brought pilots increasing recognition and acclaim. 
The primary method of publishing aerial victories during the war was through the 
Nachrichtenblatt der Luftfahrtruppen (News Reports of the Aviation Groups), which 
cataloged information regarding the air war, and included a list, in chronological order 
that week, of confirmed aerial victories. Pilots were required to file a claim form for each 
individual plane that they destroyed. The German system was far more rigorous in its 
requirements, with visual confirmation as a prerequisite, and additional corroboration by 
witnesses giving added weight to the claim.95 In ideal circumstances, a crash site with 
identifiable wreckage would render the claim all but certain. Unlike their British and 
French counterparts, the German Fliegertruppen did not create a system that “shared” 
victories between pilots. In the inevitable event of two or more pilots claiming credit for 
the destruction of an enemy machine, the Kommandeur der Flieger (Kofl) or the 
commander of the specific Army that the squadron was assigned to, acted as an 
“independent” adjudicator. These claims were then passed on to the Kommandierenden 
General der Luftstreitkräfte (Kogenluft). As reports moved from individual, to squadron, 
to army, to command and control, the impression of the air war grew increasingly 
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abstract until, once published in the Nachrichtenblatt, killing reached its most abstract 
expression, as pure numbers. 
It is significant to note that the intricacies of this system were formally 
implemented on a mass scale during one of the most successful months of aerial combat 
conducted by the Luftstreitkräfte.96  That the army suddenly felt impelled to communicate 
such detailed information about aerial victories is, perhaps, not surprising given the 
extraordinary good fortunes experienced by their squadrons along the Western Front. The 
quantity of aircraft involved in the air war also necessitated further quantification by the 
commanders of the German army. That said, the level of granulation in detail in the 
Nachrichtenblatt is, considering the scope of the conflict by 1917, remarkable. These 
reports detail the date, location of flight, where the enemy machine was observed to 
crash, the type of airplane, rank of the enemy combatant, name and squadron of the 
successful German aviator credited with the kill.97 Further, these reports expanded to 
include running totals of its most successful airmen, as well as lists of observation 
balloons destroyed by German fliers, and aircraft destroyed by ground crews manning 
anti-aircraft batteries.98 What remains utterly absent in these documents, however, are the 
reports of Germany’s observation and bombing squadrons and their influence on the 
ground war. By 1917, it is clear that German command is all but utterly obsessed with the 
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number of enemy planes brought down, rather than its overall effect on the outcome of 
the greater conflict. 
The papers of Lieutenant Ernst Heß elucidate the structure and the type of data 
that commanders were interested in. Heß’ flight report from early 1916 clearly show the 
categories of information requested: who operated the aircraft, who was the observer (if 
there was one), when did the flight occur, what was the weather and visibility?99 The 
report also inquires about the machine’s flight path, the results of the mission (were the 
objectives of the sortie completed successfully), additional observations about campaign 
activity below, and any special or unusual events? The final category was reserved for 
descriptions of aerial combat. Heß’ flight report from January 5, 1916 provides a 
snapshot of the kind of information provided in these standardized reports. Heß flew from 
his station at the Douai airfield and he flew a Fokker Monoplane, number 32/15.100 As 
the machine was a single-seater, he had no observer. The flight lasted from 1:20 - 2:25 in 
the afternoon. His flight path took him over several towns, including the town of Vitry, 
where he encountered an enemy machine.101 It is here that we see the discourse used to 
describe the destruction of an enemy machine, and the clinical data that aviators provided 
to the commanders of the Fliegertruppe during the First World War. Heß’ narrative 
begins by stating that he “visually acquired a BE2C at 2200 meters” and subsequently 
turned to attack. He opened fire on the British two-seater and was assisted by Lieutenant 
Oswald Boelcke, who attacked the BE2C at roughly 1600 meters.102 The BE2C later 
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crashed, and was credited to Heß as his first confirmed kill. The language employed by 
Heß is official, clinical, and devoid of any emotional overtones. It is a simple, matter-of-
fact account of where he was and what actions he took in the air. 
The forms filled out by Heß evolved over the time to include ever more specific 
pieces of information. A year later, in 1917 his report included additional information 
regarding information about enemy machines and the condition of any crew members 
brought down by German pilots. The form, in addition to the previously included date, 
time, location information included on the previous reports, now added space for data on 
the enemy’s aircraft type, number, as well as the engine type, horsepower displacement, 
and motor number, as well as descriptions of aircraft armament. The level of technical 
granulation in this report, which differs markedly from its predecessor a year earlier, is 
remarkable. Despite the specificity of some of the information, in particular the aircraft 
and motor number of an enemy machine, Lieutenant Heß was able to provide all of the 
requested data after a successful sortie in October 1917. The comprehensive report 
supplied by Heß could only have been completed by visiting the crash site of his victim 
to find the requisite serial numbers off such components as the aircraft’s engine. Such 
information was clearly demanded by the army command, not only to corroborate a 
victory, but to also track the number of machines being destroyed by German pilots in an 
attempt to maintain a wider, statistical view of the air war.  
Heß’ report of October 14, 1917, describes the events surrounding the downing of 
a French Dourand AR2. The aircraft number of the French machine, 1123, is noted, as 
well as the type of engine, a Renault 8-cylinder motor, stamped number 57521. Heß also 
notes the machine’s special features: that it is a photo reconnaissance machine, though he 
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notes that no camera can be found on board.103 The report also notes that two airmen 
have been taken prisoner. The report asks the aviator to qualify if the enemy fliers are 
alive or did. Heß has marked this question, “no.” A qualifying question follows: “Are 
they wounded?” Here, Heß has noted that the “leader is lightly injured, the mechanic is 
seriously wounded.” The enemy aircraft is marked as recovered by “Jagdstaffel 19,” 
presumably after ground crews from Heß’ squadron located the crash and the injured 
French airmen.104 Heß then describes his sortie: “Start 5:15 in the afternoon. On call for 
air-protection near Brimont against an A.R.” Heß is noting that he was called to intercept 
the French AR2, which was seen by ground troops near Brimont. Heß reached Fort 
Brimont and noted “The same aircraft [as described from the ground] was about to cross 
the [French side] of the Front. After a short fire, it swung north-wards at a height of 1000 
meters to make a new attempt to reach its line.” Heß’ term of “short fire” notes his 
opening fire on the French machine as it tried to cross its sector of the Front, thus 
preventing its escape.  
“After repeated attack, his [gasoline] tank was shot, where upon it set fire. I 
followed the landing [of the enemy] which broke the machine.” Heß’ description details 
the most dreaded fear among First World War aviators: fire. The Dorand was hit in its 
fuel tank, a common occurrence in First World War aerial combat. In a machine made 
mostly of wood, petroleum-doped canvas, and propelled by engines operating at high 
temperatures, the potential for fire was incredibly high. Once the fuel tank of the French 
machine was struck, gasoline spilled out, and ignited. The French pilot had no choice but 
                                                     
103 Personal Papers of Ernst Heß, Nachlasse, N208-5, Bundesarchiv Freiburg. 
104 Ernst Heß, Nachläss N208-5, Freiburg Bundesarchiv. 
  171 
to crash land the plane immediately, or suffer the fate of burning alive in the air. That the 
machine broke up on landing is not surprising. The fire, coupled with the crash landing, 
explains the injuries suffered by the pilot and observer. Heß’ tone in his reports 
demonstrate the clinical descriptions of violence by German aviators during the conflict 
and the detachment expressed in the act of destroying an enemy machine and injuring its 
crew. Note that Heß remarks on the components of the aircraft that are hit, its engine, fuel 
tank, and how the aircraft breaks on impact, not the crew inside.  
It is apparent from Heß’ reports that the German general staff cultivated an 
interest in the aerial activities of its fighter pilots that metastasized to the point of 
obsession. While the type of aircraft destroyed and the condition of its crew could reveal 
important details about the damage inflicted on a particular belligerent’s observation or 
fighter aircraft, the type of engine and its respective serial number could not have offered 
any significant insight; certainly, none that would necessitate the time and labor required 
to process such a volume of data from hundreds of fighter pilots along the Western Front. 
When placed in conversation with official communiques, the obsessive, even distracted 
nature of the information demanded by the general staff, reflects a wider preoccupation 
with the air war fighter component.  
Official reports to commanding officers of the army were met by telegrams from 
generals, crown princes, and other important figures within the German military and 
cultural hierarchy. These communiques highlight the extraordinary degree of attention 
paid to German fighter pilots during the conflict. In one instance, a General Lochow 
wrote to Jasta 10 on December 11, 1916, to commend the unit on its resent destruction of 
four enemy machines: “On the previous day, the flying troops of the 5th Army, in addition 
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to excellent reconnaissance and artillery spotting, delivered thirty-three aerial battles in 
104 fights, in which four enemies were confirmed, one enemy was forced down within 
our lines. I express my appreciation to the victorious flying crews, in particular Jasta 10, 
which alone had recorded four air battles. The airmen may always be proud of the fact 
that their active offensive spirit supports the struggle of all of our arms to a considerable 
extent.”105 
Lochow’s message extolled what he considered to be the most important aspects 
of the Fliegertruppe’s activities in the previous twenty-four hours. While he briefly 
mentions aerial observation and artillery spotting, the majority of the message focuses on 
aerial combat between machines and the destruction of four enemy aircraft, with one 
forced down behind German lines. A close reading of this message reflects a 
disproportionate importance placed on aerial combat over all other forms of air service. 
With roughly 1,3000 German soldiers dying in combat every day during the First World 
War, it is curious that Lochow was so pleased with the downing of just a handful of 
machines. His note demonstrates the increasing degree to which commanding officers 
and generals became obsessed with the air war’s air-to-air component, and how 
observation and artillery operations utterly faded to the background, despite being more 
consequential.  
The tone of these types of congratulatory messages only grew more bellicose as 
the war continued. The General of the 6th Army wrote a similar message on August 22, 
1917. While the number of victories in the air had increased, the ground war had also 
                                                     
105 Ernst Heß, Nachläss N208-5, Freiburg Bundesarchiv 
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proportionately grown in terms of carnage. Again, the language used was remarkably 
emotional and optimistic, not about the success of Germany’s air operations as a whole 
but about its fighter units in particular. “In the numerous air battles of the past few days, 
Jasta 28 has performed exceptionally. But yesterday’s missions brought the squadron 
eight air victories. We look forward with pride and joy to our comrades, who, above the 
battlefields of Flanders, with their aggression and courage in the face of death, were 
slaughtering the English there, and in their youthful chariots, they conquered all for the 
Fatherland. The Armee and myself extend thanks to the mighty fighters of the Jasta.”106 
Congratulations of this sort extended all the way up to the King of Württemberg, who 
wrote personally to Jasta 28 to commend their success: “To the latest gleaming 
performance of the often-honored Jasta, I express my most heartfelt congratulations.”107  
Official telegrams and the increasing focus given to fighter pilots combined with a 
spoils system which developed not only to reward killing in the air, but to incentivize 
further acts of violence. German aviators were gifted a goblet, known as the Ehrenbecher 
für den Sieger im Luftkampf, or the Honor Goblet for the Victor in Air Combat, was made 
of high quality silver and stamped with the mark of the head of the flying forces. The 
goblet was given to aviators on the occasion of their first aerial victory, although this 
requirement increased as the war went on. Rudolf Berthold noted that, by 1918, the 
goblets were eventually made of iron, which he felt was a more appropriate metal to 
embody the work accomplished by fighter pilots. Upon awarding of an iron goblet to a 
young pilot, Berthold noted that the war was now producing “iron men” who would 
                                                     
106 Ernst Heß, Nachläss N208-3, Freiburg Bundesarchiv. 
107 Ernst Heß, Nachläss N208-3, Freiburg Bundesarchiv. 
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continue to serve and die for the Fatherland. Such awards were seldom, if ever given to 
German aviators serving in reconnaissance and bombing units. Thus, the air service 
created an active system of encouraging aviators to fight with single seat fighter units if 
they desired a career filled with awards and congratulatory telegrams from princes and 
generals. Thus, the system established to quantify and encourage violence in the air 
worked to effectively maintain morale even as the war turned decisively against Germany 
while maintaining an extraordinary sense of privilege among the nation’s fighter pilots. 
 
Conclusion  
Violence and powered flight were intertwined from aviation’s inception at the 
start of the twentieth century. The risks associated with flight, with controlling 
underpowered aircraft built out of lightweight materials that offered no appreciable safety 
to the pilot, were known among those who entered the field during the First World War. 
Violence, however, was not a monolithic experience for all aviators, nor was it a constant 
experience over the course of four years of ever-changing war in the air. Aviation 
benefited from the static nature of the war below, yet the technical revolution sparked by 
the muddy quagmire of Flanders created a rapidly changing conflict in the air. 
The very act of performing powered flight was viewed as a violent struggle. The 
forces of nature, of gravity, inertia, speed, and the resulting strain on both body and 
airframe, cultivated a perception of violence in the minds of those who flew, and those 
onlookers on the ground. At the outbreak First World War in 1914, aviation was merely 
an embryonic, un-realized appendage that served under the jurisdiction of the generals of 
the German army, none of whom knew how to utilize this new and disruptive technology. 
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The limitations of powered flight in those early months of the war provided aviation with 
a singular task, that of observing the movement of the enemy on the ground. Even at this 
early stage, it is clear from the writing of German aviators like Rudolf Berthold that fliers 
viewed their contributions to the wider war from a highly privileged perspective. 
Observing troop movements fed a near-constant stream of intelligence back to 
German commanding officers who could then, in turn, change the direction of their own 
troops. The resulting attacks and counter-attacks were responsible for the deaths of 
hundreds, if not thousands of enemy soldiers below. While never firing a shot, the 
observers of German reconnaissance machines felt they could influence the war on the 
ground. The increasing sense of importance that the general staff held aviation only 
reinforced this privileged viewpoint. Pure observation, however, soon found its limits. 
Even dedicated men like Rudolf Berthold, whose reports had been accepted wholesale 
during the early German successes of 1914, found his new information falling on deaf 
ears when the French began counter-attacking and thus inflicting violence on the German 
soldiers beneath the wings of his large reconnaissance aircraft. That exploitation 
eventually broke the German advance and created the circumstances that would solidify 
the war on the Western Front into a static, stagnant conflict for the next three-and-a-half 
years. 
That conflict, over a stable, unmoving environment transformed aviation’s early 
use for observation into a tool for mapping the Western Front. The subsequent realization 
of military flight’s vital importance led a pace of development so rapid that aviators 
struggled to keep up. The crews of two-seat reconnaissance machines soon found 
themselves responsible for a host of new duties: photographing enemy positions, 
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manning defensive machine guns to either attack or defend against enemy aircraft, and 
ranging artillery with sophisticated wireless equipment. Thus, the experience of violence 
transformed again, from a passive to an active engagement. Ranging artillery in a large 
reconnaissance aircraft could kill several times the number of enemy combatants that one 
could ever hope to shoot down in the air. Yet observers enjoyed the privilege of viewing 
the task as an abstract exercise in calculation and plotting. As the air war grew more 
populated, however, these crews also faced direct, menacing violence in the air. The 
crews were required to operate, as Georg Neumann said, “as two working as one 
individual.” Working as a unit that could anticipate each other’s needs created a bond that 
arguably transcended that of those on the ground - where verbal communication was still 
an option. Failure to do so resulted in disastrous consequences, and circumstances from 
which men like Berthold were lucky to escape. 
Aerial bombing on the Western Front moved violence from the realm of the 
often-abstract space occupied by two-seat crews into an extraordinary dangerous and 
visceral experience for the men who served in units like Bavarian Schlasta 31. In 1918, 
the unit epitomized the transformation of violence in the air against the ground, from a 
distant mode of engagement to literally dropping bombs only a few hundred feet above 
the earth. Rather than noting “thickness and thinness” of enemy positions - which 
appeared as little more than lines in the sand from ten thousand feet up - bombing crews 
could note individual bombs destroying cars, tanks, ammunition dumps, and of course, 
killing and maiming men. These crews could also strafe troops on the ground, who were 
likely running in terror from the attack in the sky. The experience brought violence out of 
the realm of privilege and placed killing in a perspective that could not be ignored. 
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The transformation of the aircraft from the large, multi-seat machine, to that of 
the single-seat fighter, completed the movement of violence along a spectrum from 
abstract to direct. The placement of the engine, pilot, and machine gun along the same 
axis fundamentally changed the aviator’s relationship with violence. Rather than 
attempting to hit a moving aerial target from a moving aerial platform, the fighter pilot 
could move his body and machine in tandem, until he was mere feet away from his target, 
before opening fire and destroying the machine, and killing the man, in front of him. But 
aviation, that most complex of technological interfaces in the First World War, also 
provided the aviator with the privilege of ignoring the work of his own hands. Men like 
Manfred von Richthofen chose to land to survey the work of his machine guns. His 
autobiography exhibits the elation he experienced to see who well his marksmanship 
worked against his target, while all-but-ignoring the mangled bodies left in the wreckage 
of the enemy machine he had just shot down. Other aviators, like Rudolf Berthold, could 
choose not to visit the site of such crashes, which were needed to verify a victory and be 
sent on to the Fliegertruppe command to subsequently award the kill. It is perhaps telling 
that Berthold’s later entries ignore killing altogether, and expend significantly more ink 
complaining about lackluster quarters than expounding on the violence he had inflicted 
on other fliers. 
The awards fed a system created and expanded by the German military was 
designed to quantify killing while further incentivizing the act of killing in the air. The 
statistical task of tabulating “kills” or “victories” elucidates much about the concerns of 
the German command structure of the air service. Rather than counting men, the 
Germans, like their adversaries on the other side of the lines, counted machines rather 
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than men in the daily totals of aerial victories. Doing so further abstracted the grizzly 
work performed by Germany’s aviators and provided a lens through which to view 
killing as a “clean” profession which, in the words of Manfred von Richthofen, could be 
abstracted to resemble the hunting of animals, rather than the killing of men. This system 
was but the surface of a much larger, more complex apparatus that was designed for 
quantifying killing. Measurements of bomb craters from aerial weapons, statistical 
analysis of bombing, and attempts to render aerial warfare to a scientific enterprise 
elucidates the ways in with the German air service abstracted killing, and refocused its 
attention on the destruction of war materiel rather than men. Yet, as the war progressed, 
the general staff became increasingly obsessed with the air to air fighting between 
Germany’s fliers and its adversaries. Minute details that not only quantified killing but 
also recorded the serial number of the motor produced in a foreign factory, speak to the 
shift in focus away from the ground war towards the fleeting gratification of winning 
limited aerial battles. 
This shift in focus by the general staff further complicated the relationship that 
Germany’s aviators experienced with violence. Differing from their comrades on the 
front lines of the Western Front, aviators enjoyed extraordinary privilege; from their 
living quarters, to their social status as heroes to the German public, to the remarkable 
lengths to which the Fliegertruppe would go to retrieve fallen aviators. These men, 
however, experienced and subsequently processed violence in markedly different ways. 
Violence then, was a defining characteristic of the experience of flying in the First World 
War, but it was expressed in a multitude of ways along a spectrum of intensity, 
physicality, and position. It formed a central pillar of identity. Violence acted in 
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conversation with a host of other modes of personal and group expression. As we will see 
in the next chapter, regional and national identity also formed a fundamental mode of 
understanding the purpose of being a flier for the Fatherland. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: GERMAN FLIERS IN FOREIGN LANDS 
 
Introduction 
Aviation, like many new technological innovations before it, worked as a 
disruptive force within society. As we have already seen, powered flight changed the 
human relationship with the photographic camera, and created a new and privileged 
relationship with the act of killing. Flight also complicated questions surrounding 
regional and national identity. As noted in chapter one, Germany in 1914 was the product 
of decades of complex exchanges between regional and national discourses that defined 
what it meant to belong to the Fatherland. The airplane, and in particular, the role of 
aviator, would introduce new and challenging dimensions to the constellation of 
attributes that constituted what it meant to be German during the First World War. 
German aviators, who were largely part of the new, middle class members of the officer 
corps, negotiated the influence of long-standing cultivations of German identity, while 
finding new ways to express their personal sense of self, their regional affiliation, and the 
ways in which they internalized the nation.1  
As aviation’s military potential slowly crystalized before the First World War, 
Germany’s regional peculiarities emerged once more in the widely differing reaction of 
regional governments to powered flight.2 These responses, which ranged from urgently 
                                                     
1 Alon Confino’s investigation of national identity examines how Germans internalized the idea of the 
nation. This question also informs my work in this chapter. In regards to aviators, I am also curious as to 
how this internalization subsequently manifested itself in social and cultural practices. See Alon Confino, 
The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
2 John Morrow elucidates the technical and political interplay that informed the decision making of 
Bavarian and Prussian war ministers. See, John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
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adopting aviation as a vital new mode of waging and winning wars, to fretting over 
acquiring too many airplanes for the coming war, illustrate more than just the mere 
logistical and military concerns of Germany’s various regions. It demonstrates the 
lingering influence of regional peculiarities that grew from roots buried in the intellectual 
discourse of the previous century. To trace these regional and national responses to 
aviation at a point of crisis then, reveals the significant influence of Germany’s 
complicated identities on both the mentalities and lived realities of the nation’s fliers 
during the First World War. 
Aviation highlights the complex manner in which regional differences within 
Germany could dictate the life and death realities of its fliers during the First World War. 
Here the notion of regional peculiarities manifested in concrete, tangible ways. Bavaria’s 
air service, which served autonomously within the wider German Fliegertruppe and later, 
the reorganized Luftstreitkräfte, was the most emblematic example of the consequences 
of long-standing regional differences in shaping the kingdom’s experience during the 
First World War. The regional independence which was so fiercely defended by the 
Bavaria’s war ministry ultimately shaped their perception of the impending war and their 
reaction to it. First, it created a sense of war time that was distinctly different from its 
Prussian counterparts, and subsequently colored the Bavarian war ministry’s sense of the 
urgency of the conflict, and its potential to become a long, devastating ordeal. The 
consequences of this perception of the coming war created shortages of machines for 
aviators to use at the outbreak of the conflict. Second, in its efforts to maintain local 
autonomy from Prussia, Bavaria’s war ministry ultimately dictated which manufacturing 
firms would design and build machines for the kingdom’s fliers. The decision to initially 
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work with localized designers and industrial centers produced far different aircraft from 
those manufactured for Prussian squadrons. As a result, Bavarian aircraft were often 
markedly inferior form a technical and mechanical standpoint and were subsequently 
fraught with maladies, leaving Bavarian aviators exposed to greater risk of accident and 
death.3 In an era where aircraft were constructed with no thought given to protecting the 
aviator, a simple crash landing could prove fatal.4 
Here too, aviation plays a disruptive role in the discourse of regional autonomy 
and national identity by further complicating these identities by adding an additional 
layer of personal preference and superstition. In doing so, powered flight and the role of 
aviator opened a space for self-expression and new modes of identity construction. 
Aviators often had mixed reactions to new types of machines produced during the war. 
Some, like those made in early 1916 by the Bavarian firm, Pfalz, were markedly inferior 
to their Prussian counterparts.5 Only a year later, in 1917, the same firm produced a new 
machine that, despite its supposed inferiority to Prussian aircraft, would be preferred by 
some pilots in combat. This preference highlights the dynamic nature of identity, and the 
multiplicity of conversations that defined personal, regional, and national concepts of the 
self and one’s place within a broader, unified community.  
                                                     
3 See, John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
4 One such example of a fatal crash landing was that of Oswald Boelcke, the massively popular German 
fighter pilot who was one of the earliest airmen to attract attention for shooting down enemy aircraft. He 
was killed when a fellow airmen collided with him, and his aircraft was forced into a crash landing. 
Boelcke was killed on impact. Manfred von Richthofen comments on the death of Boelcke, who was his 
mentor in his autobiography. See, Manfred von Richthofen, Der rote Kampfflieger (Berlin:Verlag Ullstein 
& Company, 1917). 
5 As will be discussed later in the chapter, Rudolf Berthold notes with disgust, his reaction to a poorly built 
Pfalz aircraft. Other German aviators, however, came to depend on later Pfalz aircraft over their Prussian 
built counterparts, like the Albatros line of fighter aircraft. These proclivities were colored by personal 
preference and, at times, superstition. 
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German aviators went to great lengths to define their identity on the Western 
Front. It is in this construction of the individual as well as the community, that we find 
both the privilege and the space that aviation afforded to fliers. An examination of the 
photo album of Peter Supf reveals the effort expended in recreating the German 
homeland even in the midst of the Western Front. Within these constructions we find the 
reciprocal nature of regional and national identities, where one context cannot fully exist 
without the presence of the other. Indeed, in the process of expressing German identity, 
Bavarian units often sought ways to distinguish themselves from their fellow Germans, in 
a way that highlighted the regional peculiarities within a broader nationalistic 
framework.6  
The process of “othering” oneself from one’s neighbors fundamentally changed 
when German squadrons moved away from the Western Front, which was populated 
predominately by fellow Europeans, to foreign theaters of war. Within a truly foreign 
space, the “otherness” within regional identity, the sense that “sharp distinctions are 
drawn between neighbors,” gave way to broader tropes that often harkened back to 
nationalistic discourse. Within this space, where German aviators felt truly different from 
the other people inhabiting their surroundings, a different sense of “otherness” came to 
the forefront. Bayern Flieger-Abteilung 304b, an aviation reconnaissance unit, provides 
the perfect case study into the renegotiation of “otherness” in foreign lands. The unit 
organized and trained over the rolling green fields of Oberschleißheim airfield, just 
                                                     
6 For the ways in which populations seek to “other” themselves from their counterparts, I utilize the 
theories explained in Johnathan Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes, in To See Ourselves as 
Others See Us: Christians, Jews, “Others” in Late Antiquity, ed. Jacob Neusner and Ernest Freichs (Chico: 
Scholars Press, 1985). 
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outside of Munich, but they would soon deploy to the deserts of the Middle East in the 
final year of the First World War. Here, the broader, flatter performance of national 
identity, rather than regional idiosyncrasies, became the dominant markers of identity for 
German aviators.7 The process of “othering” those around them in Palestine began long 
before reaching their theater of operations, during the logistical challenge of 
requisitioning and organizing the needed materiel to transport the squadron from 
Germany to the middle east. The language of 304b’s documents are filled with the 
discourse of “othering.” Cultural appropriation mixed with a sense of cultural, 
intellectual, and racial superiority combine to create a new and complex “German” 
identity among the fliers of the unit that would be nicknamed, even in official documents, 
as 304b “Pascha.” Its commanding officer, Franz Walz, earned the moniker of “The 
Eagle of Jericho.” Thus, 304b both marked itself as distinctly German while “othering” 
local culture through appropriation in an act of nationalistic self-expression. The 
squadrons technical, logistical, and mechanical issues only reinforced their perception of 
seeing in a truly alien habitat devoid of any inherently “German” characteristics.8 
Aviation then, provides a valuable approach to dissect the complexities of 
regional and national identity at a heightened point of crisis within Germany. It 
contributes to a growing body of literature that refutes the notion that Germany was a 
                                                     
7 When using the phrase “flatter performance of national identity,” I mean to express the sense in which 
national tropes are expressed using broad, less defined markers of identity which are more open to 
interpretation. Regional peculiarities often require contextual markers to create cultural significance. In 
other words, a Bavarian-style hunting lodge, the kind which appears later in this chapter, requires the 
viewer to understand what architectural cues mark the building as Bavarian rather than simply German. 
Whereas flying the Imperial German Flag, or wearing an iron cross, or marking one’s aircraft with German 
colors, requires less contextual cues for a viewer to process these practices as German. These visual cues 
were broadly defined, largely by Imperial culture, as inherently German modes of expression of identity. 
8 See, Squadron Records and Correspondence of F.A. 304b ‘Pascha,’ Finding Aid: WK2077 Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv: Abt. Kriegsarchiv, Munich 
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unified nation before the First World War, as well as assertions that the war was a 
unifying experience.9 For even post-war histories of Germany’s experience in the war in 
the air were still divided into national and regional narratives. Analyzing the intellectual 
discourse that shaped the mindset of German’s born at the end of the nineteenth century, 
as well as practicing a close reading of the material culture of the period, fully elucidates 
the degree to which Germany in 1914 was still a nation defined by regional identities. 
The development of military aviation intersected with a new generation of Germans, and 
provided a canvas on which to further define and express their sense of individual, 
regional, and national identity, while marking them as distinctly different from their 
comrades on the ground. The processes through which these men defined their sense of 
individual and community while “othering” those around them, are elucidated through 
their private and public writings, their personal photographs, the personal paint schemes 
they applied to their aircraft, as well as the very machines they flew in service. These 
threads all unite under close source historical scrutiny to provide a clearer picture of the 
complex manner in which Bavarian, Prussian, and subsequently, German identity 
developed during the First World War.  
 
The Roots of Regional and National Identity in German Aviators: 1890-1914 
To understand the role of aviation in shaping or disrupting the mentalities of 
Germany’s aviators, it is necessary to examine the roots of their education and 
                                                     
9 Important works regarding the manner in which regional differences affected the experience of war have 
contributed greatly to our understanding of the ways in which Germany was still divided during the war, 
these include, Benjamin Ziemann, War Experiences in Rural Germany: 1914-1923 (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2007), and Roger Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany, Freiburg, 1914-
1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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incorporation into the nation’s complex regional and national narratives. As noted by 
Celia Applegate, Germany in the years before the First World War, remained a “nation of 
provincials.”10 The Fatherland, for many, represented a tangle of local, regional, and 
national discourses and loyalties.11 The intellectual and cultural roots of regional identity 
stretch back beyond even the early nineteenth century, where the where the negotiation of 
local versus national identity could be found in everything from popular literature to 
infrastructure construction to the educational practices of the nation’s network of 
regionally independent schools.12 Germany’s aviators, men mostly born between 1885 
and 1895, were shaped by this complex cultural exchange. The resulting perspectives 
they held, on everything from the nature of the forest to Germany’s role on the 
geopolitical world stage, were a byproduct of this background. The ongoing interplay 
between local and regional modes of identity formation, and the broader discourse of 
national unity attempted to bridge multiple divides: religious, economic, as well as urban 
                                                     
10 See Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: The University of 
California Press, 1990). 
11 The history of the roots of German regional and national identities has a rich historiography. My chapter 
incorporates this historiography into my analysis of German aviators. Among the many works that examine 
this area of German history are, Celia Applegate, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat; 
Alon Confino, The Nation as Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 
1871-1918. See also, Jeffrey Wilson, The German Forest, Nature, Identity, and the Contestation of a 
National Symbol, 1871-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 
12 German historical fiction, the defining genre of the period, reflected the ebb and flow of regional and 
national tensions that only grew over time. Brent Peterson notes that the years 1815 to 1830 marked a 
period defined by the redrawing of national borders, the concept of a “national” defense to a “foreign” 
invader, and the “strident though often nebulous demands for German unity. For more on the role of 
literature in forging a sense of national unity during and immediately following the reign of Napoleon, see: 
Brent Peterson, “German Nationalism after Napoleon: Caste and Regional Identities in Historical Fiction, 
1815-1830,” The German Quarterly, 68, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), 287. 
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and rural.13  
Four primary influences ultimately shaped the world view of German aviators. 
First, regionally distinct education systems highlighted local markers of identity while 
tying them to a deep historical past. These narratives formed the social and cultural 
signposts of Germany’s aviators, and with the added space of privilege, would appear 
again and again in their writing, their art, and their perception of the world around them. 
Second, the inclusive discourse of Heimat culture which incorporated differing 
backgrounds into a unifying narrative created a shared space for fliers from different 
regions while maintaining local peculiarities. The amorphous nature of Heimat, which 
made it remarkably adaptable to differing narratives, created a shared sense of 
community that was tied to the landscape, to tradition, and perhaps paradoxically, to the 
ever changing progress of the present and future. It was in the latter space, that the aviator 
was most at home. Third, the increasing influence of the military as a source of personal 
and class prestige and its ever-present visibility in many German towns. Young Germans 
like Rudolf Berthold remarked of the impact that seeing his fellow countrymen in 
uniform on a daily basis, had on his decision to enlist in the army after his studies. 
Others, like the aristocratic Manfred von Richthofen, embodied military life almost from 
birth, and entered the cadet academy at an extraordinarily young age. Finally, perhaps 
                                                     
13 Some divides would not be closed, however. The largely Catholic Bavarian south never fully came to 
embrace the Protestant Prussian north. Bavarian elites, even at the turn of the century, had not forgotten the 
Kulturkampf, and subsequently felt they had good reason to protect Bavarian autonomy. This mistrust was 
also reflected in Bavaria’s air service, which I will discuss later in this chapter. For more, see Helmut 
Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). See also, Rebecca Ayako Bennette, Fighting for the Soul of 
Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unification (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2012). 
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most obviously, is the role of the airplane itself, which blended with some previously 
established discourses and disrupted others. The manner in which Germany’s first 
generation fliers adapted to the airplane, made sense of themselves and their world 
through it, and subsequently expressed their identity with it, defined both their 
understanding of aviation, and influenced the popular perception of it. 
Regionally directed education was likely the earliest mode of social construction 
in the lives of young Germans. Even after unification in 1871, Germany’s public 
education system was still divided into local jurisdictions which defined student 
curriculum and assigned textbooks. The lessons taught from these works centered on the 
notion that the region was defined by distinctive occupations, customs, or expressions, 
and these resonated with particular strength in Bavaria. Textbooks in the region educated 
children on Bavarian identity by anchoring it within the foundations of the landscape. 
One piece entitled, “On the Green Isar,” highlighted the beauty of the River Isar and was 
filled with evocative words like “lieblich,” freundlich,” “herrlich,” or "schön.”14 The 
central imagery of the story, that of the child of a mountain woodcutter and his father 
floating down the river, ties the self, the family, and the wider nation to the landscape and 
its natural resources. The narrative is accompanied in the textbook by images of medieval 
castles, which in turn root the characters within the deeper discourse of Bavaria’s distant 
past. They also highlight the raft as a mode of transportation, which symbolizes the 
economic and industrial importance, not only of family and paternal nurturing, but also 
                                                     
14 Katherine Kennedy, “Visual Representation and National Identity in the Elementary Schoolbooks of 
Imperial Germany,” Paedagogica Historica, 36, No. 1 (2000), 235. 
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the invaluable influence of the river.15 “On the Green Isar” is a typical rendering of 
Heimat culture in German literature, and represents only one of a litany of stories which 
instilled young Germans with a sense of the self, the region, and the nation as being 
rooted in the landscape around them.16 
Heimat became a strong cultural anchor for German students at the close of the 
nineteenth century. As noted in chapter one, contemporary historical analysis of Heimat 
culture refutes the previously-held notion of the movement as somehow anti-modern.17 
Indeed, Celia Applegate notes that after 1871, the Heimat movement became more 
inclusive and was not anti-urban or anti-modern, and worked to incorporate Germans 
from diverse backgrounds into a single, unifying narrative.18 Regional education served 
only to further contribute to this narrative. The regional histories of Bavaria or Saxony or 
Württemberg often worked in conversation to construct individual and local notions of 
what defined a broader sense of German identity from within a regional context.  
School textbooks at the end of the nineteenth century also attempted to connect 
German identity to a deeper, shared, and often revised, historical past. One unifying event 
that was covered in textbooks across the country was the defeat of the Romans in the 
Teutoburg forest by the Germanic leader, Hermann in the ninth century. Nearly a 
thousand years later, at the end of the nineteenth century, Hermann was rhetorically 
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resurrected as the father of German national identity.19 The social importance of this 
historical moment was further reinforced through the construction of a massive 
monument, in which the hero Hermann is shown wearing period armor and brandishing a 
sword while readying for battle. Construction on the monument began in 1838 and was 
not completed until 1875. The story of Hermann’s triumph over the Roman invaders was 
published in nearly every school textbook in Germany, and the generation of 1914 grew 
up with reading the narrative of a Teutonic knight throwing out an invading force bent on 
their destruction.20 The ahistorical imagery of medieval knights would appear again in the 
stories of Germany’s aviators. 
Education and military service served to reinforce social and economic class 
status among Germany’s youth before the First World War. Rudolf Berthold, who had 
been born into a middle-class family in Bamberg, had the option at just ten years of age, 
to enroll in the Bavarian military cadet system. Rather than attending the military 
academy, Berthold’s family could elect instead to send him to the Humanistische Neue 
Gymnasium.21 Despite his family’s desire to withhold Berthold from military life, at least 
in the short term, the young German was still surrounded with the iconography of 
military service. Two army regiments were stationed in his home town at the time, and 
Berthold was constantly surrounded with the visual grandeur of infantry and cavalrymen 
in full dress uniform as they roamed the streets of the town.22  
                                                     
19 Kennedy, 237. 
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The influence of seeing those who represented masculine protectors of the 
homeland played a heavy role in Berthold’s young life, ultimately leading him to enlist in 
the Bavarian army once he completed his studies at Gymnasium at age nineteen. By 
contrast, Manfred von Richthofen, who was born into an aristocratic Prussian military 
family in Kleinburg, near Breslau, in Lower Silesia, enrolled in a military cadet academy 
at age eleven, and joined a Uhlan cavalry regiment upon graduation.23 Thus, the close 
relationship between education and military training for young men in Germany further 
informed their view of regional and national identity, and their place within local and 
wider communities. The visual culture of military academies too, informed a sense of 
identity, with each regiment, and each regional academy issuing differing uniforms. The 
visual difference created by a variety of uniforms, fostered a sense of regional 
distinctiveness among those serving in the First World War.24 
Returning a final time to the influence of Heimat culture, Alon Confino too, notes 
that Heimat culture was particularly adaptive, largely because of its amorphous nature, to 
the changing technological and economic acceleration within Germany at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Embedded within the discourse of Heimat culture, was the intense 
contradictions between a celebration of progress and a yearning for the past. Confino 
argues, “In this light, the Hemiat idea - combining an attraction to and celebration of 
progress with an anxiety over technological change, and a yearning for a past of putative 
wholeness and authenticity - seems at the center of Germany’s experience of 
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modernity.”25 Embedded within the confines of Heimat discourse, the Zeppelin shed and 
the centuries’ old farmhouse could comfortably coexist.  
It is important to note, however, that while the airplane and the Zeppelin might 
appear to be the same technological innovation, they represented very different 
perspectives on what the future of powered flight meant for the nation. Unlike the 
Zeppelin, the airplane represented an international, or at the very least, a pan-European 
technological development. Begun by the Wright Brothers and accelerated by the French 
and the British, the airplane represented both an opportunity for communities to cross 
traditional boundaries, as well as a threat to German sovereignty. Again, as noted in 
chapter one, the cartoons featured in Jugend, show us a view of the airplane that, for 
some, was seen as a tool of the ruling elite, the militaristically-minded, and the power 
hungry. For those who would become military aviators, however, the airplane represented 
an opportunity to establish themselves as a member of Germany’s officer class while 
serving their country in a manner that reflected their educational background as well as a 
culture that embraced both tradition and new technology.  
Aviation’s trajectory as an increasingly realistic military pursuit coincided with 
the recent widening of the German officer corps, which opened the previously aristocratic 
ranks of the German military to the new and growing middle class. The culture of the 
army, with its ardent nationalistic stance, also appealed to some in the German middle 
class. Peter Supf, who would serve as an observer with a Bavarian reconnaissance unit 
during the war, was a highly educated member of this class. Born in Nurnberg in 1886, 
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Supf studied law in Geneva and later, Oxford University, before returning to Germany to 
study in Munich and Berlin. In 1912, he completed a dissertation entitled, “Alsace-
Lorraine and the constitutional nature of the German Reich,” in Greifswald.26 Thus, the 
arrival of war two years following his dissertation defense likely served as an opportunity 
for Supf to realize the political ideologies he had espoused in writing. The fact that Supf 
then created and curated a large photo album of his military experience, literally from the 
moment of his unit’s organization in August 1914, further illustrates the importance of 
this moment in his life. 
It was from this political, social, and cultural conversation that Germany’s first 
generation of aviators formed their notion of the self, of community, and of the wider 
nation that they would ultimately defend. Regionally specific histories and lessons 
coincided with the malleable embrace of Heimat culture to create a Fatherland that was 
both locally expressive and nationally inclusive, particularly for the middle and upper 
class members of society who largely served in the Fliegertruppe.27 It would also provide 
new privileges and spaces to express regional differences and personal identity. All along 
the Western Front, German squadrons would find ways of replicating their local and 
national experiences in the middle of an active battlefield. For those serving in Bavarian 
squadrons in particular, the regional differences in Germany would have life and death 
consequences. 
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Bavaria’s Air Service and the Complexities of Regional Autonomy and Identity 
Aviation added another dimension of complexity to the interplay of regional 
peculiarity, national discourse, and exacerbated already contentious levels of bureaucratic 
infighting between Prussia and Bavaria. For Bavarian pilots tasked with flying over the 
Western Front, the ongoing power struggle between the two kingdoms would directly 
affect the types of aircraft given to their squadrons. For aviators, regional distinction 
often created grief in their daily work, and their reaction reflected their anger, not towards 
the political machinations of war ministries, but by the inability of aircraft manufacturers 
to produce quality machines. The growing importance of capable combat aircraft in the 
minds of aviators signaled a transition from broader, more abstract notions of identity, to 
intensely personal relationships with the machines that framed their everyday experiences 
in war. This relationship manifested in idiosyncratic predilections towards certain 
machines, and further materialized through superstition, personal talismans, and 
individual expressions of identity through the material culture of aircraft. An examination 
of the Königlich-Bayerische Fliegertruppen, or Bavarian Royal Flying Corps, elucidates 
the degree to which regional distinctions within Germany affected the lived experiences 
of the nation’s aviators, and how those experiences contributed to the growing 
relationship between pilot and plane. The subsequent manner in which this relationship 
was expressed extended beyond the aircraft and appeared in their privileged space on the 
ground. 
Animosity between Bavaria and Prussia existed long before the outbreak of the 
First World War. The origins of Prussian military authority can be traced back to the 
Brandenburg recess of 1653, which bargained with the nobility in return for an increase 
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in funding for the army, resulted in a new relationship between the crown and the Junkers 
class.28 As Robert Citino notes, this not only resulted in a well-funded and maintained 
army, but also in a Prussian officer class who enjoyed more flexibility and, consequently, 
more power within the military.29 Bavaria maintained a degree of independence, so long 
as its royal dynasty, the Wittlesbachs, would continue to remain loyal to the Prussian 
crown, the Hohenzollerns.30 As Robert Nelson deftly points out, “the ‘starting date’ for 
this German way of war was the battle of Warsaw in 1656.”31 Thus, in the minds of 
many, the German way of fighting was dictated almost exclusively by both Prussian 
officers, and the culture they embodied.  
As the twentieth century began, the competition between the two powers extended 
into the burgeoning field of aviation, as powered flight became yet another space where 
Prussia sought to dominate the less powerful kingdom to the south.32 To do so, Prussia 
encouraged the development of locations like Johannisthal airfield in Berlin, which grew 
to become the nexus of German aviation in the north. In response, Bavaria worked to 
foster the flourishing of aviation in the south. Under royal decree, construction began on 
the Oberschleißheim airfield north of Munich.33 Even the materials used in the 
construction of the two airfields highlights the degree to which Bavaria worked to 
maintain distinct regional difference between itself and its Prussian antagonist. Seeking to 
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maintain a distinctly Bavarian style, the airfield’s utilitarian buildings were constructed to 
mirror the architecture of ornate royal palaces nearby. Even the airfield’s control tower 
and work hangers, buildings not usually deigned for architectural flourishes, were built to 
model the luxurious features of the Bavarian palaces.34 Constructed in 1912 by the 
Bavarian Royal Flying Corps, the airfield became the central hub for air activity in the 
region before and during the First World War.35 There, the Royal Bavarian Flying Corps 
worked to train its own cadets using aircraft sourced from local aviation firms. 
Bavaria also worked to maintain independence in its air operations, ever since its 
war ministry expanded into the field of military flight in 1910. Bavarian flying units 
served under independent command, but were grouped under the broader jurisdiction of 
the Fliegertruppe and, after reorganization in 1916, the Luftstreitkräfte.36 The kingdom 
struggled for years to maintain varying degrees of autonomy within the wider German air 
service, although, as noted by John Morrow, “the Prussian War Ministry determined the 
Bavarian Army’s aviation budget, the Prussian research unit set procurement guidelines, 
and the Prussian Army ultimately controlled the mobilization and deployment of the 
Bavarian air arm.”37 Through contracts, licenses, and bureaucratic power struggles, 
Prussia would ultimately find ways to assume control over Bavaria’s air service.  
Having no practical means to maintain their independence under the thumb of 
Prussian authority, the Bavarians attempted to find autonomy, not through military power 
struggles, but through the production of locally sourced aircraft. But while the two 
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kingdoms were on essentially even technological footing at the start, the rate of aircraft 
development meant that the goal of building locally designed machines on par with 
Prussian firms became increasingly difficult to maintain. The central issue facing the 
Bavarian government in 1913 was the location and ownership of the most advanced 
aviation firms in Germany. The major aviation works in the nation, Albatros, Rumpler, 
Fokker, were all located in Prussia. To counteract this, the Bavarian government moved 
to support local aviation firms in the hopes that they could create new aircraft to compete 
with those of their Prussian counterparts. Failing to accomplish that, the war ministry also 
sought to simply acquire the licenses to produce copies of Prussian aircraft in Bavarian 
factories. Neither approach would yield much success. 
In 1913, the Bavarian war ministry approached the Albatros firm, which was 
based in Johannisthal, just outside of Berlin. The negotiations for the rights to produce 
Bavarian-made copies of Albatros-designed machines fell through. Inter-region 
backbiting also played a role in fomenting further animosity between the two kingdoms. 
The members of the Bavarian war ministry believed in favoring local firms, even at the 
expense of fostering the competition they believed was required to produce better 
aircraft. In doing so, the Bavarian flying corps believed that it would maintain autonomy 
by pouring funds into local aviation firms in the hopes that they could produce aircraft of 
a similar sophistication to their Prussian counterparts. First, the Bavarian Flying Service 
invested in the aviation firm, Pfalz, and contacted local financier named Gustav Otto, 
who later formed his own company, the Aerowerke Gustav Otto.38 The two firms would 
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produce some of the early military aircraft used by the Bavarian Flying Service. Bavarian 
insistence on using only regional factories to supply the army with military aircraft, 
however, would result in serious consequences; Bavaria lacked suitable military 
machines for service at the outbreak of the First World War and Bavarian air firms only 
continued to fall further behind the development work of their Prussian rivals as the war 
continued. 
The regional differences between Bavaria and Prussia also created distinctly 
different interpretations of the impending war in 1914. John Morrow notes that, “the 
[Bavarian] war ministry, worried about having too many rather than too few aircraft, 
contrasts starkly with that of the Prussian Inspectorate of the Flying Troops, which was 
frantically seizing every available airplane in north Germany.”39 In Morrow’s summary 
of Bavarian attitudes, we see a fundamentally different view of war time between the two 
kingdoms. The seemingly strange worry over having too many valuable war weapons 
rather than too few, is reflected in differing perspectives of war time. Sir Hew Strachan 
notes that Prussian military planners knew from the outset that the nation was in for a 
long, difficult, and potentially catastrophic war of attrition.40 Contrary to previous 
scholarship, Strachan contends that Prussian planners also came to this realization during 
mobilization in 1914, and not later in the conflict. 
Thus, the concern over acquiring too many or too few aircraft reflects a 
fundamentally different perception of the seriousness of the coming war.41 It is apparent 
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in the response of Bavarian war planners that they did not share the same view of the war 
as a grueling and long-term event that required logistical stockpiles to survive. The 
Prussians based their reaction around the urgent need to gather as much war materiel as 
possible, including aircraft. Bavaria, by contrast, clearly perceived the new war as a short 
engagement, and the consequences of this philosophy left many of its newly formed 
aviation units without suitable machines during the opening weeks of the conflict. Indeed, 
the prevailing fear within the Bavarian military was not being caught without enough 
aircraft, but rather being saddled with unusable machines that could not be sold off to 
counterbalance war expenditures after the conflict. This concern reflects not only the 
differing perspectives on how long and how destructive the war would be, but also in the 
speed of aircraft development, where machines produced within the previous six to 
twelve months could be woefully out of date before they could be sold. 
Rudolf Berthold lived through logistical chaos that manifested from Bavaria’s 
bureaucratic shortsightedness. Berthold, who was originally mobilized with his infantry 
unit, was soon separated out to continue service in his new role as an observer with a 
newly formed flying detachment. He notes his emotions, or his lack thereof, upon leaving 
his infantry unit: “I had soon forgotten my old [infantry] regiment… who have already 
suffered heavy fighting… Poor, dear chaps!”42 Once transferred to his new squadron, 
disorganization defined the early days of Berthold’s war experiences, as his unit 
struggled to procure the aircraft needed to fight. Berthold’s frustration is evident in his 
private war diary: “The unit consisted of six planes, under the unit’s leader, his adjutant, 
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seven pilots, and an equal number of qualified observers. Our commander, Vogel von 
Falckenstein, was a real Prussian soldier, and he was a tried and tested old flier. It was 
thanks only to his experience and tireless work that anything went smoothly at first. For 
as much preparation had been made for the mobilization of the troops, it was damn slow 
for the fliers. This was partly excusable as the flying troops still lacked experience. The 
airplanes were poorly made. They came out of the factory and were hardly able to fly.”43 
Eventually, Berthold’s unit was forced to scrounge for aircraft wherever they could find 
them, including aircraft that were never intended for military service on the front lines. 
“How we cursed the factory, which plays with human life. We fetched an old flight 
school bi-plane; and old box, but useable at least.”44 Berthold’s anger in this passage is 
clearly directed towards the manufacturers of the aircraft his unit requires, rather than the 
consequences of Bavaria’s struggle to maintain autonomy. Finally, after weeks of 
waiting, and with additional lobbying by von Falckenstein, FA23 received more suitable 
machines and deployed to the fast-moving front lines. 
Berthold’s thoughts, written in the early weeks of the First World War, can be 
unpacked to reveal the complexities of regional animosity, local and national culture, the 
consequences of Bavaria’s decisions regarding aviation, and the chaos of war as a 
moment that casts these issues into high relief. Within a few short sentences Berthold 
reveals the following pieces of information to us. First, he confirms the manner in which 
the Fliegertruppe responded with painful slowness to the organizational needs of its 
units. Despite Prussia’s overarching jurisdiction of authority, the Bavarian air service 
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ultimately had to muster, organize, and deploy their squadrons. The inability to procure 
or produce the necessary aircraft for war left Berthold and his fellow airmen flat footed as 
the war began. As the war continued, the Prussian military authorities actively worked to 
ensure that Bavarian recalcitrance would no longer hinder air operations.  
Second, Berthold touches on the manner in which his identity transformed from 
soldier to aviator within the matter of just a few days. There is no doubt that he viewed 
his transfer from infantryman to aerial observer as a promotion above his comrades, in 
both a metaphorical and literal sense. His comment of “I had soon forgotten” elucidates 
the compression of time brought on by the coming of war, as well as the chaos of 
transferring from one unit to another. He also notes the casualties suffered by his former 
comrades with an emotion of sorrow and sympathy, as well as relief for having not been 
with them.  
But while noting his emotions at not being involved in the first battles of the war, 
Berthold also reveals the third important piece of information in his frustration at not 
taking an active role in the conflicts opening days. With no coherent plan to assign men 
to squadrons and squadrons to respective armies, Berthold experiences the process as an 
excruciatingly slow procedure, one which removes him from active participation in the 
war. When Berthold was finally given the post of observer with Feldflieger-Abteilung 23, 
he notes first in his diary, that the unit possessed only six aircraft.  
The lack of sufficient aircraft moves us to Berthold’s fourth point: the poor 
quality of the few machines that his unit possessed. Berthold complains about the kinds 
of aircraft his unit was given, all of which were produced in local Bavarian factories. He 
also discusses the need to use older machines not suited for combat duty. These remarks 
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once again highlight the different perspectives on war-readiness between the Bavarian 
and Prussian war ministries. These older machines, obviously produced before the war, 
were simply not suited for active combat duty. As a result, it is Berthold’s commanding 
officer who must find a way to source the machines they will need to participate in the 
war. 
Berthold’s assessment of his commanding officer, a man named Vogel von 
Falckenstein, provides the fifth piece of information and highlights the complexities of 
the symbiotic relationship between regional identities. Berthold expresses his belief 
regarding what particular traits made his commander officer and effective leader who 
could cut through the sluggish bureaucracy that ultimately hindered his squadron’s entry 
into the war. Berthold makes a special point of noting that the issue of finding suitable 
aircraft for use at the rapidly evolving front was solved, not through official channels, but 
through von Falckenstein’s personal connections. He notes too, that his commanding 
officer’s “Prussian disposition” also played a role in fettering out needed machinery. This 
simple note in Berthold’s diary highlights the interplay within regionality even at the 
beginning of the First World War. Despite the animosity between the two war ministries, 
Berthold finds von Falckenstein’s background to be a positive gain for the squadron. It is 
also likely that Berthold’s comment refers to von Falckenstein’s efficiency at correcting 
the squadron’s logistical problem, by playing on pre-existing tropes of Prussian 
stereotypes regarding ruthless organizational skills. 
Finally, Berthold combines von Falckenstein’s Prussian disposition with his 
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technical ability and seasoned status as a flier.45 It is a combination of von Falckenstein’s 
age, and his time as an aviator, which Berthold ranks as “tried and tested old flier,” that 
creates he combination of traits needed to move from inaction to action. From this point, 
Berthold quickly takes issue with the way the Bavarian flying corps mobilized for the 
outbreak of war. The painful inefficiency does not create any points of Bavarian 
distinction in Berthold’s mind, quite the opposite is apparent in his tone. Nor is there any 
pride in the quality of aircraft produced by Bavarian factories.46 This point is made even 
more apparent when Berthold notes that his unit was forced to find second-rate training 
machines to use for front line service. The ongoing issue of inferior machines haunted 
Berthold during his service in the Bavarian Royal Flying Corps during the First World 
War. 
 
The Consequences of Regional Autonomy: The Bavarian Royal Flying Corps 
In May of 1916, Rudolf Berthold stood in front of his replacement aircraft, staring 
at its engine, filled with doubt.47 Berthold had moved from the role of observer and had, 
through the violence of losing his observer and subsequently avenging his death by 
shooting down a French aircraft, had become a fighter pilot. By the spring of 1916, 
Berthold had downed five enemy machines and was a rising figure in his squadron. A 
few days before, in an entanglement with an enemy aircraft, Berthold’s machine, a 
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Fokker Eindecker, was damaged and required extensive repairs. The only machine left 
for him to use was built by the Bavarian firm Pfalz. He recorded his misgivings in his 
journal. “Because Pfalz was universally disliked, I thought I should look it over 
thoroughly. When the machine was disassembled, it was clear that something was wrong, 
and its bad reputation from the factory in Speyer was deserved. The plane was a poor 
French imitation.”48 Berthold’s misgivings, which were so strong as to warrant 
expression in his journal, highlights the difficult position that aviators found themselves 
in. The infighting between the Prussian and Bavarian war ministries resulted in aviators 
being left to fly aircraft of wildly varying quality. Yet, this regional animosity was not at 
the forefront of Berthold’s writing, which instead centers around the central question of 
having capable aircraft for the war over the Western Front. The experience of aviators 
like Berthold and others reveals that regional infighting mattered little to pilots beyond 
the types of airplanes they received for their daily missions. 
Berthold’s passage reveals a wealth of information about the manner in which 
their daily lives were affected as aviators during the First World War. The ongoing 
struggle over the autonomy of the Bavarian Air Service created very real, life and death 
situations for the airmen serving along the Western Front in the first two years of the 
conflict.49 In addition to a shortage of machines, which Berthold noted early in his 
journal, the efforts by the Prussian war ministry to bring Bavaria to heel resulted not only 
in low production numbers, also in markedly inferior aircraft. Rather than lessening the 
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strain on Bavaria’s beleaguered air industry, Prussian authorities actively worked to limit 
the contractual rights to produce first-rate aircraft. This left firms like Pfalz in the 
unenviable position to produce second-rate copies of German, or even French aircraft.50  
Berthold’s machine, a Pfalz monoplane, was a poor copy of the Fokker Eindecker 
which had earned a positive reputation among German pilots after wreaking havoc 
among French and British aviators all along the Western Front. Aviators like Oswald 
Boelcke and Max Immelmann achieved combat success and popular acclaim at the 
controls of Fokker’s invention.51 Berthold’s machine was designed to resemble the 
Fokker, but was not nearly as well made. Berthold also mentions the plane as being “a 
poor French copy,” which, in all likelihood, refers to the rotary engine that powered the 
plane. The engine, which was based on the French rotary designs powering their fighter 
planes at the time, was not of similar quality and gave Berthold serious doubts about the 
performance of the machine. If badly manufactured, the engine could misfire, and the 
subsequent movement of the heavy engine, the full weight of which spun while in 
operation, could twist and pull the airframe out of flight, leaving the pilot powerless to 
prevent a crash.  
Despite his misgivings, Berthold later flew the machine in a test flight, with 
nearly fatal results. “I began by lifting off from the ground and, at that moment, the 
engine failed… I was about 100 meters up. In an instant, the bird went down. I heard the 
aircraft splintering, felt a blow to my head, suddenly I was in agony and from then on I 
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can remember nothing more.”52 Berthold was rescued from the crash site, but his injuries 
were life-threatening. “I had a compound leg fracture, my upper jaw and nasal bone were 
both broken, and there was damage to my eyes. The worst thing for me was the thought 
that I would have to lie in bed for weeks, perhaps even months.”53 Berthold was horribly 
injured, yet lucky to escape the incident with his life. The consequences of Bavarian 
made aircraft, which were largely inferior to their Prussian counterparts, continued in 
reconnaissance units as well. 
The photo album of Peter Supf also reflects the nature of the aircraft given to 
Bavarian observation squadrons. His photographs continue to echo the camaraderie of 
pilot and observer by posing the flight crews together in front of their machines.54 The 
machines featured in Supf’s images are important to note. His early photographs, dating 
from the beginning of 1915 show the unit using Albatros reconnaissance machines, 
which were built by the firm in Prussia. Supf’s unit, however, would not receive a full 
complement of these aircraft and, as a result, resorted to Bavarian firms to fill the gaps. 
Another photograph features the poorly made Pfalz copy of Fokker’s Eindecker 
monoplane; the same type that nearly killed Berthold. Again, this demonstrates the 
degree to which Bavarian squadrons were left to make do with second-rate aircraft in 
order to fulfill their duties. 
Supf’s unit also captured a French Farman multi-seat aircraft and repainted the 
machine in German markings, either for testing or, perhaps, use in the field as a 
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reconnaissance aircraft. The album also includes photos of a reconnaissance machine 
built by the AGO company. The machine, called the AGO GII, was an unusual looking 
aircraft for the period, featuring a twin tail configuration and center-housed nacelle 
cockpit with the engine bolted to the rear. What is telling about the machine, besides its 
low production numbers, is the manner in which it is photographed throughout the 
album.55 While the machine is captured in a few images in flight, many of Supf’s photos 
of the plane feature the aftermath of aerial accidents. The AGO is featured in two series 
of photographs after crash landing and breaking up on impact. One of Supf’s photographs 
is a close-up of an AGO GII which has crashed into a berm either on landing or an 
attempted take off. The exposed cockpit, which projected far out in front of the rest of the 
air frame, is completely smashed against the hillside. It is a telling reminder that the types 
of aircraft assigned to Bavarian aviators in the early years of the air war resulted in 
serious life and death consequences once they were pressed into service. 
The animosity that aviators felt towards badly made machines was not only 
limited to Bavarian firms. Berthold notes that he and his fallen comrade, Josef Grüner, 
once joked about the Luft-Verkehrs-Gesellschaft company, which produced 
reconnaissance and bombing aircraft for the German air service, by transposing the LVG 
acronym to mean “Leichen-Vertriebs-Gesellschaft” or “Cadavers Distribution 
Company.”56 Indeed, it is apparent that the German approach of giving the nation’s air 
industry wide independence on development and production had wide-ranging 
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consequences.57 Manfred von Richthofen wrote angrily about inadequate aircraft early as 
the summer of 1917, a full year and a half before the end of the war:  
 
“I can assure you that it is no longer any fun being the leader of a fighter 
unit in this army… For the last three days the English have done as they 
please… Our airplanes are inferior to the English in a downright 
ridiculous manner… The [Albatros] D5 is so antiquated and laughably 
inferior that we can do nothing with it. Yet the people in the homeland 
haven’t produced any better machine than this lousy Albatros in almost a 
year and have stuck with the Albatros D3, with which was I was already 
fighting in the fall of last year. We must unconditionally support the use of 
every firm that produces a type merely somewhat better than this damn 
Albatros, even if its earlier conduct has been shabby and unreliable…”58 
 
Thus, the added dimension of the air war transcended any sense of Bavarian or 
Prussian identity. Once in active combat over the Western Front, pilots cared only about 
survival, and that was entirely dependent on the types of machines they were given. Even 
the most privileged fliers like Richthofen, whose close personal relationship with Antony 
Fokker placed him in an extraordinarily advantageous position to lobby for aircraft, was 
left to fight in inferior machines. As the air war progressed, aviators looked not towards 
their respective war ministries, but rather to their own airplanes, for survival and, 
subsequently, a way of expressing personal identity. The airplane, that disruptive 
technological force, provided a space of privileged self-expression both in the air, and on 
the ground. 
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Bavarian Expressions of Personal and Community Identity on the Western Front 
Despite the intense difficulties that aviators faced on a daily basis: from a 
dangerous combat environment to unreliable machinery, they enjoyed a great deal of 
privilege in regards to the space they inhabited and the time and resources at their 
disposal. As such, the aviators of the Bavarian Royal Flying Crops provide a fascinating 
case study into the ways that personal and community identity was expressed both on the 
ground, and in the air. As the air war progressed, German aviators developed individual 
preferences for certain types of aircraft, and in turn, established personal idiosyncrasies 
and superstitions in regards to their machinery. They were also given the privilege - and 
military permission - to personally paint and decorate their aircraft. The resulting 
relationship between man and machine shows a picture that is less about the two melding 
into one autonomous unit, and more about the very human, and very emotional 
sentiments that arose between an aviator and the aircraft that kept him alive. 
The trend of lackluster Bavarian aircraft continued into 1917. While most fighter 
squadrons along the Western Front were issued an aircraft called the Albatros D5 - which 
was built by a Prussian firm - many of the Bavarian squadrons received a counterpart to 
the D5 built, once again, by Pfalz. The resulting machine, the Pfalz D3 was similar in 
appearance to the Albatros D5, but was rated by many pilots to be inferior to its Prussian 
counterpart in terms of performance in combat.59 Despite this conclusion, Berthold 
preferred the Pfalz aircraft instead, presumably because it had better performance in some 
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aspect of air fighting that gave Berthold confidence.60 Berthold’s choice was replicated 
countless times up and down the front by aviators who preferred one type of machine 
over another. It is important to note, too, that in the vast majority of squadrons, aviators 
were assigned a specific plane. Barring a fatal crash or irreparable damage, an aviator 
would serve with that specific machine until it was replaced with a newer model. Thus, 
the idiosyncrasies of a machine became known to the pilot who operated it, and many 
aviators describe a certain level of affection and attachment that developed between them 
and their machine.  
Many of Germany’s popular pilots developed preferences for one type of machine 
over another. Manfred von Richthofen lobbied personally for the Fokker Dr1 Dreidecker 
or Triplane to be put into production, favoring its odd ability to maneuver in tight circles 
and perform a trick called a “flat turn,” where the aircraft could seemly pivot almost in 
place, making it a difficult opponent for British and French pilots.61 Pilots also developed 
superstitious quirks the longer they remained at the front. One of Richthofen’s 
compatriots, a man named Werner Voss, developed a nervous habit of wearing a knit cap 
whenever he was assigned a combat patrol.62 Superstitions, predilections, and good luck 
talisman were used by German aviators to establish, no matter how intangible, some 
sense of agency in an environment where one simple mistake, or one mechanical failure, 
could mean life or death. Thus, when a machine was working well, and some sort of good 
luck charm continued to provide protection, aviators developed incredibly strong 
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emotional attachment to their assigned aircraft.  
This emotional bond materialized not only in their preference for one machine 
over another, but in the manner in which aviators decorated and expressed their personal 
identity through their aircraft. During the First World War, German aircraft became 
associated with vivid paint schemes that provided for easy identification in the air. 
Besides the tactical advantage of being able to quickly pan the skies and locate one’s 
wingman, the types of colors and insignias also represented one’s personal and, in some 
cases, regional identity. One such aircraft belonged to Hans Böhning, a Bavarian aviator 
born in Bremen in 1893, later served with FA(A) 290 as well as the fighter squadrons 
Jasta 36, 76, 79b, and served as the commanding officer of Jasta 32.63 Böhning’s aircraft 
were emblematic of the lingering influence of regional identity on German aviators 
during the conflict. Two of his most notable aircraft, both Albatros D5’s, the type that 
Richthofen so vehemently complained about in his letter to von Falkenhayn, were 
painted, in part, to reflect his Bavarian background.  
The first machine to feature these colors was a D5 painted with a bright blue 
Bavarian state crest just below the cockpit.64 The rear half of the plane was then 
intricately colored in the blue and white diamond pattern of the Bavarian state flag and 
the Wittlesbach royal crest. His second machine, which presumably replaced the first, 
shows an evolution both in his regional sense of self, as well as his perception of the 
danger he faced in the air. This design, used while serving with Jasta 79b, was painted 
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from nose to tail in blue and white stripes, similar in color to those used in the diamond 
pattern of his earlier plane.65 Replacing the Bavarian crest, however, was a poker card: an 
ace of spades. The tongue-in-cheek reference to having good luck in the air was 
appropriate by 1918, when German losses were mounting ever higher each day. Rudolf 
Berthold too, developed a paint scheme that reflected both his regional identity and 
personal sense of self. Later in the war, Berthold, who had been wounded several times 
by this point, is featured next to a Fokker D7, one of the last machines built by the firm 
before the end of the First World War. Berthold’s machine was painted a bright shade of 
blue, again similar to that used by the Bavarian state flag, and included a red nose. 
Berthold’s personal insignia, which was featured predominately on the fuselage just 
behind his seat, was an avenging sword suspended by wings.66 Regional identity was 
expressed beyond the aircraft, however, and some Bavarian flying units went to 
extraordinary lengths to promote not only their German identity, but also their Bavarian 
individualism from their comrades on the Western Front.  
Expressions of regional origin coalesced with strong senses of nationalism and 
privilege in geographic locations containing homogeneous populations. In other words, 
the Western Front, which consisted largely of white, western European populations, 
provided a space in which the expression of localized identities were the most effective 
method of creating a defining sense of self and community. An analysis of material 
culture along the Western Front provides an effective means of excavating these 
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expressions of regional and national identity. From photographs to poetry to the material 
German airfields and the odd decorations that appeared, there is a litany of source 
material that demonstrates the ways in which regional units, like Bavarian squadrons, 
expressed their background, as well as their place within the broader national narrative, in 
a combat environment. What makes these expressions all the more intriguing is the utter 
lack of any military or strategic necessity in those expressions. Constructing Bavarian 
hunting lodges, enacting local culture that included full costumes, painting aircraft in 
Bavarian colors, all distracted from the war effort, yet the men of these units, as well as 
their commanding officers, felt compelled to stake out their regional sense of self in the 
midst of unprecedented death and destruction. 
For what is perhaps one of the most fascinating examples of privilege and 
expression, we turn once again to the photo album of Peter Supf, the observer poet who 
served with the Bavarian squadron, 286b. Supf’s album, which was constructed over the 
course of his service with the unit on the Western Front from the outbreak of the war in 
1914 to the end of 1917, provides a glimpse into the everyday lives of the men who 
served in the unit.67 The private photographs that make up the body of the album also 
elucidate the unusual ways in which community identity manifested itself in the middle 
of a combat zone. The unit’s fervent pride in its regional and national heritage is apparent 
in a series of photographs taken in the summer of 1917.  
At the mid-point of the album, a photograph of what is clearly a German style 
hunting lodge stands out among a series of photographs of the daily operations of the unit 
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along the Western Front. The lodge’s main room is constructed out of wood and cut and 
designed to resemble rustic hunting lodges from the nineteenth century; the kind that 
would easily be found across Germany. Featured prominently on the outside wall of the 
lodge is a large moose head. Other small touches differentiate the hunting lodge as 
having markers of Bavarian regional identity. Planted in the ground around the borders of 
the lodge are saplings of evergreen trees, likely meant to remind the men of FA286 of the 
pine forests back home. The walls of the lodge are made with split logs which have been 
interlocked together to create a rustic, rural aesthetic to the building. Planted outside of 
the building is a flag staff with what appears to be a Bavarian flag. The lodge also 
features a thatched roof design. The interior of the building is constructed out of dark 
wood paneling on the lower half of the walls and white paneling on the upper half, again 
resembling a mountain lodge. The rooms are remarkably well-furnished, likely owing to 
the connections of one of the unit’s officers.  
Another series of photos a few pages further into the album document a 
“Kegelbahn” or bowling alley, which has clearly been constructed at FA286’s base of 
operations. Bowling, which was a long-standing sport in Bavaria, appears to be important 
enough to warrant spending time and material on constructing an alley along the Western 
Front. The alley that Supf photographed also includes decorative artwork featuring pilots, 
women, Greek gods, mythological figures, and aircraft. These decorations also feature 
poetry, likely penned by the “poet pilot.” One image showcases an observer bowling 
from the wing of a reconnaissance plane. Another shows a member of the squadron in his 
dress uniform singing next to Mars, the god of war. Another image, which features text 
that is more difficult to read, includes the image of a pilot and observer flying a crowd of 
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friends and, notably, attractive women, in their aircraft, while a final image includes a 
couple embracing tenderly. A final series of images shows Supf’s compatriots drinking 
with a frightening depiction of the god Neptune, while a final image appears to showcase 
Germania standing guard over an aviator. The theme of the Kegelbahn runs throughout, 
with even deities depicted holding bowling balls.68 
Bavarian customs extended beyond Supf’s hunting lodge. Placed in conversation 
with the photos of FA 286’s comfortable quarters and bowling alley, are images of the 
unit’s men re-enacting a traditional Bavarian Volksfest.69 The unit is divided between 
band members, who play brass instruments, and those dressed in traditional Bavarian 
clothing. Fascinating gender roles are revealed in these photographs. The unit, located in 
the middle of an active battlefield, clearly could not invite any women to participate in 
their festival activities.70 To substitute, members of the squadron were dressed in Dirndl 
to provide dance partners for the men who were wearing traditional Lederhosen. Judging 
from the facial expression of one of the men wearing Drindl, some were less than pleased 
with playing a feminine role. Other photos feature groups of men dressed in both roles, 
with their Dirndl wearing comrades wearing heavy face makeup. Another photograph, 
which has been damaged, shows what appears to be the same group dancing on stage to a 
crowd of onlookers. The stage is decorated with evergreens and features two smaller 
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Bavarian flags. Landscape too, played a role in shaping the manner in which Supf’s unit 
expressed its collective identity. The Western Front by late 1917, the date that these 
images were taken, was largely a lunar landscape of shell holes, devastated towns, 
shattered forests. The outward decorations of the lodge, which featured small evergreen 
trees, likely dug up and replanted near the lodge from a copse of trees nearby, is a way of 
remaking the landscape in a manner that rendered the environment knowable, 
controllable, and inhabitable.  
Supf’s album demonstrates the interplay of the discourses of class, the individual, 
community, region and nation, at work in the types of expression found at 286b’s airfield. 
The rustic hunting lodge, which represents German identity, aristocratic traditions, and 
some Bavarian tropes, highlights the degree to which airmen possessed both the means 
and the privilege to bring part of their homeland to the Front to a degree not enjoyed by 
the infantry. These social and cultural markers indicate both the influence of longstanding 
discourses within German culture, as well as the desire to maintain continuity between 
the world before the war, and the one that existed in their present. In other words, the 
privilege of aviators - that of having the space, time, and means to produce such 
expressions - provided a way of rendering a hostile environment recognizable to them. It 
also served as a way of rationalizing a war of defense fought exclusively on foreign soil. 
By establishing a part of Germany in Flanders, Supf’s unit likely reinforced their own 
understanding of the nation defending itself from attack.71 While infantrymen on the 
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ground might decorate the corner of a trench, or carry a fragment of home with them on 
their uniform, no unit could have constructed such an ornate, well furnished, and 
decorative space while serving in the trenches.  
Moving away from the comfortable accommodations of FA 286b’s surroundings, 
we find examples of the central educational pillars of regional distinctiveness, national 
unity, and the ever-present influence of Heimat culture still at work at the end of four 
years of war. Towards the end of the First World War, as Rudolf Berthold convalesced in 
his hometown of Bamberg, he noted his emotions regarding impending defeat and his 
inability to take part in the war’s final, climatic, conclusion. By this point in his journal, 
Berthold’s tone had changed considerably from the man who penned his experiences in 
the early week of the conflict. Gone was the excitement and anxiety about the unknown 
consequences of war. Gone too, were the overtones of nationalistic pride, of comments 
about men being made of iron as a consequence of the war. It is apparent that, by late 
October 1918, as the walls closed in around him, Berthold reached back to his 
foundational experiences, those from his youth and adolescence, to make sense of the 
emotions he felt. 
 “These days I am in the confines of my hometown near Bamberg. It is a beautiful 
patch of German soil. In the splendid German forest, the solemn spruce trees seem to me 
to be more melancholy than before – indeed, sad. They mourn with me the weakness and 
humiliation of our people.”72  It is clear that the cultural discourse of the late nineteenth 
century, which sought to create a sense of regional identity that was tied to a broader 
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national discourse by utilizing abstract tropes of landscape and Heimat culture, carried 
through the traumatic experience of war. The narrative of the emotions of the forest, the 
shared connection between the land and the people who were tied to it, forms the frame 
through which Berthold processes impending defeat.73 As the world around him began to 
make less sense, and the foundational markers of what it meant to grow up in Germany - 
a strong military presence, a Kaiser as head of state - began to break down, these older 
tropes held the waypoints by which men like Berthold navigated the autumn defeat of 
1918. It is perhaps fitting that Berthold, whose father was a game warden, found some 
form of comfort in the dark woods around him. 
It is clear that aviators expressed their personal, regional, and national identities in 
nearly every facet of the performance of their duties in combat. From their personal 
preference for aircraft, to the way they decorated them, to the extraordinary privilege they 
enjoyed in fashioning German living quarters in Flanders, aviators were the product of 
late nineteenth century discourses of German regional and national identity. Those 
discourses manifested themselves both in the mentalities of aviators, and in the physical 
realm they inhabited throughout the war. For the aviators of Bavaria’s squadrons, 
personal and community identity embodied both regional cultural markers and a broader 
sense of national participation. As Bavarian units moved further away from the Western 
Front, however, these practices became more muted. A combination of logistical 
challenges, harsh living conditions, and most importantly, a truly different population, 
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left Bavarian fliers to express their identity in broader, less specific, and more 
nationalistic terms. In such a space, expression of identity became less an act of 
signposting one’s background, and more about othering those considered “alien” in a 
foreign environment. 
 
German Nationalism in Foreign Lands: The Case of 304b 
Regional identity, formed from a collection of social and cultural markers, was 
most prominently expressed on the Western Front. Bavarian units, serving alongside 
squadrons from across Germany, highlighted their particular sense of regionally 
influenced national identity through multiple modes of expression. From aircraft paint 
schemes, to rustic German hunting lodges, to bowling alleys filled with mythical gods, 
these units marked themselves as distinct while at the same time, fitting in with a larger 
narrative of Germans serving at the front. As Johnathan Smith contends, sharp cultural 
and social differences are most firmly displayed among neighbors.74 Bavarian units 
tasked with military duty away from the Western Front, however, expressed their identity 
in markedly different ways from their comrades in Europe. In doing so, their method of 
“othering” themselves and their neighbors involved highlighting broad cultural markers 
of identity, and focused intensely on what made the surrounding population different, 
rather than highlighting their own regional distinctiveness.  
In these circumstances, broad cultural markers signaled not to regional 
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peculiarity, but to nationalistic discourse and a sense of racial and intellectual superiority. 
Bayern Flieger-Abteilung 304b, or Bavarian Flying Detachment 304b, which served 
primarily as a reconnaissance aviation unit, mobilized at Oberschleißheim airfield, 
outside of Munich, on July 20, 1917.75 The unit’s service, which was, perhaps, militarily 
insignificant, provides an ideal case study in ways that expressions of identity changed in 
distant environments. The experience of 304b also shows us the ways in which aviation, 
even in distant lands, still serves as a disruptive historical force. The squadron acquired 
the unofficial squadron nickname of “Pasha” soon after formation, and would not transfer 
to the muddy fields of the Western Front of Europe, but instead, would travel by rail to 
the deserts of the Middle East, to serve in Palestine near Iraq el-Manshiyeh.76 
The process through which 304b “othered” the inhabitants they would encounter 
began long before deployment in late 1917.  The logistical challenge of moving men and 
materiel to such a distant area of operations began this mental process long before the 
men of 304b while they were still in training in Germany. This shift in tone, towards 
othering those they would encounter in the Middle East highlighted in the squadron’s 
military communications, which were used to plan the movement of the squadrons fliers, 
observers, mechanics, doctors, as well as the aircraft, equipment, lodging, and food and 
medical supplies needed for the endeavor. The tenor of these documents is infused with a 
strain of nationalistic overtones, and at times, racist perspectives about the people who 
lived near their base of operations. In other words, the strain of training and preparation, 
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which was of a far higher order than those squadrons who would serve nearby on the 
Western Front, began the mental process of “othering” their location almost immediately. 
The need for strong, able bodied recruits, tons of equipment and materiel, and suitable 
aircraft for operations in such a harsh climate, placed an enormous strain on the 
squadrons commanding officers.  
The first set of communications between the commanding officers of 304b and 
the German military centered around the need to bring in new recruits and process them 
rapidly for training. A telegram from August 7, a mere three weeks before departure, 
requests the transfer of more training recruits, into the unit from other areas within the air 
service. The challenge of the planned operating environment for 304b necessitated the 
medical assessment of the new men.77 Once transferred into the squadron, these men 
were subjected to a medical examination which was filed with a requisite intake form. 
These intake forms catalog the new recruits basic vital information; weight, height, 
resting heart rate, raised heart rate after preforming ten squats, urine test, and lung 
function.78 Forms also included space for the listing of any faults with the subject’s 
various body parts as well as inquiries into the men’s personal habits, which asked for 
information regarding alcohol and tobacco consumption, as well as questions about 
opioid, morphine, and cocaine use.79 The vast majority of the men who transferred into 
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the squadron reported drinking and smoking on a semi regular or regular basis.80 The 
recruits were also fairly young in age; most were born between 1890 and 1895.81 The 
urgency of rapidly processing their intake is evident in the paperwork left behind in the 
squadron’s files. The medical intake forms vary between pre-fabricated and standardized 
documents, which leave space for all of the requisite medical information needed for the 
processing of the individual, and blank pages that have been typed manually to mirror the 
standard documents and include the patient’s vital information. Delineations in 
handwriting too, indicate that the haste of patient intake required multiple doctors to 
complete the intake forms in order to process more men as quickly as possible.82 
Nearly as urgent as the need for men were requests for equipment of all kinds. A 
telegram sent out to the airplane replacement depot discusses the need for aerial and 
ground surveying equipment as soon as possible. The urgency is again apparent in the 
messages tone, which closes with “in accordance with the division’s preparedness to 
assign me by August 8th, 1917, I would like to request an accelerated establishment.”83 
Other messages discuss the need for strategic maps of the Palestinian theater to be sent to 
the squadron for use as part of their service to Army Group F, one of the main forces 
serving in the region, and a subsequent request that “all of the [maps] are sent together 
according to a specific place of use.”84 It is apparent that the environment of Palestine is 
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markedly different from the known space of the Western Front, which had been mapped 
by tens of thousands of images for nearly three years by late 1917. The need to produce 
documents, too, is noted in a telegram asking for typewriters, which had to be purchased 
for the squadron rather than supplied from a material depot.85 The need for additional 
transport trucks, undoubtedly required to move all of the men and equipment to and from 
their training facilities at Oberschleißheim, is also noted. Squadron entertainment is also 
of some importance in official communications. A note from July 31, 1917, requests an 
order of 160 books, 1-2 gramophones, and twenty records for each player.86  
By August the need for military equipment became a far greater concern as their 
deployment date grew closer. The unit requested “six sets of telephones for connecting 
the reception stations, one control cabinet with approximately forty kilometers of cables. 
The telephone replacement department is asked to notify whether or not the above 
mentioned telephone sets can be delivered immediately.”87 A second cable, marked 
“Secret!” is addressed to 304b and references the “decree of July 2… the deadline for the 
“Army Group Commando F” (Falke) and ‘Pasha II’” to submit their budgets for hand 
held weapons as well as other weapons, ammunition, and equipment.88 The communique 
asks that “departments responsible for the formation of these units are asked to request 
the weapons, cartridges, etc., at the arms and ammunition procurement office, Depot 
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Inspection DI, as soon as possible, specifying which items are missed… Duplications 
must be avoided.”89 Aerial equipment such as luminous compasses, which were needed 
for nighttime navigation, as well as binoculars for viewing targets from the air, were also 
requested. 
The training instituted at Oberschleißheim for 304b would have been some of the 
best in Germany.90 Despite building often inferior aircraft, the Bavarian Royal Flying 
Corps spearheaded training for observation and bombing crews. Special instruction in 
wireless radios, aerial gunnery for observers, and artillery ranging were instituted at the 
airfield. The images from Peter Supf’s album reflect the training he likely received at the 
airfield. Multiple photographs show his commanding officer, Fritz Sendel, wearing a 
headset and sitting with small model replicas of artillery, while an observer sits atop a 
ladder practicing his ranging technique on a small model of enemy positions.91 These 
techniques were employed at Oberschleißheim and were undoubtedly employed to train 
up the men of 304b before their departure. 
Still, the strangeness of their destination weighed in the documents of the 
squadron as their departure grew nearer. The difficulties of operating aircraft during the 
First World War are apparent from the logistical communications between the squadron 
officers and the wider German military. Aircraft during this period were not capable of 
flying the long distance between Oberschleißheim airfield in Munich to their theater of 
operation in Palestine. In order to move the necessary aircraft, support equipment, 
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supplies, and living accommodations, the entire squadron would need to be packed onto 
rail cars and shipped to their final destination. The harsh climate meant that extra testing 
would be required to ensure that sensitive and non-replaceable equipment, would work in 
dry, desert conditions. The challenge of operating sensitive machinery in the harsh desert 
climate of Palestine was evident in official communiques, “motor vehicles must be tested 
for their suitability for this special undertaking, and must prove their reliability in 
practice, since replacement is impossible, due to the special circumstances.”92  
The extra time needed for testing equipment created additional logistical 
difficulties in getting both the needed supplies and the requisite rail transport aligned. 
“The equipment, aircraft, spare parts, lighting equipment, clothing, and other goods will 
be supplied to 304b and will arrive on time, with the exception of spare parts and 
photographic equipment, which are not in stock at the factories. Some of the individual 
deliveries have already rolled off from Berlin.”93 Another communication, this time from 
the Medical Inspection Department, discussed the need for sanitary equipment for all of 
the airmen serving in Palestine under Army Group F, which included 304b. “Squadrons 
301 and 304, to which the list refers, consists of 20 officers and 200 men, the airport, 
which is also included in the list, of 5 officers and 80 men. In addition to the hygienic 
nature of the destination (Turkey!), it will not be not possible to replenish supplies 
efficiently because of the spatial distance of larger sanitary stockpiles.”94 Additional 
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notes warn of snake and scorpion bites while listing the percentage of men likely to 
contract Cholera, “nervous exhaustion” or even Malaria.95 The following pages of 
documents then catalog the massive inventory of medical equipment and medicine 
needed to sustain the trip to Palestine and, presumably, the units operation for the 
foreseeable future. 
The train itinerary for 304b highlights several aspects about German aviation, 
German culture, and the realities of the war just before 1918. The complexities of 
transporting hundreds of tons of equipment and several hundred men to the desert 
thousands of miles away from Munich necessitated the drawing up of exacting and 
detailed orders. The lumbering reconnaissance aircraft that were to be used in Palestine 
were broken down, packed into crates, and then carefully loaded onto trucks, which were 
then subsequently loaded onto the train crash. The engine, which operated on coal, posed 
an intense fire hazard for the moving of aircraft constructed mostly out of wood and 
canvas. The orders note under the “General Information” section that opens the 
document, cautions that “Since the locomotives demonstrate, sparks are a danger while in 
motion. Plenty of fire extinguishers and filled water buoys are needed near the 
airplanes.”96 The need to keep the unit’s men healthy on the trip, too, is made apparent in 
the squadron orders. “Look for thorough cleansing of the car, since, despite disinfection 
commands, there is often a lot of dirt! Danger of lice!”97 “Stay in the field kitchen to keep 
coffee or tea in stock, so that those on the trip do not drink boiled water from the stations! 
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Isolate people with diarrhea.”98 It is apparent from the outset that health concerns 
weighed heavily on the logistical challenges of moving to Palestine. The challenge of 
preventing dysentery coincided with the need to protect clean drinking water, so that the 
unit did not run out.  
The document continues to highlight the alien and hazardous space to which the 
men of 304b were traveling. First is a warning about where to find fresh food, stating 
“eggs and fruit can be purchased during the trip, mostly at native stations. However, 
caution is needed in the enjoyment of raw fruits. Thoroughly clean them first.”99 The 
desire to obtain good beer, a German staple, was so important as to necessitate its own 
note in the orders: “Be sure to take beer from Constantinople, since this is the last 
possibility to supply.”100  
Perhaps most telling, are words of caution regarding native populations 
supposedly friendly to the Reich. “No natives or Turkish soldiers allowed [near aircraft 
cars]. These men often try to jump on the train at the last moment of departure… All the 
Turkish officials and officers appear to be arrogant but determined. Loud scolding does 
not accomplish anything, but only drives the Orientals to more clandestine activity.”101 
There are also warnings stating, “Proper guarding is needed at railway stations, as thefts 
are frequent.”102 The most damning order appears towards the end of the general 
information section, “When transporting Turkish workers, be sure to supervise. Ten 
Turks are needed to do the work of one German. Again, do not become impatient. The 
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cooperation of German soldiers also spurs the Orientals to work. Gifts of cigarettes often 
inspire only laziness.”103 These comments highlight latent German racism regarding 
populations outside of Europe and, in particular, populations of Middle Eastern descent. 
The journey was timed to take precisely seven days of travel time. In a secret 
squadron document, the unit’s itinerary was discussed in painstaking detail, tracking the 
hours between stations, with some stops separated by as much as 23 hours of travel. 
Notes on the types of food, “German,” or “Turkish” are indicated, as well as notes about 
the state of hygiene at each stop, “good and clean,” or whether the station included a 
“disinfection car.” Due to fear of sabotage, the itinerary notes in careful detail which 
stops will be met by German connection officers or German liaison officers. Each stop is 
also noted of any special facilities or personnel at each location: doctors, an officer’s 
quarters, small kitchens, are all noted. The primary worry in the train orders, besides 
allowing undesirables anywhere near the aircraft packed in crates, is the need for clean 
drinking water, and access to disinfection cars.104  
Once established at their base of operations, the airfield of Afoule, 304b’s mission 
focused on observing the logistical and strategic moves of the British army who were 
already making life difficult for the German forces stationed in the area. Reports from the 
squadron commander, Franz Walz, indicated activity in the following categories: flights 
conducted, flight hours recorded, photographic recordings, aerial combat, bombing 
missions conducted. Walz’s reports would then dissect enemy activity in the area to 
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include observations on British rail traffic, which continued to spike as the Palestine 
campaign of 1918 wore on, as well as shipping traffic near the Gaza coast, wagons 
stacked at railway depots, and car parks used to marshal men and equipment for military 
operations.  
The difficulties of operating in the region are apparent in the first pages of the 
squadron’s operational documents. Photographs included in the reports of 304b a series 
of a half-dozen images with the included text, “crash at airfield Afoule of…” with the 
name of the pilot included.105 Nearly a dozen images of these types of incidents depict 
two-seat reconnaissance aircraft in various states of damage from crashing upon landing. 
It appears, from the state of the aircraft, that most rolled over on landing, likely a 
consequence of high winds and rough terrain. The harsh operating conditions meant that 
a significantly high number of machines suffered mishaps while landing. Another series 
of photos includes images of British aerial forces bombing the Afoule airbase around the 
same period.106 304b clearly received a rough welcome to the harsh deserts of Iraq el-
Manshiyeh. 
Walz’s reports continued through to September 1918, and reflect the difficult 
operations faced by 304b in Palestine. Constant reports of engines failing on the unit’s 
two-seat reconnaissance aircraft are noted, as is the rotation of men in and out of the unit, 
although it is never fully clarified as to why they have rotated out of duty. Another series 
of photos documents the unit’s only losses during their time in the theater. In June 1918, 
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three aviators were killed in aerial combat and were recovered and buried by the 
squadron. Of note in the photographs of the funerals is the crowd of local onlookers who 
border the images. Standing in the center are German officers and airmen accompanied 
by other men wearing the Fez. It is unclear whether these men are part of the Ottoman air 
service or if these are German officers who have appropriated the traditional head wear 
for their own. It is important to note that on a visit to the men of 304b, General Erich von 
Falkenhayn was photographed wearing a Fez while inspecting the men on duty. It is also 
clear from the photographs of 304b that no Bavarian flags or other symbols of regional 
identity were on display. The German imperial flag, however, is seen to be clearly 
displayed in one image of the unit while operating in Palestine. The narrative of German 
nationalism was reinforced by the commanding generals of the forces stationed in 
Palestine. A farewell order from General von Falkenhayn specifically praises the pilots 
under his command, “The fliers were always dear to my heart… On this front, too, the 
airmen have stood their full strength under difficult circumstances.”107 He continues with 
more praise for those who flew during the conflict in Palestine, “I have often spoken of 
the costly work performed by the airmen for me and my troops. Wherever I go, I will tell 
of the German airmen who are the “guard” of the Orient.”108  
Von Falkenhayn’s words speak of Germany’s airmen as a unified group. The 
language used also distinguishes German airmen as the protectors of the Orient, guarding 
the exotic land of the east as great warriors. It is also apparent through the tone of Von 
                                                     
107 Squadron Records and Correspondence of F.A. 304b ‘Pascha,’ Finding Aid: WK2077, Bayerisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv: Abt. Kriegsarchiv, Munich, 1. 
108 Ibid. 
  231 
Falkenhayn’s note, that Germany is still viewed as fighting an inherently defensive 
conflict, even in the distant sands of the Middle East. Through the hardships of combat in 
the desert climates of Palestine, the unit’s commander, Franz Walz, earned another title, 
the “Eagle of Jericho.” Here the imagery used to describe Walz intersects multiple forms 
of identity. The most apparent, of course, is the eagle of the Reich, which is intrinsically 
nationalistic and represents a unified Germany. The discourse of flight is also implicit in 
Walz’s moniker. The inclusion of Jericho, the ancient and biblically significant city that 
men like Walz undoubtedly read about in school textbooks while in school, is open to 
multiple interpretations. He is both shaped by the landscape, while also imposing German 
will over it. It is at once appropriating local culture while simultaneously stamping 
German authority on the landscape and those living within it. 
 By January 1919, the men of 304b would be held as war prisoners, awaiting 
release back to the green fields of Bavaria. In their negotiations with the Entente powers 
to secure transport back to Bavaria, the squadron notes that changing national alliances 
directly affected the treatment of former adversaries. With noticeable disdain for the 
Italians who “undoubtedly treated [Austrian troops] better than their German 
counterparts.”109 The document continues, complaining that “[the Austrians] small 
number, the fact that many civilian Austrians had acquired Italian or Romanian or 
Czechoslovak nationality, received a shorter route home.”110 Reflecting the same tone as 
their train documents from a year and a half before, the document continues by noting 
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that while the Turkish delegation is negotiating their release, “the differences between the 
German and Turkish working methods are also more noticeable than before.”111 Thus, 
even after defeat, the complex interplay of national identity and foreign territory created a 
sense of unease among the German airmen and support staff waiting to go home. The 
alien environment, the harsh conditions, and a population they little understood only 
intensified their sense of being in an unrecognizable place. 
 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of the First World War did not end the ongoing antagonism 
between Bavaria and Prussia. The official history of the Bavarian Royal Flying Corps in 
the conflict was quick to note the degree to which Bavaria maintained its autonomy 
despite incessant Prussian interference, while noting that its independence was forfeited 
during the Hindenburg Program of 1916, which reorganized Germany’s air service. John 
Morrow notes too, that the “Prussian, or imperial, perspective reproaches Bavaria for its 
resistance to a unified air arm in 1916 and the deleterious effect of its independence on 
mobilization through 1916.”112 Post-war histories of the First World War in the air 
reflected the complicated interplay between regional powers and the nation’s air industry. 
In particular, Prussian and Bavarian narratives once more competed for the dominant 
story of the air war. Works by the leaders of Germany’s air service were published 
alongside regional narratives of Bavaria’s experience in the conflict. General von 
Hoepnner wrote his account of events in the simply titled, Germany’s War in the Air, 
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which competed with an edited volume by Bavarian authors entitled, Bavarian Airmen of 
the World War: A Book of Their Memories and Deeds.113 The need and subsequent 
demand to commemorate the experiences of Bavarian airmen specifically reflects the 
ongoing social and cultural practices of creating what was, for some, a distinctly 
Bavarian experience in the First World War. No doubt both works appealed to audiences 
hungry for stories about the war in the air, and how local regions played a significant role 
in those events. 
The ending of the First World War, then, continued the conversation regarding 
regional and national identity and how those spaces made sense of defeat. The generation 
that predominately served during the conflict, those born around 1890, were dramatically 
shaped by the educational, social, and cultural practices of their childhood. The formative 
experiences of youth, that of reading books filled with regional history and great figures 
of local prestige, melded with the elastic discourse of Heimat culture, created a locally 
colored yet national perspective of one’s place within the Reich. The Bavarian case, in 
particular, resulted not only in regionally distinct mentalities, but in the material realities 
of German airmen serving in Bavarian squadrons.  
Aviation once again served as a vehicle for shaping the perception and subsequent 
expression of personal and regional identity. The difficult relationship between Prussia 
and Bavaria led to markedly different responses to the coming of war in 1914. Such 
differences led to distinctly different interpretations of time and danger, with Prussia 
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frantically confiscating every available airframe in the region, while Bavarian officials 
worried, instead, about having too much war materiel and incurring the subsequent debt 
of owning outdated and unusable aircraft. These decisions, much the product of disparate 
perspectives, had very real consequences for the lived realities of those serving at the 
front lines. Rudolf Berthold’s account of frustration and limited aircraft only affirms John 
Morrow’s assessment of the policies of Bavaria’s war ministry. The choice to use 
regional aircraft firms too, had near fatal consequences for Berthold, who nearly died 
when his poorly built Pfalz copy of a Fokker monoplane crashed shortly after takeoff. 
Peter Supf’s squadron also experienced the difficulties of using inadequate machines in 
the field, as his photo album documents the crashes of Bavarian built, AGO GII aircraft 
intended to observe enemy troops but instead ended up in twisted heaps just beyond his 
airfield. Still, within the disruptive technological force of aviation, the role of personal 
preference and even superstition played a part in shaping aviator’s perspectives on the air 
war. Despite nearly losing his life in a Pfalz built aircraft, Rudolf Berthold came to 
depend on his Pfalz D3 and even marked the machine with his personal insignia as a 
mode of expressing his personal identity. 
Aircraft too, served as a mode of expression for German aviators. Color schemes 
reflected personal identity, but could also embody regional backgrounds. Aircraft painted 
in the colors of the Bavarian state flag or crest, expressed in the most outward manner 
available, the regional origins of the man sitting within. Airmen were also privileged 
enough to have the space, time, distance, and resources to bring aspects of their regional 
identities to the battlefield, as the hunting lodge and Kegelbahn of Peter Supf’s squadron 
in the middle of the Western Front powerfully demonstrates. The odd visual combination 
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of moose heads, rustic woodwork, and small evergreen trees served as the backdrop for 
the re-enacting Bavarian traditional festivals, complete with airmen dressed as Bavarian 
women. It served as a way of expressing regional and national identity, as well as 
bringing part of Germany to the front, where its soldiers and airmen consistently 
rationalized a defensive war fought on foreign soil. 
When moved to more distant territories, the discourse employed by German 
airmen grew broader, and more at odds with their surroundings. The documents of 
Bavarian unit 304b, which was tasked with moving from Oberschleißheim airfield in 
Munich to Palestine, highlight the discourse of German nationalism, as well as 
intellectual and racial superiority. The challenge of moving to such a distant location 
highlighted the fragile nature of aviation technology, and only served to heighten the 
sense of “otherness” in the minds of those who would serve in the unit. Few embodied 
this mentality more than Franz Walz, whose moniker of “The Eagle of Jericho” expressed 
the complex ways in which broader cultural markers of German identity both expressed 
its will over foreign lands while simultaneously appropriating the historical and cultural 
heritage of those they sought to dominate. By 1919, the men of 304b were stranded 
between the battlefield and home, and even in defiant defeat, noted with contempt, the 
inferiority of other nationalities.  
Memory and death too, would ultimately come to shape the conversation of 
regional and national identity among Germany’s aviators after the First World War. 
Competing histories sought to tell the experience of “Germany’s war in the air,” while 
others remained dedicated to the same regional delineations that shaped local and 
national conversations before the First World War. The mere difference in title between 
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Germany’s War in the Air and Bavarian Airmen of the World War: A Book of Their 
Memories and Deeds, demonstrates the flattening effect of national discourse against the 
markers of delineation embedded in the title of regional war histories. The conversation 
shaping national and regional narratives would continue through the 1920s and into the 
1930s. In the interim, Germans would fight, not only over the question of memory, but 
over the political direction of the nation. Bodies too, occupied the space between national 
and regional narratives. Once more, Rudolf Berthold, returns to the historical narrative, 
having served from mobilization in Bamberg in 1914 until his death fighting with the 
Freikorps in 1920. Berthold’s own corpse would come to embody the ongoing debate 
between national and regional identity. Following his gruesome murder, Berthold, who 
had written so poetically about the green forests of his home town, would not be buried in 
Bavaria, but would instead be interred in Berlin. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRIVILEGED DEATHS 
 
Introduction 
From 1960 to 2003, the grave of Rudolf Berthold, the decorated First World War 
German aviator, vanished, first within the fortified border between East and West Berlin, 
and then as an unmarked grave following reunification. In a century defined by 
unprecedented technological progress, and previously unimagined destruction in war, 
Berthold’s body is emblematic of the complicated relationship between Germany and its 
First World War aviators after 1918. Berthold’s life and death, also embodied a complex 
negotiation with time during and after the conflict. We can best access the intricacies of 
time as it was lived and experienced by men like Berthold, through the Greek terms 
chronos and kairos, which demarcate time between periods of chronological time - 
chronos - and heightened “moments of decision” represented by kairos.1 While those 
who fought might not have actively, consciously engaged with classical categories, their 
experiences are expressed in ways that reflect these conceptions of time and which 
clearly demonstrate different perceptions of time during and after the war. The conflict’s 
unprecedented nature, both in its employment of new technology and its subsequent 
violence, resonated as distinct, knowable periods of kairos for those who served. 
Aviation also added a new dimension to the lived experience of kairos, by regimenting 
time and creating order, even in the midst of immense bloodshed. Similarly, the conflict 
created a redefined perception of chronos in the minds of Germany’s aviators. Their 
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technologically driven, violent, and often short lives, elongated short spans of time into 
longer epochs. Aviators divided along generational shifts that did not reflect their 
respective ages but rather, the longevity of their service in the war and the intensity of 
violence surrounding certain periods. Here, the work of Germany’s aviation industrialists 
dramatically shaped the experiences of the nation’s fliers.  
Germany’s aviation firms fed the carnage over the Western Front with ever faster, 
ever more lethal machines. Over the course of the war, Germany’s aviation industry 
manufactured 47,931 airplanes.2 These industrialists worked within their own perception 
of time as the war progressed. These men were defined by generational differences of 
their own, and their responses to government meddling and the ever more urgent need to 
produce aircraft created their own response to time. Their work, however, was ultimately 
geared to producing ever faster and more lethal aircraft. The latest machines produced in 
Germany’s factories consistently transcended pervious conceptions of space and time, 
and continued to compress the experiences of both as the war progressed.  
As a result, aviators who fought earlier in the war had a far different perception of 
time from those who arrived to serve later. The experience of time, as passing chronology 
or heightened moments of decision, was most starkly felt within the realm of aerial 
violence. The act of killing in the air, a wholly new form of warfare, profoundly altered 
perceptions of time for those engaged in combat. This new kind of war also repurposed 
time to resurrect older tropes of medieval combat to make a new and terrifying kind of 
fighting knowable. Thus, aerial violence, combined with aviation’s rapid development, 
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distorted time for those who flew, dividing Germans from the same generation of soldiers 
into “new” and “old” fliers, while compressing space and time in ever more violent aerial 
combat.  
Time, as it was experienced in war, transformed again with the end of hostilities, 
and fundamentally altered the identities of \aviators and derailed the plans of 
industrialists. The compressed sense of chronos collapsed into the endless space of an 
uncertain future, and despite the dangers of kairos, many aviators longed for knowable 
moments of decision and action. Beyond the battlefield, designers and managers like 
Hugo Junkers, Ernst Heinkel, and Antony Fokker all prepared for a post-war world, even 
before the conflict ended, only to find their markets shattered by the peace treaty that 
ended German aviation for the foreseeable future.3 Fliers, both living and long-dead, 
were re-purposed, re-buried, and rhetorically reconstructed, as either representations of 
an earlier time or standard bearers for a new, National Socialist Reich. For men like 
Berthold, who died not in the war, but in one of Germany’s many riots in 1920, aviation’s 
relationship with a shattered homeland collapsed their wartime memories and uncertain 
future into a new and unrecognizable present. Aviation, then, transcended a diverse range 
of times, as daily sorties created a profound but brittle identity for Germany’s fliers, death 
transformed fliers, and defeat shattered the narrative of the airplane in German culture. In 
death, Berthold and others like him, transcended time, though their mortal remains were 
left mired in a contentious discourse of mourning, memory, and nationalism. The lives of 
Germany’s aviators then, did not create the palpable sense of kairos during the war, but 
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rather added new delineations to an ancient concept. 
 
Military Aviation and War Time 
As discussed in Chapter One, Germany’s social fabric at the turn of the century 
was one of a myriad of perspectives; a multiplicity of conversations centered around 
questions of national identity, industrialism, modernity, empire, gender, and regionality.4 
Germany in 1900 was a rapidly industrializing power, and consequently experienced the 
changing relationship with time shared by other developed nations. Stephen Kern notes 
that the pre-war era was defined by a new sense of the present as defined by “a 
thickening of its temporal length beyond a ‘knife edge’ between the past and future into 
an extended interval that included part of the past and future.”5 This created a new 
concept of the present, one articulated by Gertrude Stein as a lived moment that 
“involved streaming from the past and into the future.”6 Germany’s own narrative before 
1914, that of being both inherently modern and traditional; embodying both the factory 
floor and the Heimat landscape, demonstrates this complex and often contested 
relationship with time. Aviation too, before 1914, exemplified this new narrative and 
stretched its interpretation further by collapsing space between distances previously 
traveled in days, or not at all. The airplane then, was the physical manifestation of this 
new present, the next step in an evolution begun by the railroad; full of power, potential, 
and quite possibly, peril. 
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The arrival of war in 1914 fundamentally changed the relationship between time 
and aviation. National lines hardened, and the pan-European spirit of aviation, 
cooperative and competitive, evaporated as the foundational “community of fliers” were 
called up by their representative armies.7 Pioneering aviators of pre-war flight became the 
founding members of new military air forces. Time, too, changed. Kern states, “The war 
contradicted such notions of an extended present on a grand scale by isolating the present 
moment from the flow of time. However, the other extension of the present that we 
observed - a spatial extension that included a multiplicity of distant events - was 
dramatically embodied in the war experience.”8 Rudolf Berthold’s war diary reveals this 
fracture of time in his entries from the first weeks of the conflict. He notes the term “war 
standard” as the dominant the phrase used in military drills, and that a heightened sense 
of urgency, of perilous time, had arrived.9 War, in the modern sense, has always created a 
heightened sense of urgency. The compression of time, the creation of a perilous future, 
and the regimentation of military life, often erodes any sense of reliable consistency in 
the present or any notion of a predictable future. “Gradually, imperceptibly the images 
and thoughts of ordinary civilian life begin to fade; thoughts of home, wife, friends, even 
begin to grow dim and recede in the memory. The present, the vital present, occupies and 
grips the mind.”10 
Aviation, however, added new delineations to this experience. The airplane, that 
                                                     
7 For more on the pan-European spirit of flight, See Richard Wohl A Passion for Wings: Aviation and the 
Western Imagination, 1908-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
8 Kern, 294 
9 See Rudolf Berthold, Persönliches Kriegstagebuch, MSG2-10722. Freiburg Bundesarchiv. 
10 Hereford Carrington, Physical Phenomena and the War as quoted in Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time 
and Space, 294. 
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invention which compressed space and time, also revolutionized the spatial perception of 
the battlefield - not from the height of high ground or a tall tree - but from thousands of 
meters above what would become a sprawling network of trenches and fortifications.11 
Aircraft expanded the perception of the battlefield while simultaneously shrinking its 
scale. Miles of terrain could be traversed in minutes, rather than hours or even days. The 
information gathered by these aviators proved invaluable. From the opening weeks of the 
conflict, ocular reconnaissance from aircraft proved vital to the decisions made by ground 
commanders. By 1915, photographic reconnaissance provided remarkably clear images 
of the trenches, information of vital importance to winning the war. In essence, aerial 
photography provided frozen snapshots of time, that could be internalized as intelligence 
for future action. 
The development of military aviation over the course of the war also reordered 
the perception and experience of time by those tasked with flying daily sorties over the 
Western Front. As early warplanes were replaced with purpose-built machines, the lived 
experiences of pilots, observers, and ground crews, became highly regimented and 
ordered. Pilots and observers flew multiple daily missions over the Western Front, 
mapping enemy fortifications and new trench positions. By 1915, purpose-built fighter 
aircraft, designed to destroy enemy reconnaissance machines, grew in number and 
importance.12 With these new machines, a novel dimension of war time emerged, as a 
unique breed of Kampfflieger rose to prominence. 
                                                     
11 The dual-nature of aviation, that of promise and peril, is also seen in the development of the defining 
technological breakthrough of the nineteenth century: the railroad. See Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The 
Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Space and Time in the 19th Century (Berkeley: The University of 
California Press, 1986). 
12 See John Morrow, The Great War in the Air (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993). 
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The maturation of the air war over the Western Front, then, created two markedly 
different experiences in the perception of war time. First, the military demands of 
acquiring daily photographic reconnaissance, ranging artillery, and later in the war, the 
punitive bombing of infantry positions, necessitated multiple sorties each day. Each 
mission, assigned over dangerous areas of the Western Front and, sometimes, behind 
enemy lines, represented a heightened sense of kairos. These missions represented 
moments of decision that could shape the course of the war and, possibly, cost the lives 
of the airmen assigned to carry them out. Reconnaissance flights conducted daily sorties 
to gather photographic data of the Western Front. Images relayed back to military 
intelligence noted any valuable strategic information: increased troop concentrations 
which could signal an impending offensive, new troop fortifications or artillery batteries, 
damage done to friendly trench emplacements, all factored into the decision-making 
process by those on the ground. The need for such information meant that sorties were 
divided into morning, afternoon, and evening patrols that created a highly regimented, 
predictable sense of time for aviators serving over the Western Front.13 Pilots serving in 
both reconnaissance and bombing units, as well as those assigned to Jasta or “hunting” 
squadrons flew with grinding regularity as the war progressed. Even by 1918, as the war 
turned decidedly against Germany, daily missions were still conducted routinely as the 
Luftstreitkräfte attempted to create localized air superiority in the place of regional 
dominance. 
Second, the speed at which aviation developed during the war created an artificial 
                                                     
13 Weather remained an unpredictable factor in daily patrols, with weather fronts sometimes scrubbing all 
scheduled sorties for days at a time. 
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sense of distinct “eras” to the air war.14 These eras reached out through time, redefining 
the perception of chronos experienced by aviators. This redefinition of time was 
facilitated through technological improvements to aircraft. The rapid speed of 
technological development in aviation often meant that the next generation of military 
aircraft eclipsed those already in service.15 In an instant, a once reliable machine could be 
rendered militarily obsolete by newer aircraft coming into production.16  Aviation’s 
expeditious development created a psychological shift in pilots’ perception of time over 
the arc of the war years. In other words, whereas missions created a crisis moment, a 
specific point of kairos, in which aviators faced the possibly fatal risk of military flight, 
the rapid development of military aircraft redefined what “long term” time, or chronos, 
felt like. 
This elongation of time is apparent in Manfred von Richthofen’s writing, when 
describing his encounter with aviation in 1914: “At the time I hadn’t the slightest idea 
what our fliers did. I considered every flier an enormous fraud. I could not tell if he were 
friend or foe… Even today the old pilots tell how painful it was to be fired at by friend 
and foe alike.”17 Richthofen’s definition of early aviators as “old pilots” highlights how 
the violent nature of the air war, coupled with its disorientating speed of development, 
                                                     
14 For a history of Germany’s aviation industry, see John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
15 An example of the rapid rate of technological improvement comes from the technical figures of aircraft. 
In 1915, the Fokker Eindecker had a top speed of 87 mph. The Fokker DVII of 1918, by comparison, flew 
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collapsing of space experienced by aviators during the conflict. 
16 This often placed combat aviators in a precarious position. A new, superior machine provided an 
extremely overdeveloped sense of agency in the air, whereas an outdated aircraft left aviators feeling a 
complete loss of that agency. 
17 Manfred von Richthofen, Der rote Kampfflieger (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein & Company, 1917), 25. 
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could, in the space of a few short years, separate, nearly contemporary Germans into 
“new” and “old” pilots. The technical rate of development in the field of military aviation 
over the air war’s dominant years – 1915, 1916, 1917, and 1918 – created machines that 
not only improved drastically over time, but utterly eclipsed the technology which came 
before.18 Consequently, aviators could neatly divide the air war into the subsequent 
“eras” that they either personally experienced, or which preceded their arrival on the 
Western Front. These delineations of time were, of course, artificial. For those away from 
combat, the separation of mere weeks or months into epochs appeared irrational. For 
aviators, however, it is apparent through their writing that each separate “era” of the air 
war’s development was distinct. Whereas ground combat troops would mark eras through 
survival, aviation added a technical delineation, that of the development and 
implementation of new machines, to the perception of chronos and kairos.  
The physical manifestation of that agency was, of course, designed and built by 
Germany’s aviation firms. War time, for these companies, fueled a heightened sense of 
urgency. Every design, every decision made by these firms represented a moment of 
kairos in an uncertain present. The ramifications of these decisions could mean the next 
cutting-edge design, or a tremendous misstep for the company. Within this sense of 
kairos, the addition of dramatic generational and cultural variances also created markedly 
different responses to these moments of decision. Within these firms, Germany’s aviation 
designers and engineers worked against increasing government intervention and, 
                                                     
18 The technical aspects of military aviation have a voluminous historiography. For a technical history of 
the development of First World War aviation, see John Morrow, The Great War in the Air (Washington, 
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eventually, its heavy-handed intrusion into the design and construction of military 
aircraft. The process of inventing new designs or improving current machines and 
subsequently bringing them into production further reinforced this sense of kairos.19  
Beyond these moments of decision, the social and economic position occupied by 
aviation industrialists, left them insulated from the violence and suffering of war, which 
also created an elongated sense of chronos time.20 In the longer view of some 
industrialists, their perception of events was not the urgency of kairos. Instead, it was 
time’s projection forward, not into the daily, regimented duties of military flight, nor the 
epochs that developed in the minds of Germany’s aviators, but into the future of flight, as 
new designs moved from blueprint to prototype to production. Here a new regimentation 
of time emerged as the methodical chronology of research and design helped give shape 
to an uncertain present. Thus, an inherent tension existed within the culture of Germany’s 
aviation industrialists; one that placed the urgent, perilous kairos of the needs of war – 
the need to produce new and viable machines – with the chronos of design’s longer view 
of development. The perception to these types of time largely reflected the backgrounds 
of individual industrialists.  
Aeronautical development during the First World War fed off a disparate range of 
technical approaches. Hugo Junkers, already an established designer of innovative 
industrial technologies before the First World War was, perhaps, the most methodical and 
                                                     
19 John Morrow’s German Air Power in World War I describes the political/industrial relationship between 
German aviation firms and the military during the conflict. My interest here is how that relationship 
contributed to the sense of regimented “war time” and how that perception shattered, not only with defeat, 
but with the imposing of Versailles comprehensive restrictions on aviation. Thus, my approach examines 
the cultural ramifications of this political/industrial relationship. 
20 Kern notes that “In war or peace the rich and powerful have a stronger and more active sense of the 
future than the poor and powerless. Great wealth is a bridge to the future.” See Kern, 296. 
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cautious aircraft engineer in Germany. While Junkers was one of the oldest aviation 
industrialists in the country, his work was also the most forward looking. Moving beyond 
the accepted materials of the day, Junkers created a design for a machine called the J-1, 
which embodied not only of his view of aviation’s technical development, but also of his 
perception of time both before and during the war. The J-1 differed from any other 
machine in production, using an all-aluminum construction, it was utterly unique for its 
time. Junkers also pushed the boundaries on the J-1’s shape, insisting on a mono-wing 
design, which ran counter to the wishes of the German military.21 Beginning in 1911, 
Junkers researched the requirements to develop his unique aircraft. After the outbreak of 
war, the all-metal machine attracted the attention of the Idflieg: Inspektorat der 
Fliegertruppen (Inspectorate of Flying Troops) in 1915. The story of its design, and the 
machinations of Idflieg and Junkers’ company, elucidates the markedly different 
perceptions of time between the two entities during the war. 
The J-1 was moved from initial design to prototype in early 1916. The machine 
was so extreme, so alien from the wood and canvas aircraft that defined the era, that no 
test pilot was interested in being the first to fly the J-1.22 Despite fears that the machine 
was designed to crash in a heap of twisted metal, the J-1 was a success. In this 
momentary triumph, however, we locate the stark differences between Junkers far-
reaching approach to the urgent needs of wartime planners. For Idflieg, the J-1 was a 
viable solution to an immediate, and pressing military problem - that of using aircraft for 
                                                     
21 See Richard Byers, “Power and Initiative in Twentieth Century Germany: The Case for Hugo Junkers” 
(PhD Dissertation, University of Georgia, 2002). 
22 Richard Byers, “An Unhappy Marriage: The Junkers-Fokker Merger,” Journal of Historical Biography 3 
(Spring 2008), 8. 
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low-altitude, attack sorties in support of ground troops. For Junkers, however, the J-1 was 
a step in a much wider, more ambitious process. He did not intend to push the J-1 into 
mass production. Instead, the machine proved the viability behind his desire to develop a 
new system of production for all-metal aircraft. For Junkers, the J-1 was a step, not a 
solution.  
Junkers long-range planning was rooted in chronos, that of creating a fully 
realized production system for building all-metal aircraft, which would take considerable 
time and resources to fulfill. For Idflieg, however, the J-1 was a machine designed within 
kairos, a heightened moment of decision required to solve an urgent matter. With the 
request for six machines from the German military, Junkers began work on the next 
design, the J-2.23 As Richard Byers notes, Junkers decision to expand research and 
development on the J-2 rather than focusing his resources on the manufacturing of the J-1 
put the company in financial straits.24 Thus, it is apparent that Junkers’ view of time was 
fundamentally different from that of the German military. Even while placing his firm at 
great financial risk, Junkers’ insistence on pressing ahead with long-term research plans, 
indicates his sense of time as a far-reaching force that would ultimately even out the 
short-term turmoil of war. 
The disagreement between Idflieg and Hugo Junkers represents more than a 
logistical, economic, or industrial issue, and highlights two fundamentally differing 
points of view on time. Development, for Junkers, occurred along two intersecting points 
that met somewhere in a long-term future. The first point represented the ever-increasing 
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power output from Germany’s airplane motors as production and technical ability 
improved. The second represented the increasing the increasing weight loads that those 
motors could carry. Junkers projected time outward, and found the intersection of those 
two points to be the ideal moment to launch his next creation, the J-2. Development, then, 
was not to be rushed. For Idflieg, time was a fundamentally different experience, that of 
pressing, urgent military necessity. Thus, the two came to radically different 
interpretations of kairos. For Junkers, that moment of decision lay along the intersection 
of improving technologies. For Idflieg, the moment of decision was now.  
The machinations of Idflieg served the central aim of maximizing efficient use of 
war time through the production of the most effective warplanes for the German military 
while simultaneously reducing costs and increasing output by any means necessary. 
Some firms, like the Albatros company, were far more compliant to the demands of the 
Inspectorate of Flying Troops.25 Others, like Junkers, were less willing to subordinate 
future designs to the demands of the German military.  Time again, in the form of age, 
played a role in the decision making by the Junkers firm. Hugo Junkers, the oldest of 
Germany’s aviation industrialists, understood powered flight from a much wider view. 
Born in the mid-nineteenth century, Junkers viewed flight as yet another step - albeit an 
important one - in a longer trajectory of industrial and technological development. The 
Junkers firm then, did not rely entirely on aviation, although it came to depend more and 
more on its aeronautical departments for the stability of the company.  
For Junkers, the war represented an intrusion into the important work of research 
                                                     
25 See John Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982). 
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and development in the field of powered flight. Thus, the pressing needs of war time did 
not intrude on the longer, slower development cycle of aeronautical development within 
Junkers’ from. His differing view of time, and the consequences that such a perspective 
held, were often in conflict with that of his military supervisors. Consequently, Idflieg 
and the German military would later view Junkers with a disparaging eye. He eventually 
earned a reputation as being rigid and obdurate. Junkers looked forward to a day when 
the war would end, and his firm could return to the chronos of development time that he 
found more productive. Despite the interference of government intervention, the First 
World War offered a financial and industrial boon for Junkers. His from grew from 
fifteen employees in 1915 to two thousand by the end of the war in 1918.26 The war 
shaped Junkers company, and the relationship between his firm and the state. His 
relationship with time, too, changed during the war, and time would also affect the 
experiences of his competitors.  
Ernst Heinkel was Junkers’ junior by nearly three decades. Consequently, he 
came to the world of aviation at a much younger age and viewed the world of powered 
flight from an entirely different, and more emotionally visceral, perspective. In his 
autobiography, Heinkel retroactively bends time to his narrative, noting, “My real life did 
not begin in 1888 when I was born.”27 For the young Heinkel, his “official” entry into the 
world coincided with the record-breaking flight and subsequent crash of the LZ4 airship 
in 1908. Heinkel was twenty years of age when the LZ4 crashed and burned to the 
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ground. His choice of this moment to represent the beginning of his life, illustrates the 
degree to which Heinkel became obsessed with aviation. He differed from Junkers, who 
was already middle-aged when aviation quite literally, took off. Instead, Heinkel was 
born into the world of flight as a lived reality experienced in the present tense. 
Flight then, was an unfolding phenomenon for Heinkel. As a result, he felt a 
strong emotional attachment that Junkers never quite possessed. The urgency and the 
immediacy of flight from Heinkel’s younger perspective, created a sense of time more in 
line with Germany’s military needs. Heinkel also stood to lose less than the more 
established Junkers. Consequently, Heinkel developed a pragmatic nature in regards to 
his dealings with Idflieg, particularly when working with new aircraft designs.  While 
working for the Hansa-Brandenburg firm, Heinkel found his work largely dictated from 
above, with the Imperial Naval Office particularly interested in the development of float 
planes for military service. Heinkel’s designs worked with the same limitations faced by 
all German aircraft firms during the war, that of poorly performing motors and difficulty 
creating high quality machines in large numbers.28 As a result Idflieg often intruded not 
only in the production numbers of machines, but even in the specific details of an 
aircraft’s design and construction. 
Ernst Heinkel was, first and foremost, an engineer. He stated that he often 
operated under the idea of “über den Daumen gepeilt” (the rule of thumb), in other 
words, engineering through trial and error. As a result, he was especially receptive to the 
feedback of his test pilots.29 Late in the war, Heinkel was assigned to the design of yet 
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another float plane for the German Navy. His test pilot reported that the machine was tail 
heavy and therefore, unbalanced. Heinkel and his crew at the factory reacted by removing 
the upper wing and moving it rearwards to correct the issue. When he was told by a 
fellow worker that “the Navy would never allow [the design change],” Heinkel retorted, 
“then for once we won’t ask the Navy’s permission.”30  
In this regard, Heinkel differed from Junkers in important ways. First, he knew 
how to placate his supervisors from Idflieg and the German Navy while still maintaining 
some level of autonomy. Unlike Junkers, who often antagonized his superiors, Heinkel 
was adept at finding areas of aircraft design that would often fall past the scrutiny of his 
overseers. Second, Heinkel perceived the pressing concerns of war time with a different 
urgency than Junkers. This difference in perception was the result of two factors. First, 
Heinkel’s position within Albatros and Hansa-Brandenburg firm was that of an engineer, 
not an owner. Therefore, Heinkel had less at stake than Hugo Junkers. Second, Heinkel’s 
age created a greater sense of urgency for wartime production in that the war was a 
foundational experience of a young life, rather than a middle-aged one. Thus, his work, 
first at Albatros and then at Hansa-Brandenburg focused on creating war planes for 
immediate production, rather than working towards long-range, often abstract goals that 
were more in line with the projects undertaken by the Junkers firm.  
If Junkers represented the most methodical aviation industrialist of the war, one 
who viewed kairos as an event existing within a moment in the future, and Heinkel 
viewed aviation as an exciting moment within a heightened urgency in the present, then 
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Antony Fokker embodied the purest interpretation of kairos of any of Germany’s 
designers. Fokker remains one of the exceptional figures in the field of German aviation, 
not only for his designs, but for his unorthodox approach to engineering and his pliable 
relationship with patent laws.31 Fokker was not German-born, but a Dutch citizen who 
immigrated to Germany before the First World War. Having migrated to Germany in 
1910 to learn to fly, Fokker eventually established a permanent base within the country.32 
Fokker’s approach to flight differed from both Junkers and Heinkel. He was less educated 
than either of his contemporaries and preferred to work up designs based on 
experimentation rather than calculation. He also benefited from Germany’s lax patent 
protection laws by “incorporating” designs from other companies into his own.33 
Fokker’s aviation ambitions coincided with the coming of war in 1914 to create 
an ever-present sense of Kairos within his work and his perception of time. After being 
naturalized as a German citizen in the interest of national security, Fokker set to work 
competing against the largest and most established aviation firms in Germany.34 Some of 
Fokker’s earliest designs were widely successful, none more than the Fokker EIII 
monoplane which wreaked havoc on allied planes in 1915.35 Fokker also leveraged the 
power of personality by cultivating relationships with Germany’s leading combat pilots. 
Thus, the Dutch aircraft designer tied his fortunes to Germany’s rising Kampfflieger. His 
choice of aviator, the fighter pilot, also reflects his perception of the present as a moment 
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35 See Morrow, German Air Power in World War I for a full discussion on the EIII’s impact on the air war. 
  254 
of kairos. No other flier experienced the moment of decision – of life and death action – 
more so than the fighter pilot. Fokker’s designs worked actively to serve those at the 
cutting edge of the air war, by creating the most advanced aircraft possible, even if those 
designs were less than sound. The consequences of these decisions, often made in the 
moment, would nearly cost Fokker his company. 
By 1916, however, Fokker’s fortunes turned against him, as several of his 
machines failed in flight, killing the German aviators with whom he identified. 
Eventually his firm was in such dire straits that the German government sought to sell his 
machines to the Dutch government rather than press them into service over the Western 
Front.36 The following year, Fokker’s company was forcibly merged with the firm headed 
by the obdurate Junkers. The relationship would prove to be a miserable failure for both 
men.37 Fokker, however, continued to work on creating cutting edge designs for 
Germany’s fighter pilots, as he worked against an ever-pressing sense of kairos during 
the war. Fokker too, sought to transcend time through the praise of Germany’s fighter 
pilots, and the acclaim of the popular press.38 Fokker then, was a contradiction; a man 
who desperately worked within the paradigm of kairos while seeking ways to transcend 
it. 
Thus, the interpretation of time among aviation industrialists, engineers, and 
designers, differed starkly from one another and reflected not only their differing 
backgrounds and approaches to flight, but in their discernment of war time. Hugo 
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Junkers, born before the Kaiserreich, viewed flight as another technical development that 
his firm could revolutionize over the long term. Ernst Heinkel, in retrospect, viewed 
aviation as the defining experience of his life, and actively worked his way up German 
aviation firms to be a part of its development, viewed flight as an urgent and exciting 
field that he could shape. Antony Fokker, perhaps, viewed flight through the most urgent 
lens of all, that of the fighter pilots tasked with using his aircraft. 
For these men, the First World War largely played out in board rooms, design 
bureaus, and government meetings and left the question of kairos up to a broad range of 
interpretations. Junkers’ all-metal designs did not see full scale production until the final 
year of the conflict and consequently, made little measurable impact on the outcome of 
the war. Fokker, however, had a much more direct hand in the war, with his designs 
produced in large numbers and embraced by the Kampfflieger of the Western Front. His 
camaraderie with the men who flew his machines appears to have formed both out of 
admiration for their work, and the pragmatic need to maintain favor with those whose 
input could sway Idflieg’s decision regarding production orders. Heinkel’s work was 
often absorbed in the details of design, and engineering the best machines he could in the 
present. Thus, war time in the realm of Germany’s aviation industrialists highlights 
radically different interpretations of kairos as either a moment of decision in the future, 
the unfolding needs of the present, or in the urgent call from the battlefield to produce 
cutting edge machines for fighter pilots. 
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Violence, Death, and War Time in the Air 
There is a theme, as old as the mythology of Icarus, of supreme confidence that is 
evident in those who became aviators.39 Before becoming a pilot, Manfred von 
Richthofen, served with a cavalry unit. Writing to his commanding officer, Richthofen 
asked to be transferred and, after being rebuffed at first, was eventually granted a post 
with the flying service in 1915. He writes in his autobiography that, “my greatest wish 
was fulfilled.”40 By 1915 Rudolf Berthold had gained his pilot’s license and was relieved 
of the frustrations of passively observing from the air to piloting his own machine. His 
war diary reveals the extreme sense of confidence he held as an aviator: “As soon as it 
can happen, I want to be a pilot. Should my skill, my will, always be dependent on 
another person? Should the weakness of one person hinder my strength, which knows no 
barrier?”41  
It is in Berthold’s war diary that we see the degree to which aviation not only 
cultivated a sense of extreme personal agency in fighter pilots, but also the ways in which 
flight changed perceptions of time. As the war on the ground deteriorated into static, 
trench warfare with no end in sight, the development of aircraft from fragile 
reconnaissance machines into weapons of war empowered the men who flew them. The 
skill set required to be a successful combat pilot also cultivated the notion that the 
airplane provided the aviator with a sense of individual agency that his compatriot in the 
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mud below would never have.42 Berthold’s writing denotes an extraordinary sense of 
confidence that rose as he moved to take the controls of the aircraft he was assigned. That 
sense of agency, of power, was of course artificial. The power of a pilot to control his 
plane ultimately rested on the reliability and fragility of his machine. A mechanical 
failure, or damage suffered in battle, would render a fighter plane into little more than a 
plummeting coffin. From the perspective of the aviator, however, even a fragile sense of 
agency represented a far better fate than none at all, and from the confines of the cockpit, 
aviation presented a chance not only to survive the war, but to thrive. 
Thus, the foundational experience of the aviator, that of controlling his aircraft 
and fighting against another opponent, returns us to the question of violence. By 
revisiting the violent experiences of German aviators during the war, however, we can 
elucidate another perspective on pilot identity, that of their relationship to time. Aviators 
like Richthofen and Berthold experienced violence in the air in extremely heightened 
sense of kairos, where minute decisions often meant the difference between life and 
death. In his published autobiography, Richthofen reminds us about the difference 
between hunting and shooting, “My father makes a distinction between a hunter, a 
sportsman, and a shooter whose only fun is shooting.”43 While Richthofen’s description 
here undoubtedly highlights his extraordinary privilege as a killer, it also demonstrates a 
different approach to time. The act of shooting, from Richthofen’s perspective, seems to 
represent a failure in capitalizing on the opportunity presented through kairos. In other 
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words, shooting for the fun of shooting ignores the greater moment of decision at hand, 
and renders the shooter as less capable of being decisive. A hunter, by contrast, seems to 
slow kairos down, and extract every advantage from the moment. The analogy, presented 
for public consumption, illustrates the difference between an aviator who views the 
moment of decision with the gravity it deserves, and those who are more reckless.  
Richthofen also reminds us that these experiences changed over time. After 
downing an opponent, Richthofen writes, “I had the feeling of absolute satisfaction. Only 
much later did I overcome that and also became a shooter.”44 This short statement 
underscores a wealth of information regarding his perception of time as the war 
progressed. His “feeling of absolute satisfaction,” which he felt during his phase as a 
“hunter,” was derived from his conquering of the moment of decision, of moving with 
precision and accuracy and downing his one opponent. He notes immediately after, that 
he was forced, through the necessities of war, to become a shooter. This concession 
highlights the changing nature of war over the Western Front, as the skies became ever 
more populated. The other phrase, “only much later,” however, shows us the extreme 
compression of time felt by pilots during the war. Richthofen is referencing a period of 
time of little more than twelve to fourteen months. His use of the term, “much later,” 
shows us how that experience of war, created an elongated sense of chronos time, 
punctuated by extraordinary moments of kairos.   
This same sense of kairos is apparent when revisiting Berthold’s words as well. 
Berthold, after the traumatic loss of his friend and observer in 1915, vowed revenge for 
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his death. For Berthold, his deep personal loss and the subsequent need to enact 
vengeance, transformed him into a fighter pilot, and entered him into a realm of struggle 
and death. 45 Berthold did so by shooting down a French Voisin biplane. Describing the 
attack, Berthold writes, “What happened now was a few minutes’ work! … My machine 
gun began its monotonous ‘tack-tack.’ It was not long before the Frenchmen went over… 
emitting smoke and crashing.” 46 Later Berthold describes the confirmation, by phone, of 
his victory. “Then came the message from the foremost troop that two downed aircraft 
were confirmed… Half an hour later, cars drove towards [the crash.]”47 
Berthold’s victory, and his description of it after the fact, highlights his mental 
and physical experience of kairos, a moment of intense violence and danger. The “few 
minutes’ work” described by Berthold likely took a matter of seconds. Extrapolating 
from his narrative, it is clear that a short burst of machine gun fire hit the engine of the 
French machine, sending it out of control to the ground. But the experience, that of 
intense focus and a heightened sense of the immediate, dangerous present, forms the 
foundation of his memory of the event. We can sense through his entry, every tense 
aspect of the fight: maneuvering a machine into position against a moving target, feeling 
adrenaline pouring through his body while closing to a range of a few feet, opening fire 
and hearing his guns over the din of his engine; all of these details were cast into high 
relief in Berthold’s mind.48 The contrasting delay, that of landing his machine and then 
waiting hours for ground crew members and German infantry to confirm his victory, also 
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expresses a sense of prolonged chronos, of waiting to verify the intense, physical and 
psychological experience which just occurred in the air. There is a sense, in Berthold’s 
language, of time not only slowing down, but of a clear sense of that deacceleration.   
Peter Supf’s photo album too, demonstrates the intimate role that violence played 
in shaping the perception of time, even within a fighting unit whose primary task was 
photographing enemy positions. Placed in conversation with Supf’s snapshots of 
comrades and social gatherings are images of death and destruction: crashed aircraft, 
bombed out buildings, and funerals for Supf’s compatriots.49 Their placement in such 
close proximity, often on the same page, denotes the influence of violence on Supf’s 
mentality. Supf’s album, which spans the outbreak of war in 1914 until the end of 1917, 
is marked by the destruction of enemy and friendly airplanes, the deaths of his friends, 
and the carnage of the war as viewed both from the ground and from above. 
Supf’s photo album demonstrates a profound and complex relationship between 
the viewer of the album and time. Photography, more than any other medium, captures 
time in the past at a precise and unmovable point. It differs from the descriptive nature of 
text and the inherent characteristics of moving film. Time then, is frozen in a moment of 
decision.50 Supf’s album captures his comrades before they are killed in combat. It also 
features the machines that dominated the air war in the varying epochs of the conflict. 
Large, underpowered machines recall the first year of the war, when Supf’s role as an 
observer would have been largely that of ocular reconnaissance. The end of the album 
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reflects the increasing violence of the conflict, and his sense of chronos being reshaped, 
as eras within short spans of time begin to feel longer. The album then, creates a curious 
relationship with the past. Through the images, Supf and his comrades could, 
metaphorically, step back into a seemingly distant past, one that might have existed only 
months earlier. 51  
By late 1917, aviation’s development had reached a new era of ruthless efficacy, 
such that it began to devour the very aviators that defined the air war’s earlier years. The 
deaths of prominent airmen often denoted the ending of a perceived epoch within the air 
war’s history. Max Immelmann, who rose to fame during the Fokker Scourge, died in the 
summer of 1916. His death was closely followed by that of Oswald Boelcke, who died in 
the autumn of the same year. For those who followed, men like Manfred von Richthofen 
and Rudolf Berthold, the era of Boelcke and Immelmann represented a bygone era, one 
comprised of simpler machines and less hazardous skies. Such a narrative would continue 
through the rest of the air war. Werner Voss, a protégé of Manfred von Richthofen, died 
after a prolonged fight against the 56th Squadron of the Royal Flying Corps in September 
of 1917.52 Even Richthofen, who remained the spiritual leader of the air service and 
embodied the false sense of invulnerably that pilots cultivated, had been badly wounded 
and left to convalesce after being shot in the head by an enemy observation machine. 
Rudolf Berthold was also wounded on several occasions, his worst injuries suffered on 
October 10, 1917 when his right arm was shattered by enemy gunfire and, barely 
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conscious, he managed to land his machine at his home airfield. It is also worth noting 
that Peter Supf’s album ends after 1917.53 Given the fierce acceleration of the air war by 
this point, it is entirely plausible that Supf no longer had the means, or the desire, to 
continue documenting the carnage of the air war over the Western Front. 
Certainly, the most significant death of the air war came on April 24, 1918, when 
the German Army issued the following grim report: “Rittmeister Freiherr von Richthofen 
has not returned from pursuit of an opponent over the Somme Battlefield. According to 
an English report, he has fallen.”54 The death of Richthofen fundamentally changed the 
mentality of Rudolf Berthold who noted the loss in his war diary: “Now that Richthofen 
is dead, I am the last [of the old Geschwader Commanders]. It is ugly and wears one 
down. The death of Richthofen has been very depressing. Now I have to move on as one 
of the old guard. Maybe I will also be killed.”55 Berthold’s comments illustrate the degree 
to which German airmen identified with the era of the air war that they entered. For 
Berthold, who served from the early weeks of war in 1914, the summer of 1918 
represented an alien time from the one he knew four years prior. As the summer of 1918 
wore on, more of Germany’s “old pilots,” those who had served since the “early days” of 
the air war, fell one by one. 
While Berthold would not be killed, he would not escape the First World War 
without further horrific injury. That summer, as the air war had turned decisively against 
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the Germans, Berthold was shot down by enemy aircraft, and nearly died when his 
crippled Fokker DVII slammed into a house after having its control wires severed by 
enemy fire. Berthold, whose right arm was already paralyzed from his previous injuries, 
was unable to use his newly issued parachute to escape. Instead, he was pulled, 
unconscious, from the shattered wreckage of his machine and transported to a field 
hospital. After dozens of injuries, this final and most serious incident grounded him for 
the rest of the war. 
 
War’s Ending, War Time Continuing 
For men like Rudolf Berthold, war proved the defining experience of their lives. 
Berthold entered military service early in life, and the First World War represented a 
distinct space and time that, even with its horrors and loss, was a comprehensible and 
knowable horror in which those who were destined to survive, could thrive. Berthold, 
then, even with his life-threatening injuries, refused to accept that his role in the First 
World War was over. Despite being physically absent from the battlefield, the war still 
raged in Berthold’s psyche. His sister, who served as a nurse and who would occasionally 
write for her brother in his war diary, noted after his injuries that he “watched with 
increasing concern the operations at the front and at home. Soon after his crash, he was 
notified that his command would be given to someone else, and that he would be 
assigned to another use for Germany.”56 
Berthold, a highly decorated and respected fighter pilot, would watch the war end 
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for Germany from the confines of his convalescence. By October, Berthold, who was 
physically broken, was convinced that air fighting would again be a possibility for him. 
Once well enough to write, he corresponded with his sister, stating, “the will and the skill 
are still there. I want my Jagdgeschwader 2 once again.”57 By the end of October, 
Berthold was still recuperating from his injuries. He fumed in his war diary, “In a few 
days, what powerful men have built over centuries will be destroyed. What has gone 
wrong? One cannot say. ‘Peace at any price!’ So shouts the people! Peace! Yes, but on 
what conditions? Man has lost his head. They doubted the Army… We are still far in 
enemy territory… O Germany, where is your national pride? It is still present in France, 
despite the devastation in their own country... You have slowly but surely undermined the 
good spirit of the Front.”58 November 11, 1918 marked the end of the First World War 
for millions, but for aviators like Rudolf Berthold, the transition from war time to peace 
did not represent the longed-for end of war but rather the ushering in of a new and 
incomprehensible present.  
For four years, aviation provided not only a military duty, and a sense of identity, 
but a highly regimented, ordered, and predictable sense of time. Patrols had been divided 
neatly into morning, afternoon, and evening sorties. The space below them defined their 
world. Richthofen called the Somme river valley a most “beautiful hunting ground.”59 
The air war itself divided neatly into perceived epochs and the individuals who defined 
them: Bloody April, the Fokker Scourge, Manfred von Richthofen, Oswald Boelcke. The 
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Armistice of November 11th, then, did not mark a new beginning, it signaled the 
shattering of a knowable order; a fracturing of kairos, and a return to an extending, and 
disorienting chronos. For Germany’s aviators, and in particular, long-serving fliers like 
Rudolf Berthold, the previous four years had been lived almost exclusively within the 
realm of kairos. The heightened sense of purpose, of agency provided through powered 
flight, of certainty that their actions, no matter how limited, had affected the course of the 
war, was terminated with the stroke of a pen.   
For Germany’s aviation interests, the subsequent treaty signed at Versailles in 
1919, was a seismic and devastating document, which comprehensively terminated war 
time, and left thousands to transition into a post-war world. It single-handedly scattered 
the network of aviators, observers, officers, engineers, designers, and industrialists who 
had built German aviation over the course of the war. Versailles removed in a most 
comprehensive way, the regimentation of war time provided by aviation, and disbanded 
the very industry that provided Germany’s aviators with not only their military duties, but 
their core sense of identity. 
The Treaty of Versailles enacted a series of articles designed specifically to 
prohibit any development in the field of aviation within Germany.60 Article 198 stated the 
German armed forces not include military or naval air arms. Article 199 stipulated that 
“the personnel of air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be 
demobilized.” For the men who served as aviators, observers, and aircraft mechanics in 
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the First World War, military obsolescence would not translate to comparable roles in 
civilian aviation. Article 201 decreed that “the manufacture and importation of aircraft, 
parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft, shall be forbidden 
in all German territory.” 201 fundamentally ended the construction of any type of aircraft 
or aviation related materials within the German borders. Article 202 went a step beyond 
manufacturing and targeted research and development by ordering the surrender of all 
military and naval aeronautical material to the Allied and Associated Powers. This article 
grouped any material even remotely related to aviation under an umbrella of expressly 
prohibited material. The country which had been, for the better part of the First World 
War, on the cutting edge of aircraft development and production, was banned from 
continuing any work in the aviation industry. Thousands of engineers, workers, aviators, 
designers, and intellectuals were put out of work. For those whose lives were defined by 
the experience of the First World War, their very identity, that of aviators, was rendered 
not just obsolete, but illegal.61 
Germany’s aviation industrialists too, had to respond not only to the ending of the 
war and the corresponding market chaos, but to the eventual restrictions of the Versailles 
Treaty. Time then, for those who built companies around aviation, moved to a distinctly 
urgent sense of kairos, requiring moments of committed action. Hugo Junkers foresaw 
the end of the war as early as July 1918, and began to subsequently plan for the transition 
from military aviation to the largely undeveloped field of civilian flight.62 The end of the 
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war was not a time of loss and disillusionment for Junkers but rather, a moment of 
liberation. His company was imperiled by an uncertain market, but he was released from 
his forced merger with Fokker and finally free from the oversight and meddlesome 
interference of governing bodies like Idflieg. The fortunes of his company were again, his 
own.  
For Heinkel, the end of the war came not with defeat, but with grave personal 
danger. In November of 1918, Heinkel was warned against turning up at the Hansa-
Brandenburg factory, after socialist sailors from the Naval mutiny in Kiel. His close 
friend and fellow aviation industrialist, Camillo Castiglioni, cautioned Heinkel that “the 
sailors will kill you!”63 Heinkel was undaunted and proceeded to work anyway. Within a 
few weeks, Heinkel would find himself unemployed for the first time since 1910. 
Castiglioni told Heinkel, “Germany and Austria will be forbidden to build planes.”64 
Unlike the more established Junkers, Heinkel found himself without a clear way forward 
in the field of aviation with the ending of the war.  
Ever the self-promoter, Antony Fokker reinvented his own narrative by rejecting 
the story of German defeat and remaking himself as the founding member of Dutch 
aviation. His Dutch citizenship was restored and eventually his financial obligations to 
Germany were all but forgotten in the following years. Before leaving Germany, 
however, Fokker made sure to take “six trainloads of equipment, as well as millions of 
marks in liquid capital, more than enough to begin again in Holland.”65 Thus, Junkers 
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assessment of Fokker proved true. The Dutch designer who used any means necessary to 
succeed would do just that in the coming years.  
Thus, the end of the First World War signaled a transition point, from the 
experience of war time, to the new world of civilian aviation in the new, post-war 
world.66 Germany’s aviation firms initially tried to adjust to the hugely undeveloped 
civilian market before the arresting acts of the Versailles Treaty ultimately ended German 
aeronautics for the foreseeable future. Germany’s industrialists, however, were ultimately 
survivors. Junkers, in spite of being labeled as difficult by the German government, 
would continue operations in other fields before returning to flight in the late 1920s. 
Heinkel too, found work, albeit outside of the restricted borders of his home country. 
Fokker would reemerge as well, influencing German aviation on the steppes of Russia 
during the Reichswehr’s secret aviation development programs. For the designers, 
engineers, and industrialists who supplied Germany’s warplanes during the First World 
War, the war’s ending was as abstract as its lived present, and represented a survivable 
shift from one era to another. It was a privileged view, one not shared with the aviators 
who suffered defeat along the Western Front.  
 Disillusioned fliers like Rudolf Berthold, who were highly decorated and 
respected combat pilots during the war, viewed a shattered present through the prism of a 
Wilhelmine past. It is apparent from Rudolf Berthold’s war diary that, as the fall of 1918 
gave way to the early winter months of 1919, the war he had fought for four years was 
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not over. Indeed, the rising specter of Bolshevism, for Berthold, represented the next 
grave threat to Germany. His war diary, which continues after November 1918 until his 
death, reveals his sentiments regarding the transgressions committed by his fellow 
servicemen in turning to Bolshevism. He declared, “the dress uniform jacket that I have 
worn for so long is now defiled. How difficult it is, how hard it will be for me to go 
on.”67 The search for meaning amid defeat as well as social and political chaos would 
elicit a range of responses from both the German public, and the nation’s surviving 
aviators. For Peter Supf, the pre-war occupation of writer would serve as a prism through 
which to make sense of the shattered present. The “pilot poet” expounded upon his pre-
war publications by drafting a multi-volume history on the military significance of the 
Luftstreitkräfte in which he served from 1914 to 1918.68 Post-Versailles Germany also 
created a social and political need to look back at the war, and find new meaning in those 
famous fliers long dead as well as those still living.69 
For Berthold, the abdication of Kaiser Wilhelm II did not signal an end to war, 
rather it represented another, far more disastrous phase of an ongoing struggle. As he 
reflected, “Hopefully there will soon be a reckoning for the villains who have used our 
misery. The Kaiser and the princes have been deposed. Incomprehensible! The human 
mind cannot grasp how terrible it all is.”70 Berthold, who lived his life within the span of 
the Kaiserreich, could not comprehend the chaos that enveloped Germany as war ended 
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on the Western Front and social riots and political unrest overcame the nation at home. 
For a staunch monarchist like Berthold, the uprisings of 1918 and 1919 represented a 
catastrophic present. After initially being assigned to airfield duty within the newly 
formed Reichswehr, Berthold soon lost his position after being ordered to shutter the 
airfield, as stipulated by the Versailles Treaty. Suddenly, his prowess as an aviator, even 
a broken one, could do little to change the course of events enveloping Germany. In April 
of 1919, he decried the taking of Munich by a group of socialists and anarchists. 
Suddenly, the very heart of the Reich that Berthold had served - indeed, sacrificed his 
body for - was at risk. It was the singular moment that radicalized Berthold, and drove 
out of the Reichswehr and into the Freikorps.71 
Berthold used his status as a respected German combat pilot to encourage young 
men to join his own Freikorps unit. The right-wing anger that rankled many Freikorps 
units led Berthold and his troops into a right-wing putsch to overthrow the fragile Ebert 
government in Berlin. Despite being ordered to disarm and disband, Berthold and his 
men continued the fight. After a tense standoff in the town of Harburg, Berthold and his 
men attempted to surrender, only to be attacked in the streets. Rudolf Berthold, the 
decorated aviator, who had survived four years of war over the Western Front, was 
brutally killed in the streets of Harburg.72 His body was later found, all but 
unrecognizable from multiple gunshot wounds and blunt force injury to his face. His 
uniform had been stripped, his paralyzed arm pulled from its socket. For Rudolf Berthold, 
an incomprehensible present - a world without a conservative Kaiser, a world threatened 
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by Bolshevism and anarchy - ultimately represented a war that never ended in 1918. In 
that violent space, Berthold lost his life on March 15, 1920. In life, Berthold was never 
able to be repurposed in what was, for him, an incomprehensible present. In death, 
Berthold transitioned from an impossible present, into a reimagined past.  He was buried 
in Berlin’s Invalidenfriedhof, a site which, in the coming years, would serve as the space 
for Manfred von Richthofen’s reburial and subsequent repurposing for a National 
Socialist Reich. 
 
Aviation as a Site of Memory, Meaning-Making, and Mourning 
Aviation had transcended time and space in the years before and during the First 
World War. In the aftermath of war, however, and in a nation where flight was deemed 
illegal, Germans found ways of re-appropriating aviation to render a new kind of time – 
one marked by intense loss, anger, and fear – knowable. The specter of death in cities like 
Berlin, had, by the mid-1920s, become so routine as to almost fade into obscurity. 
Unidentified victims of violent crimes were displayed at police precincts and, according 
to novelist Joseph Roth, were utterly ignored by the public.73 Yet the reburial of Manfred 
von Richthofen in 1925, at Berlin’s Invalidenfriedhof, would be the site of grand public, 
as well as political, ceremony.74 
Despite dying in April of 1918, Richthofen would again serve the social, cultural, 
and political needs of the German people. Five years after the death of Rudolf Berthold, 
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the Richthofen family petitioned to have the remains of Manfred transferred from his 
grave in Flanders to their private family plot in Germany. Politics soon intervened. While 
the family wished to have him buried next to his brother Lothar, the German Defense 
Ministry, hoping to raise the profile of Richthofen’s reburial, persuaded the family to 
locate him in the Invalidenfriedhof in Berlin.75 Richthofen’s reburial in 1925, however, 
was deliberately anchored in a highly idealized past, one that provided more meaning 
than fact. Germany, still searching for stability and answers following defeat in war, and 
the political, economic, and social turmoil that followed, latched on to Richthofen as a 
point of pride; a hero to the German people and an adversary still respected by his 
opponents.  
Richthofen’s death, as it had actually been experienced in the lived present of 
1918, however, was significantly different from the images propagated at the 1925 
reburial. The illustrated cover of the magazine, Simplicissimus commemorating the death 
of Richthofen in May of 1918, could not be starker compared to the one which marked 
the passing of Oswald Boelcke two years’ prior.76  The Heimat scenes of German forests 
which marked Boelcke’s cover, are replaced with a stark, wilted silhouette of a single 
evergreen. Anchored into a foreboding hill is a shattered propeller and upon it, sits a 
black eagle, overlooking a singular grave. Gray fighter planes seem to continue fighting 
in a rambling circle in the distance. Most importantly, there is no body, as Richthofen still 
lay behind enemy lines. There are no classical motifs, there is no Icarus for the masses to 
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mourn, only the ongoing circle of violence and death, and the obliteration of the 
landscape.77 
By contrast, Richthofen’s second funeral in 1925, more closely resembled 
Boelcke’s ornate ceremony in 1916. The privileged deaths of Germany’s aviators were 
again echoed in the repatriation of Richthofen’s body to Berlin. As in the case of Ernst 
Heß, Oswald Boelcke, and Max Immelmann, the fallen aviator was afforded in death 
what so many of his comrades in the trenches were not: a singular, identifiable, and 
momentous burial. The reburial of Richthofen in Berlin offered a space to craft a new 
narrative about Germany’s experience not only in the skies over the Western Front, but 
about the war as a whole. In doing so, Richthofen’s reburial served to repurpose time to 
create a new interpretation of the past in the face of an uncertain present. As a result, 
Richthofen came to represent not only an idealized past - an era when honorable Germans 
jousted in the skies over Flanders, an era marked by individual heroism rather than 
senseless slaughter, an era when ambitious and hyper-masculine aviators seized the 
agency given to them by the machines they controlled - but also the Germany of the 
future. 
In what can only be assessed as a highly propagandized piece, Richthofen’s 
youngest surviving brother, Bolko, writes “the family agreed to this in the knowledge that 
the remembrance and memory of Manfred were not theirs alone, but rather, belonged to 
the entire German people.”78 Bolko’s writing sits awkwardly between two distinct 
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periods: the German defeat of 1918, and the Third Reich of his lived present, in 1933.79 
At once his prose both recalls the events that led to Richthofen’s repatriation to Germany 
in 1925, while echoing the sentiments of an ascendant National Socialist Germany. Field 
Marshal von Hindenburg’s correspondence from 1918 expressed similar emotions: “As 
master of the German flying force, as a model for every German man, he will live on in 
the memory of the German people. May this be a comfort in your grief.”80 
The contradiction of the two Richthofens, that of the living aviator who rose to 
notoriety during the First World War, and the new symbol of a resurgent German 
Luftwaffe fifteen years later, elucidates the complexities of memory, and ultimately, the 
role of memory in serving not the past, but an ever-evolving present. Richthofen, the 
landed baron from an influential, aristocratic family, was a staunch supporter of the 
Kaiser. Unlike Berthold, who lived and ultimately died in the aftermath of Wilhelm II’s 
abdication, Richthofen died before Germany signed an armistice. The timing of 
Richthofen’s death, just before the war turned decidedly against Germany in the summer 
of 1918, created a malleable figure, one who could come to represent a host of cultural 
and political meanings.81 
In the aftermath of the First World War, Richthofen was largely left in the 
wreckage of the conflict. His reburial in November, 1925, opened a conversation within 
                                                     
79 The 1933 re-issue date of Richthofen’s autobiography is immediately telling, and the new introduction 
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German culture, one that could look back on the war and mourn both the loss of a 
singular figure, and the collective loss of the nation. The account of Richthofen’s reburial 
encapsulates this conversation. His reissued autobiography recalls, “All the bells of the 
small Baden city began to sound… And so the whole population, from the oldest man to 
the youngest child who could walk, came to respectfully greet Manfred’s body on 
German soil… The honor guard included men who had been officers in his 
Jagdgeschwader and in the 1st Ulan Regiment. In unbroken succession Berlin’s 
population filed past the coffin the whole day.”82 Here Bolko’s recollection of his 
brother’s reburial is both rooted in a remembered past and in a repurposed present. The 
language used in his account demonstrates the tension between the two narratives. 
Richthofen was, no doubt, welcomed back to German soil by onlookers and his rail car 
procession received significant attention. The description of the crowds as “unbroken” 
and consisting of “the oldest man to the youngest child who could walk,” create the 
narrative of a universally beloved figure. The process of mourning featured in Bolko’s 
narrative is for a hero, not a fully realized human being. Thus, in reburial, Richthofen too 
transcended time, from the living world of chronos, to a future where his death, rather 
than his life, would serve a new generation of Germans. 
The description of Richthofen’s character by Bolko is further dehumanized in the 
final passages of Der Rote Kampfflieger. Manfred is characterized as being usually 
gifted, tenacious, and inspirational. Bolko writes that “Manfred put an unusual amount of 
energy into whatever he did from the days of his youth.”83 During the war, that character 
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inspired his fellow fliers, “all of his subordinates in the Jagdgeschwader had unshakable 
faith in him… he was an example to all who followed him in war.”84 “The harder and 
more difficult the battles became, and the more meaningful the air battle for Germany’s 
destiny, the greater was Manfred’s own sense of responsibility.”85 In these passages, we 
view a Richthofen who was devoid of fear, or anger, or resentment. It is the antithesis of 
the writings of Berthold during the war, who often described fits of depression, sadness, 
and anger over the loss of fellow airmen. Perhaps most ironically, Bolko recites a Latin 
verse featured in Wilfred Owen’s Dulce et Decorum est, saying “And the dulce et 
decorum est pro patria mori that his teachers once preached to him, though not always to 
his joy… became the meaning of the short life of combat that was allotted to him.”86 
The reprinting of Der Rote Kampfflieger in 1933, then, reinforced the “new” 
Richthofen as a symbol of a resurgent Germany. The new edition featured an introduction 
written by Richthofen’s successor as the commanding officer of Jasta 11: the fighter 
pilot, morphine addict, and Nazi, Hermann Goering. Goering, in the introduction of the 
new 1933 edition of Richthofen’s autobiography, re-appropriated the Baron as an 
example for the German people in the new Third Reich. The language used by Goering is 
nationalistic and bombastic. Far from the cold, resigned prose of the newspaper accounts 
reporting Richthofen’s death in 1918, Goering states, “21 April 1933 marks the fifteenth 
anniversary of the day in which Rittmeister Freiherr von Richthofen, at the zenith of his 
glory, met a hero’s death.”87  
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Thus, Richthofen was reanimated rather than remembered. The German air hero 
who returned in the 1920s and 30s bore little resemblance to the cold, calculating pilot 
who died as the First World War turned against Germany in 1918. In his place was a 
proto-Nazi, bent on securing Germany’s place as a leading world power. Goering states: 
“We will hold Manfred von Richthofen as a great symbol. His memory will help us to 
use all means in our power to reach our national goal of again giving Germany an air 
weapon equal to those of other nations, but superior to them in spirit and courageous 
sacrifice, as was the Jagdgeschwader Richthofen in the World War.”88 Richthofen 
himself would likely have not recognized the warped figure he became as Germany grew 
ever-more militaristic in the 1930s. But certain aspects of Richthofen’s character made 
his re-appropriation by National Socialism easier to achieve. Richthofen’s love of 
military discipline, his desire to hunt his victims, his view of war as sport rather than 
violence, and his ability to inspire confidence in his subordinates all resonated with the 
radical right. By removing his human characteristics, his fear of death, and the injuries he 
suffered in combat, National Socialism easily recast the monarchist as a torch bearer for 
National Socialism. Thus, the memory of the Richthofen who died in 1918, was 
repurposed to serve the needs of Germany in 1925 and again, in 1933. 
During the same period, Rudolf Berthold, that other flying hero buried at the 
Invalidenfriedhof, was similarly reanimated, in a changed form, by the Third Reich. 
Streets in Bamberg, his hometown, bore his name as he was extolled as yet another proto-
National Socialist by a regime bent on re-writing the history of its fallen Kaiserreich 
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aviators. Berthold then, joined the ranks of other deceased First World War aviators. Like 
his repurposed fallen fliers, Berthold was not remembered for his vehement defense of 
the Kaiser, but rather for his achievements in the air: that of destroying British and 
French aircraft in the name of the Fatherland. 
The reach of National Socialism also extended to Peter Supf, who moved further 
to the political right. In 1935, he published the Book of German Aviation History in two 
volumes.89 Here again, the specter of Goering appeared in the foreword, mirroring his 
words in the opening to Richthofen’s reprinted autobiography. Supf then combined his 
experiences as an aviator and observer over the Western Front with his innate passion for 
writing. During the Second World War, Supf went on to publish histories extolling the 
success of the new German Luftwaffe as it devastated the European continent 
immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War. Thus, Supf’s two identities 
mutually reinforced each other, and served a popular demand - at least among those of 
right leaning, National Socialist ideologies - for works that celebrated Germany’s 
prowess in the field of military flight. 
 
Conclusion 
New technologies often transcend our perception of space and time. The 
ascendency of powered flight at the beginning of the twentieth century furthered the 
compression of space and time which began with the railroad a century earlier. This 
transformation of time is best accessed historically, through the prism of chronos and 
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kairos as a method of demarcating chronological time and heightened moments of 
decision that were often experienced by aviators. Military flight added a highly 
regimented sense of time, where daily sorties required constant and precise work, military 
aviation created a profoundly exhilarating but brittle identity for Germany’s fliers, one 
which struggled for meaning outside of powered flight. Within the hazards of war, 
aviators also experienced extraordinary moments of kairos where minute decisions could 
mean the difference between life and death. 
The further development of military aviation, in the form of the fighter plane, 
gave pilots an extraordinary sense of agency in a war marked by growing individual 
powerlessness amid incomprehensible carnage. An analysis of both public and private 
writings reveals the degree to which aviators sensed and reacted to different experiences 
of time. Manfred von Richthofen’s hunting discourse, in addition to illustrating great 
privilege, also reveals a command over time, and the ability to heighten one’s senses to 
such a degree that perceived time slows doing. Doing so, for him, creates an advantage 
within the moment of decision. Rudolf Berthold’s private words also illustrates the ability 
of some fighter pilots to slow down time by heightening their sense of it. The “few 
minutes’ work” of his machine guns contrasts starkly with the colorless time spent 
waiting for the confirmation of his success within his moment of kairos. 
Violence then, shapes the perception of time among aviators. This violence was 
only furthered by the technological evolution of aviation during the war. Germany’s 
aviation industrialists also viewed time differently from one another, with generational 
differences often shaping the perception of war’s urgency and the action required of the 
moment. The work by these firms, however, was prodigious. The rapid rate of such was 
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so disorientating as to radically elongate the chronological experience of war for 
Germany’s aviators. In a war which occupied just four years, pilots could be defined as 
“new” and “old” with mere weeks or months separating the two. Thus, lifespans could 
prove correspondingly abbreviated. Kairos and death, then, appear intertwined as a 
marked a transcendent moment, a point where fallen comrades were memorized in 
private photo albums, war diaries, published autobiographies, and even in the changing 
language of Sanke postcards. Death transformed the aviator from the living world of the 
Kampfflieger to the realm of the Fliegerhelden.  
The end of the First World War shattered a highly regimented, organized, and 
knowable, if horrific, existence for the fliers of the German Luftstreitkräfte.  The Treaty 
of Versailles, signed the following year, systematically dismantled Germany’s aviation 
industry. The end of the war, coupled with the end of flight, left men like Berthold utterly 
shocked. His only option was to throw himself back into a conflict that never ceased. In 
that sense, Berthold abandoned his identity as an aviator and transitioned to the only 
comparable role that remained, that of soldier. In repurposing his identity, he served the 
Freikorps against the next wave of “threats” against the Fatherland. His incomprehensible 
present, that of a world devoid of a Kaiser and under perpetual external danger, 
ultimately cost him his life. Peter Supf, the “poet pilot” used his writing skills to draft a 
history of the German Luftstreitkräfte. And those long dead, like Manfred von 
Richthofen, were resurrected both physically and rhetorically. As Berthold passed from 
the world of the living, he too became what Richthofen would soon represent to a new 
generation of Germans: a good National Socialist. 
Germany’s First World War aviators, then, occupied a different space of 
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experience and memory from their fellow Germans. Aviation harnessed both 
technological promise and peril, creating machines that could achieve individualistic 
success while potentially killing those who flew. War hardened the identities created by 
powered flight. It was a mode of existence that ceased to exist with the armistice of 1918. 
And it was a world rendered extinct with the passing of the Versailles Treaty a year 
later.90 When processed through the prism of aviation, the meaning of the war splintered 
into a multiplicity of interpretations by the living: of a struggle that never truly ended, of 
an epoch that demanded authorial intention. For the dead, repurposing was perhaps 
easier, as Germany reanimated rather than remembered its fallen aviators to make sense 
of the loss. Men like Richthofen and Berthold then, embodied the great paradox of 
Germany’s relationship with its First World War aviators. These fliers simultaneously 
represented an idealized past and an unfulfilled future. It is perhaps fitting then, that 
Berthold’s body remained trapped in an unmarked grave - situated in a “neutral” zone 
between East and West Berlin - for four decades of a divided Germany. Berthold’s 
physical purgatory is emblematic of Germany’s historical relationship with its First 
World War aviators; a generation of fliers who lived and died within a nation that 
reimagined them, reburied them, and repurposed them, but never fully realized their 
lived, horrific and, often tragic, reality. 
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CONCLUSION 
Powered flight was a powerfully disruptive force for aviators during a massive 
point of rupture in the wider history of Germany. In the span of just fourteen years, a 
fractious and rapidly industrializing German society sprinted from the spectacle of the 
airship to the specter of the airplane. The diverse range of responses to the airplane 
reflected both the ambiguity of new technologies, as well as the potential power that 
aviation represented. Germans viewed the airplane as everything from a national 
spectacle to a potential threat to the nation. The resulting discourse that grew around 
flight before the First World War, reflected broader cultural markers within Germany, 
and reflected wider anxieties about technological and economic change in the new 
century. 
Aviation also reflected differences between generations, with the resentment of 
Jugend towards their elders evident in the cartoons which depicted flight as just another 
tool for the older guard to threaten the dreams of young Germans. Within this swirling 
array of changes, Heimat culture served as a language which could embrace seemingly 
disparate populations within the country, placing the farmhouse and the zeppelin shed 
side by side within its discourse. Aviation then, represented the theoretical possibilities to 
usher in a new post-national, transcendent age, or a new and terrifying era of rampant 
militarism and slaughter. Aviation was a technological promise that could literally raise 
Germans to the heavens, but it could also kill the very people who sought to harness its 
power. The arrival of war did not end these conversations; it only moved them from a 
space of possibility and rhetoric into the stark relief of reality at a point of rupture and 
crisis. 
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Technologies seldom operate in a vacuum, however, and often feed off other 
existing innovations to further validate their importance. The airplane that went to war in 
the summer of 1914 was at best an embryonic representation of the potential of powered 
flight as a weapon. When the airplane intersected the photographic camera, however, 
both technologies transformed into mutually dependent, and incredibly important tools 
for military planners and aviators alike. 
At the outset of the First World War, military aircraft were incapable of being 
used to deliver weapons over the battlefield. Inefficient engines and light airframes meant 
that an aircraft could barely hoist a pilot and observer aloft in the first weeks of the war. 
Therefore, the only practical use for air power at the time was the observation of enemy 
troop movements over what was, at the moment, a rapidly shifting battlefield. As the war 
of maneuver stalled out in the autumn of 1914 and both sides dug in for a long war of 
attrition, the airplane continued to monitor the construction of defensive fortifications or 
the buildup of men and materiel the would signal an impending offensive. 
By the beginning of the following year, however, the photographic camera had 
become a weaponized tool of war. One such example was the Maschinengewehrkamera, 
or “machine gun camera,” developed by Oskar Messter and built for German aerial 
observation units by the Erneman company in Dresden.1 The camera had been 
weaponized both in form and function, resembling the MG08 machine guns then used by 
aerial observation crews to defend themselves from attack. The airplane could now carry 
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enough weight to lift pilot, observer, camera, and defensive weapons into the air over the 
Western Front. 
The effects of an airplane equipped with photographic equipment was a revelation 
for the battlefield. Previous observation flights relied entirely on the notes taken by an 
observer at altitude and were subject to the limitations of his ability to see the enemy 
through a pair of binoculars, and the accuracy of his note taking while under the duress of 
flying in a harsh environment and, often, under fire. The camera replaced the observer’s 
eyes with high resolution glass plates that captured extraordinary detail and definition of 
the actions of enemy troops on the ground. Observation crews could count, almost to the 
man, the number of enemy soldiers in a particular location and, when placed together 
with a series of photographs, could literally map out sections of the Western Front in 
remarkable detail. The kind of information captured by these crews was invaluable to 
intelligence gathering efforts on the ground. Reports that accompanied these photographs 
noted, in precise detail, the “thickness” and “thinness” of enemy positions, the number of 
new guns moved into an era, or whether the enemy was constructing extra defensives or 
repairing for an attack. Such information was invaluable, and soon both sides worked on 
ways of preventing their adversaries from acquiring it. With those efforts, the fighter 
plane and a new type of aviator, entered the battlefield. 
Aviation, which had always been a dangerous undertaking, further transformed 
the relationship between fliers and killing as the air war progressed. Aviators viewed the 
process of flight itself as an inherently violent struggle, one where the man and machine 
fought against the very forces of nature that were determined to drag them back to earth. 
Losing such a fight often ended in a fatal crash. Thus, airmen like Manfred von 
  285 
Richthofen viewed their first flight as a transformational experience of violence, one 
where survival marked their transcendence from frightened passenger, into seasoned 
pilot.2 The early discourse of flight itself, which encapsulated flight in animalistic and 
frightening terms, embodied the dangers that were embedded in the field of aviation at 
the start of the First World War.  
As the air war progressed and aviation technology improved in its ability to carry 
more weight higher, farther, and faster, aviators experienced new forms of violence that 
moved beyond the confines of the airplane and extended to the battlefield below. For 
observation and later, bombing crews, violence in the air was often an abstract 
experience. Even though an observer’s photographs or reconnaissance notes could help 
plan an offensive, the kind that might kill hundreds of soldiers, aviators did not view their 
actions as part of killing troops on the ground. As technology progressed, these observers 
could later range artillery batteries directly using wireless transmitters. The increasing 
role they played in killing troops on the ground was reflected in squadron newspapers. 
Here, images of overworked and overburdened observers show the strain that 
technological progression placed on their shoulders, as a world-weary observer looked 
out from the pages of his newspaper, encumbered with hundreds of pounds of equipment. 
Still, the abstraction of his task, described with terms like, “ranging, targeting, and 
observing” distanced himself from his actions. Even bombing focused on target areas, 
rather than men. The use of large aircraft for these duties too, placed the observer within 
a discourse of defense, as he was often left to fight off attack from fighter aircraft. 
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The men who occupied the confines of single-seat aircraft represented a new type 
of warrior on the battlefield. Rather than working in teams to utilize the weapons on 
board an aircraft, the fighter pilot, who controlled his aircraft and fired his machine gun, 
was the weapon. Thus, their perspective on violence shifted from an abstract and fleeting 
engagement with the enemy, to a much more personalized mode of killing. Aviation, 
however, disrupted even killing by providing new spaces and new discourses to frame the 
act of killing in new and privileged ways. Rudolf Berthold, who longed to become a 
fighter pilot, and who felt great satisfaction in enacting revenge for fallen comrade, still 
refused to visit the crash site of his victim, citing the ugliness of the sight as his reason to 
ignore the consequences of his actions while still celebrating their results. In stark 
contrast, Manfred von Richthofen gleefully landed at the mangled wrecks of his victims 
to both confirm his victories, and to cut off a souvenir of his victim’s machine as a way 
of marking his success in yet another aerial fight. 
Confirming victories, and the process of knowledge creation that the task entailed, 
created yet another new and abstract discourse around killing; one which counted 
machines instead of men, and which actively incentivized the continued killing of enemy 
airmen by Germany’s fliers. Aviators filled out remarkably detailed reports around the 
events that involved killing another human being in the air. Aircraft serial numbers, 
types, engine types and serial numbers, and an inventory of any equipment on board, 
were part and parcel of German military reports. Such exacting detail signaled a 
hierarchy of importance in killing within military discourse. While an infantry unit might 
report the number of men killed in attack, such close detail was never called for. Thus, in 
the minds of both the military and aviators, a privileged sense of the importance of 
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specific types of killing emerged. Aviators were awarded silver victory goblets for killing 
another airman, and victory tallies were often the top sheet report on German air service 
intelligence briefings. As the war progressed, leaders within the Luftstreitkräfte became 
increasingly concerned, not with how the air war was impacting events on the ground, but 
with the individual victories of its most talented fighter pilots. Even in death, fighter 
pilots received extraordinary attention from the Luftstreitkräfte, as squadrons sent out 
search parties to find downed aircraft and retrieve the bodies of its airmen. The funerals 
afforded to fliers created a privileged sense of dignity in death that was seldom afforded 
to their counterparts on the ground. 
Aviation also created privileged spaces for the expression of regional and national 
identity on the behalf of aviators and the members of their ground crew. These 
expressions reflected the discourse of regional peculiarity embedded within discourses of 
national identity that reached back through the long nineteenth century. Military aviation 
was directly affected by the acrimonious relationship between the kingdoms of Bavaria 
and Prussia. The Royal Bavarian Flying Corps worked to maintain autonomy within the 
wider German air service, as Prussia sought to work, through contractual constraints and 
jurisdictional authority, to strip that autonomy away from the kingdom to the south. This 
power struggle was not in the forefront of the minds of German aviators, but the logistical 
results of the contest were. Bavarian squadrons were often equipped with inferior 
machines built by local firms, as Prussian contracts severely limited the use of aircraft 
constructed to the north. Bavarian pilots often made do with aircraft that were poor 
imitations of their Prussian counterparts, or direct copies of aircraft built by Germany’s 
adversaries. In this sense, regionalism directly affected the course of the air war in 
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Germany. 
Aviation also reflected regional idiosyncrasies by creating new and often 
privileged spaces for the expression of identity. German aviators, like most members of 
the “generation of 1914,” were a product of long reaching discourses in a regionally 
shaped, national history of the Fatherland. Local heroes, mythological characters, and the 
role of the landscape within the flexible discourse of Heimat culture, all contributed to 
one’s perception of their place in the greater narrative of German history, and their role in 
the First World War. All along the Western Front, Bavarian aviators incorporated a 
reciprocal relationship of regional peculiarity and nationalistic discourse that made them 
a part of the German experience while also differentiating themselves from those around 
them. Aviation provided space and privilege that soldiers in the trenches never enjoyed. 
Peter Supf’s squadron, FA 286b constructed a rustic German hunting lodge, replete with 
Bavarian trappings, as well as a Kegelbahn filled with images of mythological gods 
fraternizing with squadron-mates. These expressions extended to the iconography 
displayed on aircraft as well, with personal paint schemes reflecting colors that either 
directly or indirectly reflected Bavarian heritage, as well as personal identity. 
In foreign territory, Bavarian squadrons expressed their identity in broader, more 
nationalistically rooted tropes. In the deserts of Palestine, the process of “othering” 
reversed, from expressing what made Bavarians distinct, to the attributes and infirmities 
that made the local populations in the Middle East different and therefore, inferior, to 
their German counterparts. 304b “Pasha” began othering those in Palestine the moment 
they began training at Oberschleißheim airfield outside of Munich. The logistical 
challenge of brining hundreds of men and tens of thousands of pounds of equipment to 
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the harsh deserts of Palestine embedded a discourse of “othering” in the minds of those 
preparing for the trip. Here again, we see the ways in which the environment shaped both 
the practical use of the airplane as well as its perceived power. Machines designed for use 
in Western Europe were never meant for high temperatures and sandy, dusty 
environments. The need to bring several spares of every part, as well as marking 
locations where German beer would last be found, all served to denote their destination 
as a harsh and alien environment.  
Even military orders, which seemingly deal with the dry details of moving men 
and materiel, take the time to chastise local populations as lazy, or clandestine, or 
dangerous. Once at their airfield near Iraq el-Manshiyeh, the daily operations of 304b 
only served to reinforce the dangers of their environment, with the squadron noting 
multiple crash landings as aviators struggled to deal with setting down skittish aircraft on 
rough, uneven airfields built in the desert. Continual bombardment from the British 
forces in the region, and a failing German line on the Western Front, combined to create a 
mentality of a squadron under siege. Its commanding officer, Franz Walz, earned the 
moniker “the Eagle of Jericho,” for his steadfast devotion to duty under difficult 
circumstances. His nickname representing both German authority and cultural 
appropriation that was commonly seen in the region. Even General von Falkenhayn’s 
farewell address to his men reflected both a sense of German superiority and the narrative 
of constantly fighting a defensive war on foreign soil, as he branded his airmen as the 
“guardians of the Orient.” In defeat, the discourse of nationalism and an inherent sense of 
superiority permeated even internal memos regarding the squadron’s release to go home 
to Germany in 1919. 
  290 
Perhaps the most fundamental disruption created by powered flight was its 
capacity to transform perceptions and experiences of time.  For men like Rudolf 
Berthold, the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 created a split in his perception of 
time, best encapsulated by the Greek words chronos and kairos, which divides time 
between chronological, limitless time, and sharply highlighted moments of decision and 
crisis. Indeed, the war’s utterly distinct and, in many ways, unprecedented nature, both in 
its technological innovations and the scale of its slaughter, became a sharp, lived 
experience of kairos for those who fought. Aviation disrupted this process further by 
compressing space and time in concrete ways, as ever-faster machines propelled men and 
weapons across greater distances in shorter spans of time. 
Flight’s rapid development over the Western Front compressed time in the lives 
of German aviators. Aircraft progressed at such a frighteningly expeditious rate distorted 
time for those who served, dividing Germans from the same chronological generation 
into airmen of the “new” or “old” guard. Living through such progress was a difficult 
task. Airmen trained in 1915 were accustomed to aircraft that would fly at a top speed of 
roughly 85 miles an hour. Just three years later, that speed had almost doubled, with front 
line fighters of 1918 flying at speeds in access of 165 miles an hour. Thus, staying alive 
in an environment where time compressed the lived and perceived realities of airmen was 
exceedingly difficult, and weighed on airmen’s understanding of time. 
Aviation also regimented time into distinct patterns. This sense of war time, the 
chronos experience of morning, afternoon, and evening patrols, gave a sense of structure 
and regimentation to the lives of aviators. Even after being wounded and sent to the 
hospital for a third time, Rudolf Berthold still lamented his absence from the front. This 
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emotion resonated both a sense of duty, but also an attachment to the predictability of life 
as an airman, with its combination of chronos and kairos experiences of time. As aviators 
fell during the war, their deaths marked particular epochs in the air war; the era of 
Boelcke, Immelmann, Voss, and later, Richthofen, all signaled a particular time and 
technological space to those who flew. For those who continued to serve, it seemed as if 
time and death would claim them as well, and a growing sense of fatalism accompanied 
their perception of time and space as a chasm that would eventually swallow every flier 
at the front. 
The end of the First World War shattered this sense of both time and identity for 
many German aviators. For men like Rudolf Berthold, the inability to renegotiate his 
relationship with the system of chronos and kairos time that defined his life for four 
years, led to a perception that the war never ended, but rather, merely changed theaters. 
For him and many others, the First World War bled into the social and political uprisings 
that resulted in violence and bloodshed in the streets of Germany’s cities in 1919 and 
1920. For the airmen who served through the outbreak of the First World War, and its 
four years of slaughter and death, many did not recognize the country they inhabited in 
the postwar period. For Berthold, the threat of Bolshevism fashioned a new enemy for 
him to rage against as yet another threat to the Fatherland. As a member of the Freikorps, 
Berthold struggled to return the Kaiser back to the throne, and his anger and disgust 
towards what his country became was evident in his writings until his death in 1920.  
Airmen following the First World War struggled to find their way into a new 
sense of time that little resembled the world of conflict they had known for four years. 
Before the war, aviation’s influence contributed to important questions regarding German 
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national identity, generational disputes, and the role of technology in shaping society; in 
the essence of how Germany could modernize while retaining its soul. The tenor of these 
conversations shifted dramatically after November 1918. Most Germans were exhausted 
from war, as well as economically and socially devastated from defeat. Over two million 
German soldiers died during the conflict, and another 430,000 civilians perished at home 
as a result of the famine and disease wrought by the blockade of German ports.3 The 
world of post-war Germany seemed to have no place either for aviators, or for the 
airplane itself. If aviation disrupted the social and cultural conversation in Germany 
before the First World War, its own disruption by defeat and the Treaty of Versailles and 
postwar fallout would continue to shape Germany well into the next decade. 
The importance of Germany’s contribution to the field of powered flight was 
evident by the length the victorious powers went to prohibit its development after the 
First World War. Articles 198 through 202 expressly banned German aviation firms from 
constructing aircraft, prohibited German institutions from conducting research in the field 
of aeronautics, and ordering the surrender of all military and naval aeronautical material 
to the Allied and Associated powers. With the stroke of a pen, the entirety of Germany’s 
aviation industry was rendered illegal and, consequently, extinct. German aviation 
industrialists like Ernst Heinkel, began working outside of the country.4 Antony Fokker, 
the Dutch aviation pioneer who designed, or copied, some of the most influential aircraft 
of the conflict, absconded back to his home country of Holland, leaving a trail of unpaid 
bills while taking trainloads filled with aeronautical equipment. Hugo Junkers doggedly 
                                                     
3 Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 337. 
4 See Ernst Heinkel, Stürmisch Leben (Stuttgart: Europäischer Buchklub, 1953). 
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pressed on, convinced that at some point, his all-metal aircraft would find a place in a 
resurgent German aviation industry. Beyond aviation, however, the social and cultural 
landscape of Germany transformed dramatically in the decade following the First World 
War. 
The culture of the Weimar Republic culture little resembled the world of the 
Kaiserreich. Peter Gay famously noted that Weimar largely fostered the culture of the 
“outsiders” of Germany that had been so repressed during the Kaiserreich. Liberals, 
artists, and the Aufklärer, all moved from a submerged discourse to becoming the 
predominant paradigm within cosmopolitan centers like Berlin.5 The German capital was 
remade in the 1920s, and become a revitalized, energetic, and socially open city.6 The 
myriad of fields explored in Weimar exploded; the study of psychology flourished in 
Berlin with the founding of the Psychoanalytic Institute; political research grew under the 
Deutsche Hochschule für Politik. In Hamburg, the Warburg Institute studied art history, 
and the Bauhaus, perhaps the most famous contribution of Weimar culture, created its 
own genre of architectural design. Aviators, who represented the harsh, atonal strains of 
militarism and regimentation, found little cultural signposts to identify with. Largely 
prohibited from flying within their homeland’s national borders, those German aviators 
who survived the war often did not survive the peace, as Lothar von Richthofen, the 
brother of the famous Red Baron, died in a flying accident in the Swiss Alps in the 1920s. 
Weimar culture intensified pre-existing strains of ambivalence toward modernity 
that were present during the Kaiserreich. Indeed, Weimar viewed technological 
                                                     
5 See Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1968). 
6 See Eric Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
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innovation with a far greater degree of fear and uncertainty than had been present before 
the First World War. Films like Metropolis stressed the inhumanity of modern 
industrialism, and the manner in which it cheapened the value of human life. This 
sentiment is reflected in the film’s iconography, such as factory workers who have no 
names and are represented only by numbers. Even the opening scene of the film only 
features a lone passing aircraft, emphasizing the degree to which aviation had faded from 
public consciousness in the aftermath of Versailles. The movie’s storyline reveals a city 
slowly devolving into chaos and hedonism as the machine age continues to rise. Faint 
echoes of the sentiments of Heimat remain at the end of Lang’s masterpiece, with the 
ethos: “between the mind that plans and the hands that build, there must be a mediator, 
and this must be the heart.”7 
The culture of the Weimar Republic, however, also represented a far darker side 
of German intellectual discourse. Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit presented a troubling 
and often amoral method with which to engage with the world - stressing that 
engagement was all that mattered and that ethics were essentially meaningless. The 
political writing of Oswald Spangler’s “Preussentum und Sozialismus” presented the 
intellectual underpinnings for future political distortion. Beneath this philosophical 
tampering was the Vernunftrepublikaner. These Germans represent a large body of 
intellectuals and everyday citizens who neither loved nor loathed Weimar. The 
hyperinflation crisis of 1921 to 1924 created an intense sense of inherent, intractable 
instability within the Republic. The resulting political apathy eventually gave way to 
                                                     
7 Fritz Lang, Metropolis. Film. Directed by Fritz Lang, 1927, Berlin: UFA. 
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resentment and then eventual dismissal of Weimar by the German people. Within this 
space, the rhetoric of the right, and with it, the mentalities of many disaffected aviators, 
would find new resonance.  
It was perhaps telling then, that in 1925, the body of Manfred von Richthofen, the 
defining German aviator at the end of the First World War, was exhumed from his grave 
in Flanders to be reburied in Berlin. The location of Richthofen’s new grave, also 
revealed the political undercurrents behind his reburial. Rather than being placed within 
the Richthofen family plot, the fallen aviator was repatriated to the German capital of 
Berlin. Richthofen’s body, represented a wider discourse that looked back to the First 
World War for meaning, and for many, heroes. Within that discourse aviation maintained 
its place as a technological innovation that served the dual purpose of looking back to an 
idealized past and towards a not yet realized future.  
The timing of Richthofen’s death, in the spring of 1918, also created 
extraordinarily malleable interpretations regarding his life. Having not lived long enough 
to witness defeat, the Richthofen embodied in the man who died at the climactic moment 
of battle in the First World War. As a result, he could represent a wide range of 
discourses, from the emotions of personal loss to nationalistic longing. For Germans 
seeking meaning in the destruction of war, the rise of great men like Richthofen 
demonstrated the manner in which war strengthened the individual against conflict. 
Authors like Ernst Jünger only served to reinforce these ideas with his book, Storm of 
Steel which not only celebrated the crucible of war and violence during the First World 
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War, but openly advocated its repetition with each subsequent generation of Germans.8 
It is clear that the rhetoric of National Socialism resonated with many First World 
War aviators. Franz Walz, the “Eagle of Jericho,” who served on the Western Front and 
later as the leader of 304b “Pasha” in the Middle East, became a police commander 
following the First World War. The regimentation of military life found an easy 
translation to the work of the police force. Later, in the 1930s, Walz joined the resurgent 
Luftwaffe and served in the Second World War, dying in a Soviet prisoner of war camp 
in 1945. While Peter Supf did not actively serve in World War II, it is clear from the 
litany of correspondence he kept between the 1930s and 1940s that he was sympathetic to 
the cause of National Socialism.9 In addition to publishing works of poetry and a history 
of the German Luftstreitkräfte during the First World War, he wrote several “histories” of 
the Luftwaffe’s actions in places like Poland and France while the Second World War 
was ongoing.  
Other noted German aviators, like Hermann Göring, who became one of Jasta 
11’s commanding officers after the death of Manfred von Richthofen, became part of 
Hitler’s inner circle during the Third Reich. Rudolf Hess served in the 7th Bavarian Field 
Artillery Regiment during the First World War before becoming an airman. He later 
served as Deputy Führer under Hitler. Ernst Udet, who survived the war and became a 
stunt flier, would later serve within the ranks of the Nazi party, before eventually 
committing suicide in 1941. Perhaps it is not surprising that Richthofen’s autobiography, 
                                                     
8 See Ernst Jünger, Storm of Steel (London: Penguin, 1961). 
9 , Biographical data from finding aid for Peter Supf, Finding Aid: NL 063, Archiv der Deutsches Museum, 
Munich.  
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Der rote Kampfflieger, which was originally published in 1917, was reprinted eight years 
after his reburial in Berlin. This new edition featured an introduction from Hermann 
Göring, who quickly re-appropriated Richthofen, not as a hero of the past, but as a 
beacon for the future, and the figurehead of a resurgent Luftwaffe that would soon reign 
terror across Europe and Russia at the outbreak of the Second World War.  
The question of why Nazism resonated so intensely with Germany’s First World 
War fliers remains an important point of historical inquiry. The cultural signposts 
engrained within the aviation pilot community, and particularly in fighter pilots: aspects 
of Heimat culture, the expression of a love of nature, of identifying with both the 
landscape and the deep historical traditions of Germany, of intense pride in the 
Fatherland and an exaggerated sense of individual agency, certainly contributed to 
Richthofen’s easy malleability into a National Socialist after death. By coopting the 
imagery that defined so much of Germany’s First World War youth, the National 
Socialist movement could then appeal to that generation while simultaneously coopting 
them as examples of what National Socialism could achieve.  
Aviation then, played an important role, yet again, in the cultural conversations of 
Germany after the First World War. In this second conversation, powered flight became 
an expression of political ideology, and the imposition of power and terror on the 
enemies of the Third Reich. The speed of aviation’s innovation did not cease during 
peace, and only accelerated under the direction of men like Göring. The old aviation 
industrialists, like Ernst Heinkel, would contribute once again to military aviation, as new 
pioneers, like Willy Messerschmitt and Kurt Tank designed a new generation of aircraft 
that would redefine time and space, and reshape perceptions of everything from killing to 
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the ferocity of war itself. 
Perhaps it is appropriate then, that our examination of the disruptive nature of 
aviation in Germany during and after the First World War ends where many Bavarian 
flying careers began, at Oberschleißheim airfield, outside of Munich. The airfield itself 
would represent the intersection of aviation and German history throughout the twentieth 
century. Oberschleißheim airfield was built by royal decree in 1910, an act of governance 
more at home in the nineteenth century than the twentieth. Its architecture was also 
defined by the previous epoch, with modern buildings like hangers and control towers 
designed to model the stylistic cues of royal palaces rather than the utilitarian nature of 
their intended use. The airmen trained at Oberschleißheim would serve on the Western 
Front and in far off locations like Palestine during the First World War. Their experiences 
not only defined their identities as aviators, but specifically as German fliers.10 
Within a space designed to resemble the past, Oberschleißheim was the home of a 
new kind of fighter for the future. It trained and sent men to Flanders and Palestine, and 
perfected training methods that made aviation a more effective and deadly tool on the 
battlefield. And since spaces exist after the wars that shape them, the airfield would house 
the carcasses of warplanes rendered illegal by peace treaty, and slated for demolition. 
Following a period of relentless stagnation, Oberschleißheim was reborn as a center for 
innovation in powered flight, this time to serve the menacing needs of National 
Socialism.  
                                                     
10 See, Flugwerft Schleissheim exhibit, Deutsches Museum at Oberschleißheim in Munich, Germany. 
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During the Second World War, the airfield would continue to train pilots, whose 
sleek metal fighter planes bore Swastikas on their tails that emboldened Germans at home 
and terrified civilian populations abroad. Oberschleißheim also bore witness to Hitler’s 
crimes against humanity, as Jewish prisoners worked to maintain the airfield’s facilities 
after being bombed by American B-17 Flying Fortresses, whose bomb bays carried 
quantities of explosives never imagined in the First World War. Aviation continued the 
disruptive conversation that it began in Germany in 1908. Its manifestation as a fragile 
technology capable of transcending space and time transformed German conversations 
surrounding the potential and perils of new technologies. Its maturation during the First 
World War provided the foundational, if disruptive experience of the lives of thousands 
of fliers, while providing comforting, if illusionary reassurances of continuity to Germans 
at home. In the aftermath of the Great War, aviation’s development temporarily ceased 
while Germans found ways to repurpose its meanings to form new narratives about a 
resurgent Germany. Flight too, would ultimately contribute again, not to the realization of 
the Thousand Year Reich, but to its destruction.  
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